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NATIONAL

INTERESTS

NATIO°NAL

POLICY

F. R.SCOTT

CANADA TODAY

HER NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND NATIONAL POLICY

Canada Today is a condensed analysis of Cana¬
dian conditions and Canadian problems with
special emphasis on those that have a bearing on
Canada’s external relations.

The author describes the most important
economic, political and social factors which deter¬
mine Canada’s national interests and outlook.
He distinguishes the various schools of opinion
within the country, and he particularly emphasizes
the relation between internal forces and external
policy. Here in simple terms are the facts that
explain what is happening in Canada at the
present time.

On the basis of a realistic discussion of Canada’s
national interests, the author examines the possi¬
bilities of co-operation today between Canada and
the other member countries of the British Com¬
monwealth.

F. R. Scott has been for ten years a member of
the faculty of law of McGill University, Montreal,
and is now professor of civil law. He is a member
of the bar, a former Rhodes scholar, and is well
known for his writings on Canadian internal and
external problems. He has several times appeared
before royal commissions and parliamentary com¬
mittees to give evidence on matters relating to
constitutional and legal reform.

This volume is published under the auspices of
the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
an unofficial and non-partisan body which exists
to promote the study in Canada of Commonwealth
and international affairs. The Canadian Institute
has submitted Canada Today Jo the second un¬
official British Commonwealth Relations Con¬
ference, Sydney, Australia, September 1938.

Price
Bound in cloth
Bound in paper

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The Canadian Institute of International Affairs
is an unofficial and non-political body founded in
1928 to promote “an understanding of international
questions and problems, particularly in so far as these
may relate to Canada and the British Empire, and
. . . an understanding of questions and problems
which affect the relations of the United Kingdom
with any other of His Majesty’s Dominions or of
these Dominions with one another”.

The Institute, as such, is precluded by its con¬
stitution from expressing an opinion on any aspect
of British Commonwealth relations or of domestic
or international affairs. The views expressed in
this book are, therefore, purely individual.

CANADA TODAY

A STUDY OF

HER NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND NATIONAL POLICY

F. R. SCOTT

Professor of Civil Law , McGill University

With a Foreword By

E. J. TARR

Prepared for the

British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON TORONTO NEW YORK

1938

Issued under the auspices of the
Canadian Institute of International Affairs

by OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

All rights reserved. No part of
this book may be reproduced in
any form, by mimeograph or any
other means, without permission
in writing from the publishers.

PRINTED IN CANADA

BY THE HUNTER-ROSE CO. LIMITED, TORONTO

FOREWORD

T HE first unofficial conference on British Commonwealth
relations, held at Toronto in September 1933, met less
than two years after the enactment of the Statute of
Westminster. During that conference there were clear indi¬
cations that a new approach to Commonwealth questions
was emerging, an approach which involved a shifting of
emphasis from discussion of the constitutional rights of the
dominions to a search for useful fields of intra-Common-
wealth co-operation.

The period from 1887, the date of the first Colonial Con¬
ference, down to 1931, the date of the Statute of West¬
minster, had been a period of significant constitutional
development in intra-imperial relations. The more im¬
portant colonies had become self-governing dominions, and
the greater part of Ireland had withdrawn from the United
Kingdom to become a member country. The result was a
group of autonomous states—in a word, Empire had become
Commonwealth. The principal concern of Imperial confer¬
ences during that period, especially since the establishment of
the Irish Free State, had been the settlement of constitutional
questions. After 1931 most of the important constitutional
questions that remained had become matters for individual
action, if and when desired, rather than for group considera¬
tion. Such questions, which have already been dealt with by
one or more of the members of the Commonwealth, are the
creation of dominion great seals, the abolition of appeals to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the establish¬
ment by the executive in a dominion of virtually complete
control over the office of governor-general, and the removal
from the domestic law of a dominion of the legal principle of
the supremacy of the Imperial parliament. There doubtless
remain subjects which can be more satisfactorily settled by
mutual agreement. Of these the most pertinent seem to be

Vi CANADA TODAY

various aspects of foreign relations, of which some have
already been raised, such as the right to neutrality and the
right to secession.

Not only has the British Empire changed, but so has the
world in which it exists. When the Toronto conference was
held, Herr Hitler’s appointment as chancellor was only of
seven months’ standing. Since then we have witnessed the
rising power of Germany, Japan and Italy; the break-up of
the Paris peace settlement; the decline of the League; the
change in the balance of power in Europe and in the Far East.

In the light of these changes, both internal and external,
the emphasis must be not upon constitutional adjustments
as we formerly knew them, but upon another problem, that
of discovering to what extent there can be a unity of purpose
and action amongst all the members of the Commonwealth
or, in some cases, groups of members.

A number of questions then present themselves—questions
to which too little attention has been given in the past.
What are the members of the Commonwealth willing to
co-operate for? Is general co-operation of advantage to all
of them, or would their national interests and aspirations be
better fulfilled by a policy of national isolation, by member¬
ship in some regional grouping, or in a revised League of
Nations? Do these alternatives actually exist for all or any
member states of the Commonwealth? If the ultimate an¬
swers given to such questions by member states differ from
each other, can varying degrees of co-operation be developed
without threatening the underlying Commonwealth bond,
and if so, how?

In approaching such questions, the second British Com¬
monwealth Relations Conference is to start with a realistic
discussion of the position of each member country. A paper
is being prepared in each country—in Great Britain, in
Eire, in India and in each Dominion—describing the most
important economic, political and social factors which deter¬
mine its interests and sentiment, and analysing the move¬
ments of opinion amongst its citizens with respect to Com¬
monwealth and international affairs. On the basis of these
statements it is hoped to discover, during the conference,

FOREWORD

vii

those fields of action in which future co-operation between
two or more or all members of the Commonwealth may be
most useful to the member countries, the Commonwealth,
and the world.

The Canadian Institute entrusted the task of writing the
principal Canadian paper to Professor F. R. Scott, of McGill
University. As he himself writes in his preface, his particular
aim has been “to show the relation between internal forces
and external policy”. Thus it is that Canada Today, the
immediate purpose of which is to help in a re-examination of
Canada’s relations with the other states in the Common¬
wealth, deals so largely with Canadian domestic policy.

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, which is
affiliated with all the other Commonwealth institutes, is a
national organization with branches in sixteen of the prin¬
cipal Canadian cities. It is an unofficial and non-partisan
body, which aims to provide and maintain means of informa¬
tion upon Commonwealth and international questions and
to promote the study and investigation of these questions
by means of discussion meetings, study groups, conferences,
and the preparation and publication of books and reports.

None of the Commonwealth institutes is propagandist.
They endeavour to include in their memberships repre¬
sentatives of all important shades of opinion on Common¬
wealth and international affairs. They are precluded by
their constitutions from expressing an opinion on any aspect
of domestic, Commonwealth or international affairs. The
views expressed in this book, as in all Institute publications,
are purely those of the author or others quoted by him.

This volume is a condensed analysis of Canadian condi¬
tions and Canadian problems that have a bearing on
Canada’s external relations. For a more detailed discussion
of similar questions the reader is referred to the publications
listed in the bibliography in this book and especially to
Canada Looks Abroad, by R. A. MacKay and E. B. Rogers,
which was published two months ago under the auspices of
the Canadian Institute by the Oxford University Press
(Toronto, London, New York). Canada Looks Abroad deals
with the geographic, economic and demographic background

viii CANADA TODAY

of Canadian policy at greater length than does this volume.
It then goes on to discuss the historical development of
Canada’s relations with other parts of the Empire, with the
League of Nations, with the United States, the Far East and
the U.S.S.R. One chapter deals with defence; a section is
concerned with constitutional questions; one chapter de¬
scribes the machinery through which external affairs are
actually conducted; and others discuss the problems of
parliamentary control of policy, the power of Canada to con¬
clude treaties and give effect to them, and the question of
neutrality. The final section is given to discussions of four
alternative external policies: the present non-committal
policy which has evolved slowly over a long period; non¬
intervention, or “isolation”; Commonwealth solidarity, or
a “British front”; and collective security. The book also
contains about sixty-five pages of documents expressing
official policy on various aspects of external affairs and the
views of political leaders on broad issues.

The National Council of the Canadian Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs wish to express their appreciation of the
service rendered by Professor F. R. Scott in writing Canada
Today. They also desire to record their gratitude for the
invaluable assistance rendered by those many members of
the Canadian and other Institutes who criticized the first
draft of Mr. Scott’s study.

E. J. TARR, President,

Canadian Institute of
International Affairs.

Winnipeg, June 13, 1938.

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

T HIS short survey of Canadian conditions and opinions
was prepared at the request of the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs as the principal Canadian paper
for the second British Commonwealth Relations Conference
which is to be held at Sydney, Australia, in September 1938^
My aim has been, following the conference agenda, to de¬
scribe the most important economic, political and social
factors which determine Canada’s national interests and
outlook, to distinguish the various schools of opinion within
the country, and particularly to show the relation between
internal forces and external policy. Limits of time and space
have prevented a more extensive analysis of the many ques¬
tions touched upon. Where popular opinions were being
considered I have tried, though fully aware of the diffi¬
culties, to give a three-dimensional rather than a two-
dimensional picture; to show, that is, not only what the
a tematives are but also the degree of their support among
the people and of their harmony or conflict with underlying
forces. Throughout I have attempted to exclude common
assumptions about Canada and the Commonwealth and to
examine the facts objectively, but I am conscious that in the
last resort even the so-called objective analysis rests un¬
avoidably upon personal choice and estimate. The paper is
a photograph of social facts rather than an attempt to
answer the questions raised. Other points of view, and more
detailed reports on special topics, will be presented to the
conference in the Canadian supplementary papers.

The first draft of Canada Today, under the title “Canada
an d the Commonwealth , was written in the summer/of
1937 and was circulated for comment to the branches of the
Canadian Institute of International Affairs and to many
individuals at home and abroad. I am greatly indebted to the
study groups and to the individuals who read the draft_

x CANADA TODAY

their names are too numerous to mention—-for their substan¬
tial assistance whether in the form of criticism or of new
material. As far as possible I have embodied their sugges¬
tions in the text. In particular I wish to thank the members
of the Research Committee and the secretariat of the
Canadian Institute for their help in the work of revision and
in the details of publication. crwi^r

F. R. bCOl I.

McGill University,

Montreal, June 4, 1938.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Foreword, by e. j. tarr . v

Author’s Preface..

CHAPTER

I. The Influence of Geography .... l

Boundaries Internal Geographic Divisions—Distribu-
tion of Population—Effects of Geography.

II. The Population of Canada.13

Growth of the Population—Religious Affiliations—Popu-
lation and Immigration—Present Movements in Popula¬
tion—Assimilation of Immigrants—Future Growth of
Population.

III. The Nature of the Canadian Economy . . 27

Development of the Economy—Transportation System—
External Debtor and Creditor Position—External Trade
—Canadian Trade Agreements—Natural Resources—

The State and Economic Life—Standards of Living—

Labour and Farmer Organization in Canada.

IV. Political Parties.61

Liberal Conservative — Social Credit — Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation—Other Groups.

V. The Nationalist Movement in French

Canada.69

Basis of French-Canadian Nationalism —Union Nationale.

VI. Constitutional Problems. 75

Judicial Revolution—Divergence between Constitutional
Law and National Development.

VII. The Growth of Canadian National Feeling 83

VIII. Canada’s Defence Problem.87

Diplomatic Defences—Military Defence of Canadian
Territory—Preparation for Defence of the Common¬
wealth or of the League.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

IX. Canada’s External Associations . . .

Associations with the Commonwealth—Associations with
the United States—Canada and the League of Nations—
Associations with Other Countries.

X. Some Advantages and Disadvantages of
Membership in the Commonwealth .

XI. The Problem of Neutrality . . • • •

Emergence of the Problem—Confusion of Opinion in
Canada—Advantages of Clarification.

XII. Present Objectives of Canada’s External
Policies .

Political—Economic.

XIII. Co-operation in the Commonwealth

Bibliography ... 1 .

Index .

Maps and Charts

Distribution of Population.

Physiographic Divisions of North America

Physiographic Divisions of Canada

Net Production, 1935 .

page

113

120

130

142

153

157

CHAPTER I

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY

C ANADA’S geographical position and structure vitally
affect her external relations as well as her internal or¬
ganization. Externally the predominant factor is her
isolation from every country save the United States; intem-
ally geography has divided the country into a number of
distinct regions, widely separated and difficult to weld into
a single political or economic framework.

BOUNDARIES

Canada occupies the northern half of the continent of
North America, a total area of 3,694,863 square miles, or 27
per cent, of the area of the British Commonwealth. Her
boundaries, except in the remote north, are now settled.
Eastward lie the Atlantic and the “coast of Labrador”,
Newfoundland’s mainland territory, the limits of which were
defined by the Privy Council decision of 1927. To the south
is the United States boundary, 3,987 miles long, of which
2,198 are on water and 1,789 on land. 1 To the west is the
Pacific coast and the Alaskan boundary, the latter being
some 1,500 miles of additional United States frontier. North¬
ward Canada disappears in a sector of ice, the radii of which
she has decided shall be the meridians of 60° and 141° west
longitude. No formal international recognition has yet been
given to the northern limits but neither has there been any
challenge to the Canadian claims. 2

For all practical purposes, Canada has frontier contacts
with the United States alone. The Labrador boundary, the
solitary land frontier not separating Canada from United
States territory, runs through an uninhabited waste. The

iFor a full description of the boundary see Wilgus, William J., Railway Interrelations
of the United States and Canada (Toronto, 1937), p. 4.

2Norway, however, registered her general objection to the sector principle when ad¬
mitting Canada’s sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands in 1930. See despatch in prefix
to Statutes of Canada , 1931.

2 CANADA TODAY

island of Newfoundland, which occupies a strategic position
in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, is at the moment a British de¬
pendency, having given up its dominion status. Canadian
intercourse with it is not extensive, though it furnishes essen¬
tial supplies of iron ore to the steel mills of Nova Scotia, and
is an important link in the chain of imperial communications
as a landing-stage for trans-Atlantic cables and air-lines.
Halifax, the easternmost large Canadian port, is 2,500 miles
from Liverpool; Vancouver, the westernmost, is 4,200 miles
from Yokohama.

The distance of Canada from Europe, however, has not
meant an absence of world communications. The St. Law¬
rence to the east forms a national gateway through which
travels a great part of Canada’s total world trade. Van¬
couver has become an increasingly important outlet for trade
not only with the Far East but with Great Britain and
Europe via the Panama Canal. The Hudson Bay route,
though still but slightly used as an outlet for grain to Europe,
serves to remind Canadians that their fortunes are linked to
the high seas. Only two out of the nine Canadian provinces
are without coast.

INTERNAL GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS

Canada is a nation that in many respects has been built
despite geography. The geographical obstacles she has had
to overcome have been very serious. On the other hand it is
often pointed out that the present Dominion is, in rough out¬
line, a natural response to the geographical relationship be¬
tween the interior continental plain, the Canadian Shield,
and the vast waterways of the St. Lawrence River, the Great
Lakes, the less known “great lakes” of the west and north
and the connecting rivers. On this extraordinary system of
water transport was based first the fur trade, next the eastern
lumber trade, then the wheat trade. The oft-repeated state¬
ment that the “natural lines” of communication and trade
for Canada run north and south and that the east-west
structure is a costly piece of artificiality is true only in part.
Most Canadian economists would say that the east-west
communication has much in it that is “natural”. Compass

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY 3

courses for trade are often irrelevant: there are many de¬
terminants, minor and major, and of these it is sufficient to
point out the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system as the chief.
On it, despite geographical difficulties, has been forged the
economic and political system of the country.

_ The inhabited part of the Dominion falls into five main
divisions. To the east are the maritime provinces of Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. They are
a country of forests, hills and streams, with agricultural land
suitable only for small-scale operations. Minor industries,
lumbering, mixed farming and fishing constitute the princi¬
pal economic interests of the population. The only large
industrial undertakings are the coal mines and steel mills in
Nova Scotia. The population is mostly British, and has a
strong local patriotism. There are important French minori¬
ties, particularly in New Brunswick, where they constitute
one-third of the population. These provinces are separated
from the rest of Canada by ranges of mountains, and by the
American boundary which cuts far north along New Bruns¬
wick to form a pronounced salient.

The St. Lawrence and Lower Lakes region covers the
southern part of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Here
is concentrated 60 per cent, of the population and 80 per cent,
of the manufacturing activity of the Dominion. 1 Montreal
and Toronto are the chief financial and industrial centres.
In economic interests these two provinces are very similar,
combining mixed agriculture with extensive operations in
industry, water-power, forestry and mines, all within a com¬
paratively short distance of the St. Lawrence waterways
system and the Great Lakes. But in racial and religious
background they are quite distinct, Quebec being 80 per
cent. French and Catholic, while Ontario is 75 per cent.

iThe following table shows the regional distribution of the population of Canada,
according to the census of 1931:

Inhabitants

Per cent, of

(1931)

Dominion Total

Maritime Provinces.

1,009,103

6,305,938

2,353,529

694,263

13,953

9.73

60.77

22.68

6.69

.13

Ontario and Quebec.

Prairie Provinces.

British Columbia.

Yukon and Northwest Territories.

4 CANADA TODAY

British and Protestant. In degree of development they also
differ, industrial progress being much further advanced in
Ontario, while Quebec has clung longer to her peasant agri¬
culture.

The third section is the great prairie plain, the northern
extension of the interior continental plain, out of which have
been created the three prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskat¬
chewan and Alberta. This area is separated from eastern
Canada by some 800 miles of sparsely inhabited country
north of Lake Superior. It is still impossible to motor from
Ontario to the west without going through the United States.
The soil and climate here make the large-scale production of
wheat the principal activity, though other field crops are of
importance. A variable rainfall, particularly in southern
Saskatchewan and Alberta, and uncertain factors such as
frost, hail and insect pests make for large variations in the
annual production. Wheat, which is the principal cash crop,
has ranged from a record high of 566,726,000 bushels in 1928
to a low of 159,000,000 in 1937, with corresponding vari¬
ability of income. The population in this area is the most
mixed of any in the Dominion, having been augmented for
the greater part by immigration during the earlier years of
the present century; only about 49 per cent, are British by
racial origin. 1

The prairies are bounded on the west by the Rocky
Mountains. On the Pacific slopes of the Rockies lies the
fourth of the geographical divisions of Canada, British Col¬
umbia. This westernmost section consists mostly of moun¬
tains, with considerable forest, fishery and mineral resources,
but with little agricultural land save in the valleys. Forestry,
mining, fishing and farming are the main activities. The
racial composition of the population is mostly British, but
there are important Oriental minorities which are denied the
franchise and constitute unassimilated groups.

To the north of the more inhabited portions of Quebec,
Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan lies the great Cana¬
dian Shield, sometimes called the Pre-Cambrian Shield.
This is a vast outcropping of crystalline rock which stretches

lAs shown in the 1936 census, Canada Year Book , 1937.

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY

from Labrador to the Mackenzie River, covering an area of
some 2 x /i million square miles, or 65 per cent, of the entire
country. It is a great expanse of lakes, rivers, muskeg
and forests, containing little arable land, but possessing,
besides its forest resources of timber, pulp-wood and fur,
large deposits of precious and base metals. Its uniform
geological structure and natural resources provide a certain
geographic and economic unity in northern Canada.

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

The Canadian population has hitherto grouped itself in
the first four of these main divisions for reasons which are
largely physiographical. Nowhere does settlement extend
northward to any great depth, so that the entire population
has been strung out along the American border in a strip
nearly 4,000 miles long. More than nine out of every ten
Canadians live within 200 miles of the border, and more
than half within 100 miles. 1 For many years it seemed as
though this distribution of population would be permanent,
and that Canadians would be unable to occupy more than
the southern fringe of their vast domain. Two developments
of recent years have to some degree caused a revision of this
idea. The first is the opening up of the rich mineral deposits
in the Canadian Shield. Great developments have occurred
in these mining regions in the past ten years, and new towns
have sprung into existence where formerly there was but
empty wilderness. This has deepened the area of settlement,
and caused a further shift in the economic balance away from
agriculture. In a psychological sense it is tending to unify
the country by giving a new outlet to the north for capital,
ambition and talent; the old advice, “Go west, young man,
go west”, has become, “Go north, young man, go north”.
At the same time the Canadian Shield is unlikely to support
a large permanent population. Hydro-electric works, the
production of pulp and paper and the development of min¬
eral resources will provide for a small fixed population;
but any larger movements will be nomadic.

lMacKay, R. A. and Rogers, E. B., Canada Looks Abroad (Toronto and London,
1938), p. 12.

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY 7

The other development which is having a similar effect on
a smaller scale is the opening up of new areas of settlement
in the Peace River district of Alberta and British Columbia,
and in northern Saskatchewan. Here good soil extends far
to the north, and temperature and rainfall are suitable for
growth during the short summer season. The breeding of
new types of wheat such as Marquis and Reward, which
ripen early and so escape autumn frosts, has been one of the
great achievements of the Department of Agriculture at
Ottawa; it has made possible the continuous northward
extension of agricultural settlement on the prairies.

Scientific agriculture and new mining fields are making
Canadians look northward. The aeroplane and the radio
make contacts with civilization possible for remote settle¬
ments. Canada as a thin ribbon of population across a con¬
tinent is still a fact, but the opportunities for pioneering in
the north are increasing and the awareness of their existence
helps to develop and unify the national consciousness.

EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHY

The geographical divisions of Canada are responsible for
many of the economic, political and social characteristics of
the Dominion. The building of national unity on such a long
and narrow base would be a task of great difficulty even if
additional divisive influences such as race, religion and his¬
torical tradition were absent. The Maritime Provinces had
a longer history as separate British colonies than they have
yet had as provinces of the Dominion. Their sense of iden¬
tity, distinct from Canada, is still strong; their economic
ties would naturally be more with their geographical neigh¬
bours, the New England states, than with central or western
Canada. They do not feel they have received the full bene¬
fits of political union since Confederation, for the tariff wall
has cut them off from their natural markets and forced them
to become an outlying, almost remote, settlement of an
economy concentrated to the west. Many of their sons and
daughters have been forced to migrate south and west to find
their livelihood: indeed, the Maritimes play the part of the
Canadian Scotland, exporting talent which achieves a

CANADA TODAY

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY

disproportionate share of important positions in Canadian
(and American) political, educational and industrial life, but
leaves behind a sense of stagnation and loss.

Geography gives Quebec and Ontario similar economic
opportunities and interests which offset to some extent their
racial and religious differences. Both provinces are the
centres of protectionist thought, for in both live the manu¬
facturers who benefit most from the tariff. The Prairie
Provinces, predominantly suppliers of a single commodity
which must be sold on a world market, are naturally inclined
to free trade so as to be able to buy cheaply their agricultural
machinery and domestic supplies; their dependence upon
the eastern capital which controls railways and banks makes
them lean to political radicalism and new experiments,
particularly in times of depression. British Columbia, facing
the Pacific, containing a considerable Oriental population,
and separating the United States from her Alaskan territory,
is most conscious of Canada’s position in the Pacific and of
the serious problems that would arise should war occur in
that area, even if Canada were neutral.

Canada’s climate, a consequence of her geographical posi¬
tion, affects the life, character and economic development
of the country very greatly. The climate is bracing and
healthy, but the variations of temperature and the long
winters impose additional costs on transportation and con¬
struction ; make for a short growing season and for problems
of seasonal unemployment; and limit the agricultural pro¬
duce to the range of north temperate fruits, grains and
vegetables. Industrial processes requiring tropical or semi-
tropical produce must thus rely on imports.

It was geography, as well as race, which made Canada a
federal rather than a unitary state. No Dominion cabinet
can be formed except on a federal basis, giving representa¬
tion to each of the main divisions of the country. The
Canadian Senate is composed of 24 senators from each of the
four divisions of the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario and the
western provinces—a method which blends geography and
race. Royal commissions must be appointed, the civil ser¬
vices staffed, and political patronage expended, in accordance

10 CANADA TODAY

with sectional and racial divisions. The twenty per cent,
of the population which is neither British nor French, how¬
ever, has little representation in the Dominion or provincial
legislatures or administrative services.

Geography has laid upon the Canadian economy the in¬
escapable burden of heavy transportation costs. The price
the Dominion has had to pay to create an economic and
political unity against great natural obstacles is to be seen
in her 43,000 miles of railway, her canals, highways and
telegraphs. Not all of this is chargeable against the effort to
overcome geography: some of it, especially much of the
railway mileage, is to be attributed to simple lack of intelli¬
gence in high places or in low, some of it to the recklessness
of pioneer optimism and some to the corruption that always
attends large-scale construction projects in a new country
where the social controls are weak. However it has arisen,
this overhead debt lies heavily upon the economy.

Geography, finally, makes Canada a North American na¬
tion. This simple and obvious fact has hitherto been an
unconscious rather than a conscious influence upon Canadian
life and thought, so strong have been the sentimental ties
binding Canadians to Europe, particularly to Great Britain,
and so live has been the fear that to turn attention from the
old world would mean absorption by the United States.
Today those ties are less strong and the fear less alive. The
waves of immigration have ceased, and the children of immi¬
grants have not the European memories of their parents.
In 1911 a reciprocity treaty with the United States overthrew
a government because the people believed it would mean
annexation; in 1935 a new treaty, less extensive but of
similar appearance, was negotiated with the approval of
every political party in Canada. Canadians are beginning
to talk of themselves as “North Americans”, which formerly
they seldom did. 1 Many factors have hastened the accep-

lSee, e.g., Canada, An American Nation by J. W. Dafoe (New York, 1935), pp. 5-6.
An editorial of March 13, 1938, in Le Devoir, a leading French-Canadian daily in Mont¬
real, points out with approval the development of the North American viewpoint amongst
English Canadians; “Un journal £t sympathies conservatrices, 4 tendences imp^rialistes,
le Journal d’Ottawa, n’ecrivait-il pas ces jours-ci, au cours d’un article sur I’avenir du parti
conservateur, une fois M. Bennett a sa retraite; %’h4ritage ideologique de ce continent
nord-am6ricain difffcre du tout au tout de celui du continent europ6en?’ En d'autres termes,
nous sommes un peuple d’Am^rique, nos probl£mes sont d’Am^rique, qu’on nous laisse la
paix avec les problSmes particuliers de 1’Europe ; ces ont les siens, et nous avons les ndtres”

Courtesy of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics

Physiographic Divisions of Canada

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY

12 CANADA TODAY

tance of this position, but the underlying influence has
been geography. Moreover, in a world constantly on the
verge of war, geographical isolation assumes an unwonted
attraction.

CHAPTER II

THE POPULATION OF CANADA

C ANADA on the average map appears as a large un¬
broken block of red, thus creating the impression that
the country is both united and British. A closer in¬
spection of physiographical features has shown how divided
are the several sections of the country. An examination of
the racial elements in the population will reveal a similar
lack of unity.

GROWTH OF THE POPULATION

Of the aboriginal races, there are about 6,000 Eskimos and
123,000 Red Indians surviving. The two minorities are
treated as wards of the Dominion, and do not possess citi¬
zens’ rights. 1 The first European settlers were the French,
many of whom came from Normandy and Brittany, an¬
cestors of the French Canadians who now number approxim¬
ately 3,300,000 or 30 per cent, of the population. British set¬
tlers (excluding the traders in Hudson Bay who came about
the same time as the main wave of French Canadians) arrived
first in Acadia, the original Nova Scotia, which was ceded
to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and which
received a considerable influx of New Englanders prior to
the American Revolution. That struggle sent to Canada
large numbers of United Empire Loyalists, whose influx
created the provinces of New Brunswick and Ontario, and
the pro-British sentiment of whose descendants today often
proves keener than that of many a later British immigrant.
The first census after Confederation, taken in 1871, showed a
population of 3,486,000, distributed racially as follows: 2

60.55 per cent.
31.07 per cent.
8.39 per cent.

British

French

Others

UJnless, in the case of the Indians, they fought in the world war. Other disfranchised
minorities under Dominion or Provincial laws, or both, are Doukhobors, Chinese, Japanese,
and Hindus.

2This census covered only the four original provinces of Canada—Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario. Canada Year Book , 1937, pp. 122-3.

14 CANADA TODAY

Then came the building of the C.P.R., the opening of the
Canadian west, and the adoption of a policy of attracting
immigrants indiscriminately. Canada, like the United States,
became a melting-pot into which were poured many kinds of
human material. The process did not stop until the world
depression began. The population grew to 5.37 millions in
1901 and 10.37 millions in 1931; today (1938) it is estimated
at 11.2 millions. But now the racial proportions are altered;
the British element has steadily declined since 1871, while
the “Others” have increased. The process of change is
shown by the following table:

1871
per cent.

1881
per cent.

1901
per cent.

1911
per cent.

1921
per cent.

1931
per cent.

British.

French. . . .
Others.

60.55

31.07

8.39

58.93

30.03

11.03

57.03

30.71

12.28

54.07

28.51

17.40

55.40

27.91

16.68

51.86

28.22

19.93

If the 1931 figures are broken down into the dominant
racial groups, then we find that the French is the largest.
The order is:

Origin 1

Number (1931)

French.

. 2,927,990

English.

.2,741,419

Scottish.

. 1,346,350

Irish.

. 1,230,808

German.

. 473,544

Scandinavian.

. 228,049

Ukrainian.

. 225,113

Hebrew.

. 156,726

Dutch.

. 148,962

Polish.

. 145,503

Indian and Eskimo.

. 128,890

Italian..

. 98,173

lAs the figures are based on paternity there is actually more intermixture than they
suggest. See Hurd, W. B., Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People, Census
monograph No. 4 (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, 1938) (to be included in Vol.
XII of the Seventh Census of Canada, 1931).

THE POPULATION OF CANADA 15

The population trend as indicated by the number of
children under 1 year of age is as follows (1931):

Total

Under 1 year

Per 1,000

British.

5,381,071

86,202

French.

2,927,990

73,000

German.

473,544

10,066

Scandinavian.

228,049

4,290

Ukrainian.

225,113

5,229

Hebrew.

156,726

2,192

Polish.

145,503

3,375

It will be noticed how low is the British reproduction rate
relative to that of other groups.

The distribution of the racial groups within the country
varies greatly. The British elements are strongest in the
Maritimes, Ontario and British Columbia: of those sections
they constitute approximately 70 per cent., 75 per cent, and
70 per cent, respectively. Further, persons of British descent
usually occupy the most influential positions in politics,
religion and education, outside Quebec, and in finance and
industry throughout the country. Their power to control
the destinies of Canada is therefore very much greater than
their numbers would indicate; also, their cultural influence
on immigrants of other racial stocks is disproportionately
strong. The French are concentrated largely in Quebec, of
whose population they form 80 per cent.; but they are now
spread far more generally throughout other provinces than
was formerly the case, the principal settlements being in
eastern and northern Ontario, New Brunswick, and the
Prairie Provinces. Whereas in 1871 there were only 153,123
or 14 per cent, of the French Canadians outside Quebec, in
1931 there were 657,931 or 22 per cent. 1 This fact is a power¬
ful deterrent to the separatist movement that has recently
been revived by certain groups in French Canada. Of the

lSee Anderson, Violet (ed.), World Currents and Canada's Course (Toronto, 1937), p. 121.
It is also estimated that there are at least 1,500,000 French Canadians living in New England,
thus showing that the north-south pull for French-Canadian emigrants from Quebec has
been stronger than the east-west pull. In 1930 there were in the United States 264,361
French Canadians born in Canada.

(

16 CANADA TODAY

2,067,725 persons of non-British, non-French extraction
nearly 60 per cent, were confined to the three Prairie Pro¬
vinces. The Oriental group, though small in number
(Chinese 46,519; Japanese 23,342, 1931), are almost all on
the Pacific coast and constitute a special minority since they
are denied the franchise and are not treated on a plane of
equality with other citizens. Finally, it is worth stressing
the point that half the people of Canada today, if they look
back to an ancestral “mother country , find it elsewhere
than in the British Isles; the 51.86 per cent. British of 1931
have become less than 50 per cent, by 1938. Moreover, of
the persons classified as British an unspecified number are
American settlers of British extraction, other than United
Empire Loyalists, whose mother country is really the United
States. In 1931 only 14 per cent, of the total population had
been born in the British Isles. 1

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

To the internal divisions in Canada resulting from geo¬
graphy and race must be added those of religion. The follow¬
ing table shows the number of Canadians in each of the
principal religious groups, and the proportion each group
bears to the total population of the country: 2

Religion

Total Population
(1931)

Percentage of Total
Population (1931)

Roman Catholic.

4,285,388

41.3

United Church of Canada..

2,017,375

19.4

Anglican.

1,635,615

15.8

Presbyterian.

870,728

8.4

Baptist.

443,341

4.3

Lutheran.

394,194

3.8

Jewish.

155,614

1.5

Greek Orthodox.

102,389

1.0

Others.

472,142

4.5

l Canada Year Book, 1936, p. 118.

2 Ibid., pp 116-7. A more complete table is to be found in MacKay and Rogers, op. cit.,
p. 64.

THE POPULATION OF CANADA

If the Protestant sects are classed together, they make up
54.9 per cent, of the total population, as against 41.3 per
cent. Roman Catholic and 3.8 per cent, others. The Roman
Catholics are 66.5 per cent. French Canadian, 8.9 per cent.
Irish, 4.1 per cent. English, 3.6 per cent. Ukrainian and 3.5
per cent. Scottish.

Religion exerts a very large influence upon Canada’s
domestic and external affairs, particularly in these days when
the “conflict of ideologies” brings everyone face to face in
politics with fundamental moral and ethical alternatives.
The Catholic and the Protestant interpretations of domestic
and international events often differ widely. Thus the
French Roman Catholic element in Canada was sympathetic
to Italy in the Abyssinian War and Catholic opinion gener¬
ally has supported Franco in Spain. Three delegates of the
Spanish government were driven out of Montreal by or¬
ganized bands of students when they attempted to speak in
November, 1936, but the delegate of the rebels was officially
received by the mayor in February, 1938. The Catholic
Church is naturally very fearful of the power and influence of
Moscow, and is no friend of a democracy which tolerates
freedom of speech for those whom it calls “communists”. 1
The authoritarian character of the Catholic Church makes it
more lenient to the doctrine of fascism than the Protestant
churches would be, and it is teaching a form of “corporatism”
in Quebec, based on Papal encyclicals, as a remedy for social
and economic ills. Because 66 per cent, of the Catholics in
Canada are French Canadian, the Church tends to be isola¬
tionist in foreign policy and is inclined to be distrustful of
the League of Nations.

These attitudes within Canadian Catholicism are fre¬
quently in sharp contrast to those adopted by the various
Protestant Churches. The Protestant pulpits may vary in
their emphasis on particular policies, and, in typical Pro¬
testant fashion, they speak with many voices, but their
general influence in foreign affairs is against isolation and in

Hn 1937, shortly after the Dominion parliament repealed the law making the Com¬
munist party illegal, the Quebec Legislature adopted the Padlock Act under which the
Attorney-General can order the closing of houses of suspected. Communists without judicial
authorization, and can seize and destroy, also without judicial warrant, any communistic
literature which is being printed or circulated.

U 1

18 CANADA TODAY

favour of active Canadian support of the League and the
Commonwealth. In domestic matters they emphasize, more
than do the Catholics, the value of state control and social
legislation to remedy economic evils, and oppose any
changes in parliamentary government that savour of dic¬
tatorship from the “right” as well as from the left . In
some parts of Canada, as in the United States, an evangelical
type of politico-religious revival can win much support,
social credit was given to the people of Alberta in this man¬
ner through Mr. Aberhart’s “Prophetic Bible Institute”,
and the British Israelite movement finds some support from
certain elements in the population.

POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION

Recent studies of the effects of immigration upon the
growth of Canada’s population have led to some important,
if tentative, conclusions. 1 While it would be dangerous to
accept all the findings as final and complete they are suffi¬
ciently exact to render necessary a revision of the popular
idea that every new immigrant means an increase of one in
the size of the total population, or that Canada, because of
her “vast resources” and “great open spaces”, can readily
absorb a large number of new immigrants.

Briefly, the facts appear to show that over the period
1851-1931 the total immigration was about equalled by the
amount of emigration, mostly to the United States, so that
in fact the net result was largely a substitution of foreign-
bom settlers (including British) for native-born Canadians.
It has been demonstrated 2 that if there had been no emigra¬
tion during those years the Canadian population would be
at least as large as, and probably larger than, it is today, even
if there had been no immigration from abroad at all. The
following table gives some idea of the way the process worked
during the decade 1921-1931: 3

1A convenient summary of the evidence, with full references to sources, will be found
in the Canadian Memorandum No. 1, presented to the International Studies Conference
of 1937 by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, on Canada and the Doctrine oj
Peaceful Change, edited by H. F. Angus. (Mimeographed.)

2See Angus (ed.), op. cit., p. 63.

*Canada Year Book, 1936, p. 107.

THE POPULATION OF CANADA

Population, Census 1921. 8,787,949

Natural Increase, 1921-1931 (est.). 1,325,256

Immigration, 1921-1931 1 . 1,509,136

Total. 11,622,341

Population, Census 1931. 10,376,786

Emigration, 1921-1931 (est.). 1,245,555

Net Immigration, 1921-1931. 263,581

In that decade, for every five persons coming into the
country, four went out. At the same time unemployment in
Canada increased by some 270,000. 2

It would be improper to conclude that over the long period
immigration was the sole cause of the emigration. There
are many attractions in the United States, such as higher
wages, which invite Canadians to move south, and Cana¬
dians have been exempted from the quota restrictions applic¬
able since 1921 to other immigrants. Few immigrants settled
in the Maritimes or Quebec, yet there was considerable
emigration from these sections. It appears, however, that
both migrations occurred together, and there is evidence to
suggest that the relationship of cause and effect existed to
some degree. 3 The waves of immigration are found to pre¬
cede, not to succeed, emigration: the emigrants went largely
from occupations reinforced by immigrants; the immigrants,
being in large part single adult males between 20 and 35
years old, were better fitted for work at lower wage levels
and <hence were more attractive to Canadian employers
seeking low costs.

This emigration of Canadians to the United States, it
should be noted, is not all loss, from the Canadian point of
view. The presence of so many people of Canadian antece¬
dents in the States contributes to the understanding between
the two countries. A good many Canadian emigrants hold
positions of influence in American business and in the pro¬
fessions. The number of Canadian-born persons living in
the United States in 1930 was 1,280,000: of these 264,361
were French Canadian.

lincluding returning Canadians.
2Angus (ed.), op. ctt., p. 62.

8 Ibid., pp. 58-60.

CANADA TODAY

PRESENT MOVEMENTS IN POPULATION

Emigration of Canadians to the United States was stopped
partly by the depression, partly by the American legislation
of 1930. The Canadian-born population must now stay in
Canada and find employment at home. This it has to do in
the face of a labour market depressed by the presence of
large numbers of unemployed and drought victims.

Immigration into Canada is now very restricted. Chinese
immigration was ended by the Dominion Chinese Immigra¬
tion Act of 1923; between 1925 and 1936 only 7 Chinese
were admitted. 2 Japanese immigration is governed by the
“gentleman’s agreement” of 1907, as revised in 1928, under
which the number of Japanese entering the country does not
exceed 150 a year. 8 The total number admitted between
1929 and 1936 was 813. 4 Other immigration is governed by
the new regulations laid down in the Order-in-Council. of
March 21, 1931, which limits immigration to the following
four classes: 5

1. A British subject entering Canada directly or indirectly from
Great Britain or Northern Ireland, the Irish Free State, Newfound¬
land, the United States of America, New Zealand, Australia, or the
Union of South Africa, who has sufficient means to maintain himself
until employment is secured; provided that the only persons admiss¬
ible under the authority of this clause are British subjects by reason
of birth or naturalization in Great Britain or Northern Ireland, the
Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia, or the Union
of South Africa.

2. A United States citizen entering Canada from the United States
who has sufficient means to maintain himself until employment is
secured.

3. The wife or unmarried child under 16 years of age of any person
legally admitted to and resident in Canada who is in a position to
receive and care for his dependents.

4. An agriculturist having sufficient means to farm in Canada.

lThe numbers on direct relief in recent years, including dependents, b» v e been: Novem¬
ber 1932, 1,113,849; November, 1934, 1,063,592; November, 1936, 1,100,025; December,
1937, 951,000.

2Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 205.

3 Canadian Annual Review, 1927-28, p. 145.

4 Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 205.

6P.C. 695, March 21, 1931.

THE POPULATION OF CANADA

The annual immigration since this order took effect has been
very small, averaging only about 12,000 annually for the
past five years. 1 In spite of the preference for British immi¬
grants revealed in the new regulations, nearly 80 per cent,
of the new arrivals in Canada in the years 1931-1936 were
from places outside the British Isles.

A noticeable movement of the population within the
country in recent years has been the drift from country to
town. Urbanization is not a purely Canadian phenomenon,
but its development in the Dominion has been marked. Be¬
tween 1891 and 1931 the proportion of the population living
in rural centres decreased from 68.20 to 46.30 per cent. 2 In
1931, 41.74 per cent, of the people lived in cities or towns of
5,000 population and over. 3 The drift in the decade 1921-
1931 was most noticeable in the provinces of Quebec and
Ontario, and was several times greater in Quebec than in any
other province—a fact which in part explains why the birth¬
rate is declining rapidly in French Canada as well as in the
Dominion as a whole. In that decade a net rural-urban
movement occurred in Canada amounting to about 437,000,
all ages. 4

Moreover, even by 1931 it was apparent that the internal
flow of population, which early in the century had been from
east to west, had been reversed. The three Prairie Provinces
by 1931 had not only ceased to absorb surplus population
from the east, but were exporting part of their own surplus
to the east. This movement has no doubt continued since
1931 owing to the various causes preventing a return of pros¬
perous conditions to western agriculture. The prairies are
thus proving unable to hold their own people under present
conditions. 8

The internal drift of the immigrant population shows the

i Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 194.

2Hurd, W. B., “The Decline in the Canadian Birth Rate”, Canadian Journal of Eco¬
nomics and Political Science, February, 1937, p. 43.

3 Canada Year Book, 1936, p. 125.

4See Hurd, W. B. and Cameron, Jean C., “Population Movements in Canada, 1921-
1931: Some Further Considerations”, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,
May, 1935, p. 226, note 3; Hurd, “The Decline in the Canadian Birth Rate”, {op. cit.)g

5See Hurd, “Population Movements in Canada, 1921-1931”, in Proceedings of Canadian
Political Science Association, 1934, Vol. VI, p. 224. In the five-year period, 1931-36, the
population of the three Prairie Provinces increased by only 2.6 per cent.

22 CANADA TODAY

same tendency to concentrate in cities, and cities in the east.
“Despite continuous efforts on the part of the authorities to
stimulate rural rather than urban settlement, the proportion
of the current net immigration domiciled in towns and cities
at the close of the decade (1921-1931) was three times greater
than that found in the country. Whereas in 1921, only 56
per cent, of the foreign-born population in Canada was resi¬
dent in urban centres, over 75 per cent, of the net foreign
immigration during the last ten years found its way to towns
and cities.” 1 The cities and towns of Ontario and Quebec
combined accounted for nearly 63 per cent, of the net in¬
crease in urban foreign-born over the ten-year period. Even
rural immigrants did not prefer the prairies; Ontario alone
absorbed 52 per cent, of the net rural immigration from
abroad during the decade, while the four western provinces
only accounted for 43 per cent. 2

Other interesting features of Canadian population move¬
ments might be emphasized, but enough has been said to
indicate how unreliable are many of the popular ideas about
the “great open spaces” in Canada and their capacity to
absorb large numbers of immigrants. Canada, in the present
condition of her domestic and foreign markets, appears
already overcrowded. If agriculture merely holds its own
and other rural employment is not forthcoming, a rural
surplus of 800,000 is quite possible by 1941. 3 To absorb the
present natural increase in urban Canada, the estimated
rural-urban migration, and the number of unemployed in
1931, would require a 45 to 50 per cent, increase in urban
employment over the next decade. 4 There is little likelihood
of this occurring. Canada would be more than able to supply
her own population requirements for five or ten years to
come if the rate of economic expansion obtaining during the
period 1911-1931 were restored, and even if the boom con¬
ditions of 1901-1911 were repeated she would not need to
draw more than a few thousand a year from abroad to reach
the limit of her absorptive capacity. 6

lHurd and Cameron, op. cit., pp. 237-8.

2 Ibid., pp. 233, 235.

3Hurd, “Population Movements in Canada, 1921-1931”, (op. cit.), p. 231.

4Hurd and Cameron, op. cit., p. 232.

6 Angus (ed.), op. cit., p. 70.

The foregoing estimates, based upon the most authorita¬
tive research that has been done in this field, are not gener¬
ally known in Canada and are not accepted by all who do
know of them. Some authorities contend that many more
settlers can be supported in the Peace River district of
Alberta, and that on the prairies themselves there may de¬
velop a type of self-contained peasant farm through a more
scientific use of soils. Consequently the hope of revived im¬
migration is one entertained by a number of individuals and
institutions (such as transportation companies) which be¬
lieve increased immigration will be a means of increasing the
population, reducing the per capita debt burden and increas¬
ing the internal consuming power. The chief opposition
comes from the French Canadians, who fear additions to the
British majority, and labour organizations which take the
view that the present immigration restrictions should be
maintained 4 'until the present unemployment and agri¬
cultural depression has disappeared”. 1

ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANTS

Assimilation is not a term easy to define nor a condition
easy to measure. The French Canadian would use it differ¬
ently from the English Canadian. If it means "to make
Canadian”, in the sense that the settler comes to accept
Canada as the country of his primary allegiance and to feel
at home there, then it occurs in nearly every instance. In this
sense immigrants from the British Isles need to be "assimi¬
lated”, for they do not have a Canadian viewpoint when
they arrive. Acceptance of the English language and Cana¬
dian customs goes on steadily amongst most foreign-born
immigrants. The new settlers seldom join the French-
Canadian group. Perhaps the process of assimilation is best
described by saying that everyone in Canada, except the
French Canadian, sooner or later speaks some variant of the
North American language and adopts North American
habits, while keeping, in many instances, the language and
culture of his forbears.

iSee Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, “Representations to the Dominion Govern¬
ment, January 1938”, Canada Labour Gazette , 1938, p. 144.

24 CANADA TODAY

The assimilation of immigrants, in the form of intermar¬
riage and a mixing of stocks, is slow. The ‘ melting-pot is
not producing a racial alloy. Racial diversity is especially
noticeable when a foreign group settles in a community,
forms a “colony”, and preserves its own language and cus-
toms, as do the Ukrainians, the Doukhobors, the Orientals,
and some other peoples. Moreover, there is no national
education system to unify the children s outlook rapidly.
Each province has a separate educational programme,
though there is some co-operation between provincial edu¬
cational authorities, particularly in the western provinces.
Separate schools for Catholics and Protestants exist by law
in Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and Alberta, and in prac¬
tice education generally is divided on religious lines. The
census of 1931 showed that the school system in Canada
provided all but 7 per cent, of the children between the ages
of 7 and 14 with schooling, but 34 per cent, of those between
the ages 5-19 were not at school. 1 Of all children in Canada,
only two-thirds go as far as the final year of elementary
schools, one-fifth or more reach the final or matriculation
year, one-tenth or more continue to a professional school or
university, and about three per cent, obtain a university
degree. 2 Besides this inadequacy of education, the fact that
all newspapers are regional, and the almost total absence of
popular periodicals which are read from coast to coast, tend
to keep public opinion sectional, though the control of radio
broadcasting is assisting in the development of a more
national outlook. 3

Assimilation in Canada thus has not meant cultural or
linguistic uniformity, and permits of wide variations of be¬
haviour and belief. The two major races, French and Eng¬
lish, have approached each other remarkably little during

l Canada Year Book , 1936, p. 133; Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. IV, pp. 1354-5.

2Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Cost of Education Bulletin No. 1, 1934. The figures
do not include Quebec and British Columbia.

3To connect the 53 stations making up a national network necessary to broadcast a
single programme throughout Canada, takes over 8,000 miles of transmission lines (.as
opposed to less than 1,000 miles in Great Britain) and even then it only reaches 10 per
cent of the land area of the provinces of Canada and not more than 75 per cent, ot the
total population. The further facts that 30 per cent, of the people desire to hear broadcasts
in their mother tongue, French; that Canada stretches through five time zones; and that
all broadcasting is done in competition with American stations spending 50 times as much
money, using 30 times as much power, covering the entire United States and at night more
of Canada than the Canadian stations, illustrate the difficulties which have to be overcome
in attempting to use the radio as an instrument for fostering national unity.

THE POPULATION OF CANADA

their long and close association. In the words of Andre
Siegfried, 1 they have a “modus vivendi without cordiality”.
This observation is not altogether true, for there are groups
in the upper levels of professional and business life who know
and respect each other; but it describes well enough the
relations of the mass of each population, between whom is
an almost impenetrable wall built of religion, race, language,
education, history, geography and simple ignorance of one
another’s point of view. In times of political and economic
calm the spirit of mutual non-interference permits each
group to pursue its separate path with little disturbance,
but every crisis reveals how wide is the gulf between them.

FUTURE GROWTH OF POPULATION

There are two kinds of estimates of Canada’s future popu¬
lation—those made by speakers on public platforms, which
receive wide publicity, and those made by academic students
of the problem, which get buried in learned periodicals. The
former predict a population by the year 2000 A.D. of any¬
where from 50 to 200 million; the latter seem to agree that
unless present trends are altered in a manner that is im¬
possible to predict, the population will not be above 18
million by the end of this century, with a limiting population
found ultimately somewhere between 20 and 35 million. 2

Factors pointing to the lower estimates are the decline in
the Canadian birth-rate, which, due to increasing urbaniza¬
tion and other factors, dropped 14.4 per cent, in the decade
1921-1931, 3 and has declined 23.3 per cent, since 1881; new
statistics indicating that the extent of unoccupied land suit¬
able for agricultural settlement in the Dominion is much less
than was at first estimated; 4 a better understanding of the

ISiegfried, Andr£, Canada (London, 1937), p. 255.

2See Angus (ed.), op. cit.. Chap. II, p. 41. All the authorities are there collected. The
following are the most important; MacLean, M. C., andHurd, W. B.,‘‘Projection of Canada’s
Population on the Basis of Current Birth and Death Rates, 1931-1971”, Canadian Paper
for Yosemite Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936; Hurd, W. B., "The De¬
cline of the Canadian Birth Rate”, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,
February, 1937; MacKay and Rogers, op. cit., pp. 55 ff.

3"Of this ten year decrease, slightly under 2.4 points or 16.7 per cent, seems to have
been attributable to less favourable age distribution generally; slightly under 7.3 points or
50.7 per cent, to less favourable conjugal condition, and only something over 4.7 points or
32.6 per cent, to other causes including increased illegitimacy, birth control, abortion,
infant mortality and so on.” Hurd, W. B., “The Decline in the Canadian Birth Rate”,
(op. cit.), p. 57.

4See below, p. 45.

26 CANADA TODAY

effects of immigration; and general considerations such as
the world trend toward economic nationalism, which sug¬
gests that the expansion of Canadian foreign trade, and
hence Canada’s capacity to support new industries, is not
likely to proceed as rapidly in the future as it has done in the
past. It is always possible that new factors will enter in to
upset these estimates, but in attempting to guess at future
developments it would seem wiser to adopt the sober rather
than the enthusiastic view. The rate of natural increase of
population has declined from 17.8 per thousand population
in 1921 to 10.6 in 1936. 1

One interesting conclusion of these forecasts is that by
1971 the French-Canadian element in the population is likely
to outnumber that of British descent. It is dangerous, how¬
ever, to argue too much from this prediction. The French
Canadians will still be concentrated very largely in a single
province, and many of the non-British, non-French races in
the country will by then be assimilated to those of British
descent in attitudes and outlook, thus increasing the homo¬
geneity of the non-French group. Moreover, the attitudes of
the two races upon national questions may well grow more
alike with the passage of time. Nevertheless, a progressive
extension of the French influence in Canada is to be expected.

1 Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 189,

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY

S INCE the earliest days of settlement in New France
Canada has been a country depending largely upon
foreign trade. Great wealth lay in her natural resources,
but since population and markets were far away economic
policy was concerned with extracting the wealth and export¬
ing it to the markets. Despite the growth in manufacturing
industries during the past fifty years, that description re¬
mains basically true of the present economy. Canada is
built on the assumption that other people can and will buy
her staple products.

Taken in historical order, the chief Canadian exports have
been fish, in the early days of French settlement; furs, for
the following two centuries; lumber, in the early and mid¬
nineteenth century; followed by wheat, with the opening of
the west. Then industrial activity began to add its quota of
products for export, such as flour, planks and boards, wood
pulp and paper, and later automobiles. Mining has steadily
increased its importance in the economy since the twentieth
century began. The Pre-Cambrian Shield has supplied three
of the principal sources of wealth, namely furs, forests, and
minerals, and it also supplies the hydro-electric power which
makes production possible in areas remote from other sources
of energy. One measure of the success of this policy of staple
production for export is the fact that Canada had, in 1935,
the fifth largest export trade of any country in the world,
and ranked sixth in total value of world trade. 1

A picture of the principal divisions of production in Canada
is given by the following table for the year 1935. The per¬
centages are based on the net value of production in each
division. 2

lLeague of Nations figures, cited Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 501.

2Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Survey of Production in Canada, 1935

28 CANADA TODAY

Per cent, of Total

Division of Industry Production for 1935

Manufactures. 53.96

Agriculture. 26.01

Mining. 9.96

Forestry. 9.50

Electric Power. 5 -22

Fisheries. 1-44

Construction, Custom and Repair. 7.83

It will be noticed how far manufacturing is ahead of agri¬
culture in terms of value of production. The figures for
manufactures include some items also included under other
heads (such as dairy factories, sawmills, etc.) but even when
all duplication is removed manufactures count for about 40
per cent, of the total. The importance of manufacturing is
reflected in the distribution of the population as between
town and country; in 1931, 53.7 per cent, lived in urban,

46.3 per cent, in rural communities. In 1901 the proportions
were the other way, 62.5 per cent, living in rural, and only

37.3 per cent, in urban communities. The change is another
measure of Canada’s growing industrialization. It is making
the large metropolitan centres like Montreal, Toronto, Win¬
nipeg and Vancouver of increasing importance as govern¬
mental and administrative units.

The net value of all goods produced in Canada in 1935 was
estimated at $2,394,720,688, and total exports amounted to
$756,625,925; thus 31.6 per cent, of the total production was
exported. 1 This figure is emphatic proof of Canada’s de¬
pendence on world markets. In many of the basic industries
the home consumption is a small fraction of production.
Moreover, when the export figures are analysed more closely
they show that a comparatively few commodities constitute
the great bulk of the exports; in 1937, for instance, the five
staples—wheat and flour, pulp and paper, lumber, precious
and base metals, and fish—accounted for two-thirds of the
total. The extraction of a few staple products from the
natural resources, and their shipment abroad, are, as has been

lFigures from Survey of Production, 1935, and Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 545.

NET PRODUCTION

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION

035 INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION

Courtesy of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics

30 CANADA TODAY

said, dominant characteristics of the Canadian economy

today. . ,

If the figures for total net production are distributed

amongst economic regions in Canada, the. immense pre¬
ponderance of the two central provinces is evident. Ontario
accounted in 1935 for 43.7 per cent, and Quebec 25.4 per
cent, of the total, or 69.1 per cent, between them. The three
prairie provinces produced only 16.5 per cent., British
Columbia 7.8 per cent., and the Maritimes together only
6.6 per cent. The importance and wealth of Ontario and
Quebec, coupled with the nationalist sentiment in Quebec,
tend to make these two provinces strong defenders of “pro¬
vincial rights”, while the other sections of the country, with
fewer sources of revenue and more need of special attention,
are apt to favour a reasonable assumption by the Dominion
of essential social services.

Partly, no doubt, because of this dependence on foreign
trade and because of the nature of her staple products,
Canada is liable to a highly fluctuating national income.
The demand for many of the staples is inelastic, and most of
them are produced in other parts of the world. Wheat pro¬
duction is subject to the vagaries of nature at home and to
rapid price changes in the world market. The depression of
1929, when the national income was cut 50 per cent, in four
years, 1 revealed this weakness in the structure of the economy.
Foreign trade dropped 65 per cent, in the same period. And
because of the tariff and the regional grouping of many of the
major economic activities (manufactures in Quebec and On¬
tario, wheat on the prairies, etc.) the changes in national
income are very unevenly distributed throughout the eco¬
nomy, and set up within Canada political movements and
claims for special treatment in depressed areas.

While historic economic tradition and the facts of geo¬
graphy have combined to make Canada so dependent on the
direct exploitation of her natural resources and raw ma¬
terials, it is nevertheless true that diversified manufacturing
is steadily increasing in the country, and the percentage of
manufactured exports to total exports is rising. No less than

Unnis, H. A. and Plumptre, A. F. W. (eds.), The Canadian Economy and Its Problems,
(Toronto 1934), p. 181. The figures are for dollar values.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 31

55 different kinds of commodities were exported in 1936 to
a value of $2,000,000 or over. 1 Whereas in the early days of
Canada’s development the imports were made up chiefly of
manufactured products and the exports of raw and semi¬
manufactured products, since the opening of the century
this has been reversed. A considerable percentage of im¬
ports now consists of raw and semi-manufactured products
for use in Canadian manufacturing industries, and the ex¬
ports consist predominantly of products which have under¬
gone some process of manufacture. In 1937, of the value of
total imports 29 per cent, were raw materials, 9.8 per cent,
partly and 61.2 per cent, fully manufactured; of total
exports the raw materials were 35.9 per cent., partly manu¬
factured goods 27.9 per cent., and fully manufactured goods
36.2 per cent. 2 The leading manufactures in Canada are, as
might be expected, for the processing of raw materials. As
the internal market expands so does the range of goods which
may be profitably manufactured, and there are a number of
industries in Canada serving the domestic and even foreign
markets, using imported raw materials such as rubber, cotton
and sugar. Canadian manufactures, however, are not being
developed with a view to making Canada self-sufficient;
their growth is entirely a matter of unplanned expansion
determined by considerations of profitable investment.

Contemporaneously with the growth of manufacturing, an
increased trend to monopolistic and semi-monopolistic con¬
trol within the Canadian economy has taken place. In most
of the large-scale industries, two, three, four or six corpora¬
tions control from 75 to 95 per cent, of the output. 3 The

l Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 518.

2 Condensed Preliminary Report on the Trade of Canada, 1936-37, p. 33. See also Canada
Year Book, 1937, p. 519. The following table {ibid, p. 407) shows the rate of growth in
industrial establishments;

Year

Capital

Employees

Salaries
and Wages

Net Value
of Products

1900.

446,916,487

339,173

113,249,350

214,525,517

1910.

1,247,583,609

515,203

241,008,416

564,466,621

1920.

3,371,940,653

609,586

732,120,585

1,686,978,408

1930.

5,203,316,760

644,439

736,092,766

1,665,631,771

1935.

4,698,991,853

582,874

590,236,904

1,302,179,099

The technological improvement in manufacturing is evidenced by the small increase
of employees as compared with the increase in the capital and net value of products. The
number of establishments increased from 14,650 in 1900 to 25,491 in 1935.

3Innis and Plumptre (eds.), op. cit., p. 182.

32 CANADA TODAY

growth of the large corporation has proceeded more rapidly
than the growth of business m general. In 1932 the 100
largest non-financial corporations had 82 per cent, of the
assets of all Canadian companies publishing balance sheets,
including railways. 1 This concentration of economic power
in a few corporations has been accompanied by a concentra¬
tion of control within the corporations themselves; the wide
distribution of share ownership, the use of such devices as
the holding company and non-voting stock, have tended o
vest the real direction of corporate affairs in the hands ot
small managerial groups.

The trend toward monopoly is a factor of great importance
in contemporary Canada. It explains much that occurs in
the political and economic life of the Dominion. The power¬
ful financial and industrial groups inevitably exert a continu¬
ous influence upon governmental policy. Indirectly, by the
opposition their power arouses amongst the people, they
have given rise to new political alignments. Monopoly has
brought class conflict into the political arena. All the mino¬
rity parties that have either arisen or improved their position
since the depression—the socialist farmer-labour movement
known as the C.C.F., 2 the Social Credit Party, Mr. Stevens s
Reconstruction Party of 1935, and the Communists 3 —have
derived their principal strength from the fact that they
organized the small man and the underdog against exploita¬
tion by the “trusts” and “big business”. The same economic
conflict in part accounts for French-Canadian nationalism,
for the French Canadians feel that they are mere “hewers of
wood and drawers of water” in their own country, and resent
the fact that they are scarcely represented in the inner circles
of the large corporations. 4 Monopoly also brings the state
into economic life in an endeavour to protect the public

interest. . , , .

Most of the large Canadian firms are organized to do busi-

IRepori of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 1935, p. 21. A detailed analysis of the
trend to monopoly is given in League for Social Reconstruct,on .SocuU
(Toronto, 1935), Chap. Ill; see also Taylor, K. W., in Anderson, Violet (ed.),
Currents and Canada's Course, p. 99. ^

2The abbreviation for “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation”.

3The combined vote of these parties was approximately 25 per cent, of the total vote
at the 1935 general elections. See below, p. 66, n. 3.

4See Barbeau, Victor, La Mesure de Notre Taille (Montreal, 1936).

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 33

ness throughout the Dominion; they therefore provide
unified structures reaching across provincial boundaries and
tending to break down sectional and provincial barriers. The
increasing accumulation of capital in these few hands is also
responsible for the increasing investment of Canadian capital
in foreign countries; the surplus funds made available by
operations on a large scale seek the most profitable outlets,
and if conditions look more promising elsewhere the money
will be exported. Thus Canadians own large utilities in
places as remote as Mexico and Brazil and have mining in¬
terests as far away as Rhodesia.

Besides its dependence on the export of staple products
and its trend to monopoly, the Canadian economy today is
noteworthy for its internal rigidities. The transportation
costs in a country with Canada’s geography and climate are
inevitably high; large amounts of capital have been invested
in permanent works in railways, roads, canals, harbours and
terminals, and many of these are in full use for only a part of
the year. 1 The very size of many corporations makes for high
overhead costs and rigid organization. The tariff enables the
prices of manufactured goods to be maintained at times when
the prices for Canadian exports of wheat and raw materials
are falling, thus causing slow adjustments and great inequi¬
ties in the incidence, as between regions and classes, of the
burdens of depression. Labour is rendered largely immobile
by racial and geographical obstacles, as well as by trades
union organization. Governmental, corporate and private
debts are high, 2 and the costs of government (of ten govern¬
ments, in fact) are heavy.

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Canada is a land of great distances and widely separated
economic areas. To make her development possible, she
inevitably had to acquire a large and costly transportation
equipment. Actually she provided herself with far more than

iCanadian transportation costs, it may be pointed out, are not all borne by producers
and shippers. The average of Canadian rates is the lowest per ton mile in the world, the
difference between high costs and low rates being made up by the tax-payer.

2See table of Dominion, provincial and municipal debts in Innis and Plumptre (eds.),
op. cit., pp. 62-4; D. C. MacGregor, “The Problem of Public Debt in Canada , Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1936, p. 167.

34 CANADA TODAY

she needed. No less than three separate transcontinental
railway systems were built — the Canadian Pacific Railway,
completed in 1885, the Canadian Northern, built in the de¬
cade and a half just before the world war, and the Grand
Trunk Pacific (with the government-built National Trans¬
continental), completed 1904-15. The Canadian Northern,
the Grand Trunk and its subsidiary the Grand Trunk Pacific
were taken over by the government between 1917 and 1921
and were merged with the Canadian Government Railways,
being ultimately consolidated in 1923 under the descriptive
title Canadian National Railways. The taking over was to
prevent the bankruptcy which faced the private owners.
One railway runs north to Churchill on Hudson Bay, provid¬
ing a short, almost unused, route to Europe from the prairies
during the brief season of navigation. 1 The main C.P.R. line
to the Maritime Provinces runs through American territory
in Maine, and both the C.P.R. and the C.N.R. are members
of the Association of American Railroads. In freight and
passenger rates, in equipment and in practice they are closely
tied to United States lines. Canadian freight rates are set by
the Board of Railway Commissioners on a basis determined
by various factors such as cost, water competition, a desire
to assist remote areas, and political considerations; five
separate rate divisions exist, corresponding in some degree
to the economic regions of the country. 2

The manner of building of these lines, the extent of govern¬
mental grants and guarantees, the political consequences of
the scramble for charters and privileges, constitute in the
history of the Dominion a special chapter in which national
vision blends with political corruption, the glamour of en¬
gineering achievement with the tragedy of waste and un¬
necessary duplication. Canada pays heavily today for the
peculiar character of her rail system. Without a railway
backbone, however, the Canadian body economic would
never survive; these lines of steel enable prairie wheat to
reach the Great Lakes or the Pacific, and the forest and
mineral products of the Pre-Cambrian Shield to be brought

lEight sea-going vessels cleared in 1936.
2Innis and Plumptre (eds.), op. cit., pp. 71 ff.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 35

within reach of markets. Railways are a primary factor in
the unity of east and west as well as a major link in the chain
of intra-Commonwealth communications.

In 1934 there were 42,916 miles of steam railways in
Canada. It has been estimated that the debt incurred in
respect of railways, including grants made to the C.P.R., ac¬
counts for more than half of the public debt of the Dominion. 1
In addition, some $300,000,000 have been spent on the canal
systems, mainly in the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes area. The
proposed St. Lawrence Waterways Treaty has not yet be¬
come effective owing to the rejection by the American Senate
and the opposition of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario,
and also to the uncertain distribution of legislative jurisdic¬
tion as between the Dominion and the provinces. Besides
the Dominion canal systems there is the Panama Canal,
which, by providing a direct connection between the east and
west coast, open all year, has become an important factor in
Canadian transportation development. Wheat from Alberta
tends to move via Panama to Europe, and the competition
of freight rates on this route exerts a powerful influence upon
transcontinental railway rates in the Dominion. 2 The St.
Lawrence route controls freight rates from Chicago to the
Atlantic seaboard.

Highway construction in the Dominion is another part of
the transportation problem. When the constitution of
Canada was drafted railways were the predominant mode of
commercial land transport, and power to control these was
given to the Dominion. Highways were of local importance
only, and fell under provincial or municipal management.
Today the provinces, sometimes helped by the Dominion,
have spent large sums on highway development, and the
trucking services have become serious competitors of rail¬
ways without having been brought under any co-ordinating
authority. In 1937 a provincial Royal Commission was ap¬
pointed by Ontario to investigate the problem.

Civil aviation is the latest mode of transportation to be
developed, and is making steady progress. The first trans-

iMacKay and Rogers, Canada Looks Abroad , pp. 29-30.

2For a detailed discussion see Innis and Plumptre (eds.), op. cit., Appendix V, by H. A.
Innis.

36 CANADA TODAY

Canada service opened in 1938. In 1937 began the test
flights of Imperial Airways linking Canada with Great
Britain by air. Aviation is proving most useful in opening
and servicing the remote mining areas of the Canadian Shield;
prospecting is aided, and machinery and supplies are carried
into otherwise inaccessible regions. 1 The trial flights of the
Soviet fliers over the pole in 1937 reminded Canadians that
they are on the direct air route between Asia and North
America

Despite her dependence on foreign trade and her large
system of inland waterways, Canada has not developed her
own shipping fleet to any great extent. The net tonnage of
all vessels registered in Canada at December 31, 1934, was
1,389,343. 2 Some 700,000 tons of this are in lake vessels, 3 and
most of the remainder in coastal shipping. Few Canadian
ships ply the high seas; the Canadian Pacific Steamships ves¬
sels, for instance, are registered in England and are mostly
staffed by non-Canadians. The goods that leave Canadian
shores in such abundance have in many cases already been
sold to foreign purchasers, and are mostly loaded in non-
Canadian ships. This fact does not make the trade any less
important to Canada, but it is relevant to any discussion of
Canada’s providing naval protection for her foreign trade.
The tonnage of freight entered outwards for the sea from
Canadian ports for the fiscal year ending March, 1937, was
about 16,000,000 tons, of which 8,000,000 tons were carried
in British ships, 6,000,000 in foreign ships and 2,000,000 in
Canadian vessels.

EXTERNAL DEBTOR AND CREDITOR POSITION

The development of Canadian resources and the increasing
industrialization of the country have required large amounts
of capital. It was natural for Canada to borrow that capital
from the countries with which she had the closest connections
—Great Britain and the United States. At first Great

lln 1936 more express and freight was carried by air in Canada than in any other
country .—Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 709.

2 Ibid., p. 677.

iGreen's Register of Lake Tonnage. Lloyds’ list shows approximately 400,000 on the
lakes and 840,000 coastal, but many vessels of the latter category are lakers which do a
small coastal trade.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 37

Britain supplied the bulk of the funds, but the outbreak of
the world war in 1914 blocked that source and thenceforth
Canada was compelled to look chiefly to the United States,
and to herself. In 1913 the total British capital invested in
Canada was some 2,570 millions of dollars, while American
capital was only 780 millions; by 1937 British investments
had risen to 2,727 but the American totalled 3,996. In the
same period the investments of all other countries dropped
from 180 to 131 millions.

The following table shows the foreign investments classi¬
fied into main types, as at December 31, 1937 1 (in millions
of dollars).

Total

United

Kingdom

United

States

Other

Countries

Government Securities....
Public Utilities:

1,696

516

1,177

Railways.

1,626

1,060

546

Other.

764

185

570

Manufacturing.

1,389

383

990

Mining.

363

260

Merchandising and Service

228

149

Insurance.

Finance and Mortgage

211

122

Companies.

296

162

Miscellaneous.

275

160

6,848

2,721

3,996

131

There were some 1,200 companies in Canada in 1934 con¬
trolled by, or definitely affiliated with, American firms,which
manufacture for the Canadian market and for export mark¬
ets made available either by the imperial preference or by
arrangement with the parent company. In many cases
foreign markets are assigned to branch plants by the parent
companies in an attempt to reduce branch plant unit costs by
increasing output. 2 Almost a fourth of the manufacturing in

iSee Bulletin of Dominion Bureau of Statistics, January 27, 1938. Estimated Balance
of International Payments for Canada , 1987 (Preliminary Statement).

2See Marshall, H., Southard, F. A., and Taylor, K. W., Canadian-American Industry
(New Haven and Toronto, 1936), pp. 19, 242.

38 CANADA TODAY

Canada is done by American-controlled or affiliated com-

P While the presence of this large amount of foreign capital
influences Canadian policy in many ways, it must be viewed
in relation to the total amount of capital in the country, t
was estimated that in 1934 this sum was in the neighbour¬
hood of 18,000 millions, and that of this amount 62 y 2 per
cent, was owned in Canada, 22 per cent, in the United States
and 15 per cent, in Great Britain. 1 Moreover, Canada has
for many years been an exporter as well as an importer ot
capital, and in 1937 was estimated to have no less than 1,694
millions invested abroad—a sum equal to about 25 per cent,
of the foreign investments in Canada. It is interesting to
note that 1,017 millions of this were in the United States,
624 in other countries and only 53 in Great Britain. Canada s
net foreign indebtedness is thus 5,144 millions of dollars. 2
Owing to favourable conditions Canada was amortizing her
foreign debt at the rate of about 3 }4 to 4 per cent, per annum

during 1936-37. . , ,

The payment of interest on this debit balance is one ot the
major problems of Canadian economic policy. So long as
world trade flourishes, Canadian exports will provide the
necessary funds. In a world of shrunken trade and increas¬
ing tariff barriers the payment is rendered extremely difficult.
The tariff policy of the Dominion must always keep in view
this obligation of external payments, and must endeavour to
secure for the Dominion as a whole an annual surplus suffi¬
cient to meet the obligation. In the past the principal sur-
pluses have come from trade with Great Britain while the
principal debts have been paid in the Ijnited States, the
Canadian dollar having to be kept in a position of equili-
brium relative to the pound sterling and the New York
dollar. 8 The growth of the tourist trade 4 and the develop-

l Canada Year Book , 1936, p. 891.

2As at December 31, 1937. See the Bulletin, cited supra.

3In 1931-2 Canada was pinched between the depreciated pound and the
dollar From this painful situation she was relieved by Roosevelt s inflation policy. See
rfutL T Douelas and Plumptre, A. F. W., “The Economic Effects on Canada of the
Recent' Monetary Policy of the United States”, in Canadian Papers for th . e .^ ose1 "^
Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936; also chart showing relations of the pound
and the dollar in Siegfried, Canada , p. 202.

4The net credit balance on tourist account was estimated at 170 million dollars in
1937. See below, p. 42.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 39

ment of new staples (pulp and paper, gold and other min¬
erals) are helping considerably to facilitate payment on the
external debt payable in the United States.

EXTERNAL TRADE

The importance of foreign trade to Canada has already
been stressed. The direction and nature of that trade have
also a great influence upon the Dominion’s domestic and
foreign policy. A simple picture of Canada’s commercial
dealings with foreign countries is given in the following
tables. 1

Canadian exports are distributed in the following percentages:

Other

Total

Other

Total

Fiscal

United

British

United

Foreign

Year

Kingdom

Empire

States

Countries

1896....

57.2

3.7

60.9

34.4

4.7

39.1

1916....

60.9

4.2

65.1

27.1

7.8

34.9

1926. ...

38.5

6.8

45.3

36.4

18.3

54.7

1932....

29.0

7.7

36.7

42.9

20.4

63.3

1937....

38.4

8.3

46.7

41.0

12.3

53.3

Canadian imports are derived from the following sources:

Fiscal

Year

United

Kingdom

Other

British

Empire

Total

British

Empire

United

States

Other

Foreign

Countries

Total

Foreign

Countries

1896....

31.2

2.2

33.4

50.8

15.8

66.6

1916....

15.2

5.5

20.7

73.0

6.3

79.3

1926....

17.6

4.9

22.5

65.6

11.9

77.5

1932....

18.4

7.2

25.6

60.8

13.6

74.4

1937....

19.3

10.2

29.5

58.7

11.8

70.5

These figures show that Canada’s most important eco¬
nomic relationships are with the United States. To that

i Condensed Preliminary Report on the Trade of Canada , 1936-37, p. 32. The figures
represent dollar value.

40 CANADA TODAY

country went 41 per cent, of Canada s exports in 1937, from
it came 58.7 per cent, of the imports. The United Kingdom
ranks a good second in economic importance, taking 38.4
per cent, of the exports and providing 19.3 per cent, of the
imports; it also provides a very favourable balance for
Canada. In terms of totals, Canada’s trade with the United
States was 729 million dollars in 1937, with the United King¬
dom, 537 million dollars.

If Canada’s trade is viewed with respect to its internal
regional basis, the importance of foreign markets varies
greatly. Certain parts of Canada, such as the prairies and
the mining regions in northern Quebec and Ontario, could
not live at all without foreign trade; other parts, such as the
rural districts of Quebec and the Maritimes, are more self-
sustaining. For British Columbia and the Prairie Provinces
the export trade with Great Britain is of paramount impor¬
tance, whereas Ontario imports more from the British Isles
than she exports to them. The principal consuming markets
of Canada are in Ontario and western Quebec, where popu¬
lation and wealth are concentrated.

The United States and Great Britain accounted for nearly
80 per cent, of Canada’s total foreign trade in 1937. During
the world depression Canada’s commercial relationships with
the United States declined while those with the United King¬
dom increased; between 1929 and 1934 the proportion of
Canadian exports to and imports from the United States fell
from 37 to 33 and 69 to 54 per cent, respectively, while exports
to Britain rose from 31 to 43 per cent, and imports from Britain
from 15 to 24 per cent. 1 This was due to various causes
amongst which may be mentioned the tariff increases in the
United States and Canada, the greater intensity of the de¬
pression in the United States as compared with Great Bri¬
tain, the Ottawa Agreements, and the fact that a large part
of Canadian trade with the United States is in capital goods
an d in manufacturers’ raw materials, the demand for which
is particularly affected by a depression. 2 The improvement
in conditions since 1933, however, and particularly the

1 Condensed Preliminary Report on the Trade of Canada , 1936-37, p. 32.
2See Gibson and Plumptre, op. cit.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 41

Reciprocity Treaty with the United States which came into
force on January 1, 1936, have tended again to increase
the United States* share of Canada’s total trade.

Since 1935 a significant change has come over Canada’s
trade relations with the United States. Formerly the
visible trade balance was unfavourable to Canada; in 1929
the debit balance was as high as $363,800,000.! This differ¬
ence was made up by the surplus of exports to Great Britain
and other countries, and by other items of exchange such as
tourist expenditures. In 1936 and 1937, however, the trade
with the United States (including gold exports) showed a
favourable balance of considerable proportions. This change
is making Canada less dependent on trade in Europe as a
means of meeting her debt charges in the United States,
though the permanence of the change may be open to doubt. 2

In 1937 Canada’s trade with countries outside Great
Britain and the United States was about evenly divided
between other parts of the British Empire and other foreign
countries. Exports to the latter were as high as 24 per cent,
of total exports in 1929. Trade with other British Empire
countries has grown while trade with other foreign countries
has relatively declined in recent years. Belgium and Japan
are Canada’s best customers amongst non-British countries,
apart from the United States. The trade with Japan in
certain raw materials increased rapidly as the Sino-Japanese
dispute of 1937 became acute; exports to Japan of nickel,
scrap iron, lead, copper, aluminium, zinc and sulphite rose
from million dollars in 1936 to 17J^ million dollars in
1937. 3 It is clear that Japan, like Great Britain, looks to
Canada as a source of supply of raw materials in time of war.

The gross value of Canada’s external trade varies greatly
with world conditions. The high point of 1929 showed ex¬
ports at $1,368,000,000 and imports of $1,266,000,000. By
1933 these had fallen to $528,000,000 and $406,000,000, or
declines of 61.5 per cent, and 67.9 per cent, respectively. 4
By 1937 the exports had reached a value of $1,061,181,000

l Condensed Preliminary Report on the Trade of Canada, 1936-37, p. 31.

2The most recent figures seem to suggest a revival of the adverse balance.

3Calendar years. In the same period Japan’s purchase of Canadian foodstuffs declined.

4 Canada Year Book , 1937, pp. 528-9.

42 CANADA TODAY

and imports a value of $671,875,000.' These variations are
reflected rapidly in the Canadian economy, though, as has
been said, the internal rigidities may distribute the effect of

the changes very unevenly. . .

The distribution of Canadian trade by continents is of lm-
portance, because of its bearing on the possibility of regional
economic and political arrangements. In the fiscal year
1936-37, the continental percentages of Canadian imports

and exports were : 2

Imports

Exports

XTnrth America Total .

61.3

43.4

lM Ul lit riiiitilocij x ..

fTTrnfpH States.

58.71

41.01

\ Other.

2.6 J

2.4J

Tnrnne Total .

25.5

46.0

f United Kingdom .

19.31

38.41

1 Other .

6.2.

(

7.6;

Asia,.

5.3

3.4

Smith America .

4.2

1.3

Oceania .

2.6

3.8

Africa.

1.1

2.1

These figures show again Canada s predominant depend¬
ence upon North America; they also indicate the very small
degree of trade with South America.

The above analysis shows the visible trade items. Amongst
the invisible items the tourist trade is of great importance;
it might be described as a major industry of the Dominion.
In 1929 the net income from this source reached 187 million
dollars, deduction being made of Canadian tourist expendi¬
ture abroad; in the years 1935-37 it was 123, 156 and 170
millions respectively. Nearly all of this comes from the
United States, and helps to adjust the balance of trade with
that country in Canada’s favour. To stimulate the influx of
tourists large amounts of money are being spent improving
highways, developing summer and winter sport resorts, and
opening up scenic regions.

l Condensed, Preliminary Report on the Trade of Canada, 1936-37, p. 31.

2 Ibid., p. 16.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 43

CANADIAN TRADE AGREEMENTS

The principle on which the Canadian tariff has been built
since 1907 is that there are three categories of duties—the
general, the intermediate and the British preferential. The
general tariff provides a maximum rate for countries with
which Canada has no commercial treaty relationships; the
intermediate is for countries which the Dominion wishes to
treat more favourably; the British preference, initiated in
1897, gives a lower rate for any part of the British Empire
to which the Canadian government may wish to extend it.
According to the practice in the Commonwealth, concessions
under the British preference are not available to foreign
countries with which Canada has most-favoured-nation
treaties.

This broad tariff structure is modified by numerous indi¬
vidual agreements with particular countries. Canada, with
a few exceptions, adopts in practice the unconditional most¬
favoured-nation principle, and hence tariff concessions to one
country (excluding British preferential rates) are automatic¬
ally extended to all other countries with which Canada has
treaty arrangements. Easily the most important trade agree¬
ments are those regulating Canada's dealings with her two
biggest customers—the United States and Great Britain.

The trade agreement between Canada and the United
States came into effect on January 1, 1936. Canada secured
reduced duties on some 60 commodities representative of the
main fields of Canadian production. Concessions by Canada
included the extension to the United States of the inter¬
mediate tariff in its entirety, 1 and reductions in 88 items
below existing favoured-nation rates. Unconditional most¬
favoured-nation treatment in respect of customs matters
was mutually agreed upon. 2

The trade relations between Canada and Great Britain
are governed by the Ottawa agreements of 1932, modified by
the changes which took effect on September 1, 1937. The

lThis concession means that the general tariff has ceased to be of great importance in
the Canadian tariff structure; practically all Canadian trade is governed now by the
intermediate or by the British preferential rates.

2See Feis, H., “A Year of the Canadian Trade Agreement”, Foreign Affairs, July, 1937;
Bidwell, Percy W., “The Prospects for a Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom”,
Foreign Affairs, October, 1937.

44 CANADA TODAY

principal Canadian exports benefitted were wheat, timber,
hams and bacon, fisheries products, milk products, copper,
lead and zinc; British manufactures given lower rates in the
Canadian market were mostly in the groups of iron and steel,
drugs and chemicals, textiles and leather goods. Under the
agreement revisions of duties may be sought by the British
government before the Dominion Tariff Board. So far these
have resulted in only modest changes of former schedules,
and little additional preference for the British manufacturer.

Canadian trade with both the United States and Great
Britain has increased very greatly since these agreements
went into effect, but it is not easy to decide how far the in¬
crease was due to these or to other factors. Total trade be¬
tween Canada and Great Britain, both exports and imports,
increased by approximately $143,000,000 from March, 1933,
to March, 1937, but in the same interval total trade with the
United States increased $371,000,000, though the reciprocity
treaty had only been in effect 15 months while the Ottawa
agreements had been operating for nearly four and a half
years. 1

Besides these two principal agreements, Canada has trade
treaties with other British dominions such as Australia,
South Africa, New Zealand, Southern Rhodesia and the
Irish Free State. There is an agreement with France, and
special arrangements have been made with Germany, Poland
and Japan. Altogether most-favoured-nation treatment is
accorded some 32 foreign countries. 2

NATURAL RESOURCES

That Canada has been endowed by nature with very con¬
siderable natural resources is an undoubted fact. She pos¬
sesses unoccupied land, large forests, rich coal and mineral
deposits, undeveloped water powers. The natural basis for a
prosperous community seems to be present. The easy as¬
sumption is too often made, however, that nothing is lacking
save population to make this wealth useful and available.

for

Condensed Preliminary Report on the Trade of Canada, 1936-37, p. 31. See also Taylor,
V , “The Effect of the Ottawa Agreements on Canadian Trade , in Canadian Papers
he Yosemite Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936 (C.I.I.A., Toronto).

See summary in Canada Year Book, 1937, pp. 487 ff.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 45

What has already been said about population problems will
suggest there is a fallacy in this conclusion.

Moreover, a closer inspection of Canada’s resources makes
them appear less alluring. The most obvious possession of the
Dominion is land, yet by far the greater part of the land is
unsuited for agricultural settlement. The Dominion Bureau
of Statistics estimates that only 27.5 per cent, of the land
area of Canada is “potential” agricultural land (352,000,000
acres), of which total 46.3 per cent. (163,000,000 acres) is
occupied, leaving some 189,000,000 still unoccupied. 1 Of the
“occupied” land possibly as much as 40,000,000 acres is
either rough bush land, unfit for production of anything but
timber, or semi-arid. The maximum area under field crops
was reached in 1930, with 62,214,000 acres. Since then this
figure has slowly declined. The official figure for “potential”
agricultural land as given above is unreliable; a competent
authority has called it a gross exaggeration. 2 It does not rest
upon a scientific analysis of soil, and makes no allowance for
remoteness of markets. Thus for the province of Nova Scotia,
whose settlement began over 200 years ago, the official
figures give a total area of some 17,000,000 acres, an area
“occupied” as farm land of some 4,000,000 acres and an
area of “estimated possible farm land” of some 8,000,000
acres. There is little doubt that every piece of land in Nova
Scotia that would sustain life on any reasonable scale was
long ago taken up. Indeed, some land from which people are
trying to make a living today is so poor that it probably
ought to be abandoned.

The official figures for the other provinces are almost as
misleading. In the three Prairie Provinces the most recent
surveys suggest that in 1931 there were only another 20,-
000,000 acres or so available and suitable for occupation: if
these were filled with settlers in accordance with existing
agricultural practices it would only increase the population
of the area by 600,000 or 700,000 persons. 3 This assumes too

1 Canada Year Book, 1936, p. 38.

Mackintosh, W. A. in Bowman, Isaiah (ed.), Limits of Land Settlement (New York,
1937), p. 71. I am indebted to Prof. A. R. M. Lower for this general criticism of the
official figures.

3Angus, H. F. (ed.), Canada and the Doctrine of Peaceful Change , pp. 53-4; Mackintosh,
W. A., Prairie Settlement: The Geographical Setting (Toronto, 1934) (Canadian Frontiers
of Settlement, Vol. I), pp. 232-4.

46 CANADA TODAY

that there would be a market for the additional wheat grown.

In a great part of the west it is “wheat or nothing . Only
one-third of what is needed to support life on the prairies
can be produced there, owing to the specialized nature ol
western agriculture. The size of farms has been increasing
and the density of rural population decreasing, thus reducing
the degree to which agriculture can stimulate immigration.
The Attorney-General of Saskatchewan declared before the
Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations that
at present (1937) of economically free land (i.e. land that it
would pay under present conditions to settle) there is in
Saskatchewan none.

Natural resources in Canada are frequently the sole source
of livelihood in their area. Much of the mining country in
the Pre-Cambrian Shield will produce nothing but minerals;
the soil is second or third rate in quality and uneven in occur¬
rence, and will seldom support independent agricultural
communities. Increased supplies of minerals are not needed
for present domestic consumption. Unless, therefore, these
resources can be extracted and sold abroad, or a larger
market can be provided at home, they are not resources at
all. “The millions of tons of bituminous coal underlying the
province of Alberta are no more natural resources under
existing conditions than is the nitrogen in the atmosphere
overlying that province.” 2 If conditions change, particularly
if world trade develops, Canada will be able to employ more
persons in the development of her wealth, but in the present
Canadian economy the ‘Value” of the resources is largely
determined by foreign demand over which Canada has little
control.

Certain raw materials are found in small quantity only or
are lacking altogether. The petroleum supply is meagre,
though the Turner Valley fields of Alberta are showing con¬
siderable promise. Because of the lack of a market for the
natural gas overlying this oil field, it has been disposed of
for many years by the simple process of burning it off at the
rate of 225,000,000 cubic feet per day. 3 Canada has little

lBowman (ed.), Limits of Land Settlement, p. 72.

3 Alberta* s^first attempt to"*control this huge wastage was prevented by the courts. See
Spooner Oils case, Canada, Supreme Court Reports, 1933, p. b2y.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 47

anthracite and imports virtually all her supplies; about half
the bituminous coal used is imported, owing to the distance
of the Nova Scotia and Alberta fields. Iron ore is found
in a number of places but not rich in quantity or quality;
consequently supplies are imported from the Wabana de¬
posits of Newfoundland and the Mesabi range of Minnesota.
Aluminium and tin are absent. Tropical and semi-tropical
products—rubber, cotton, silk, sugar, cocoa, coffee, tea and
oils—must be imported.

Canada’s large foreign trade, her accumulation of capital
equipment and her ability now to service her foreign debt, all
are proof that her natural resources have been effectively
developed and that the money invested in her has been, on
the whole, put to profitable use. At the same time the num¬
bers of her unemployed and the difficulties she has experi¬
enced in her public finance during and since the world
depression, serve as reminders that a proper utilization of her
resources calls for an improvement in her internal economic
organization as well as in the state of world markets. Many
Canadians feel, indeed, that even without waiting for world
improvement Canada could, by appropriate internal reforms
(about which there is much difference of opinion) increase
her consuming power and provide a larger home market for
her own produce, while many see a similar possibility in
intra-Commonwealth economic co-operation.

THE STATE AND ECONOMIC LIFE

The state has played a very large part in the development
of Canadian industry and commerce. Canadians possess
many of the individualistic traits common to a people with
a strong pioneering tradition, but at the same time they have
not hesitated to employ the power of the state to achieve
results which could not be obtained by individual action.
The construction of canals and railways was the first eco¬
nomic undertaking to engage the attention of Canadian
governments on a large scale. The three transcontinental
lines all received ample, at times too ample, state aid in the
form of direct subsidies, grants of land or guarantees of bonds.
Today the Canadian National Railway System functions

48 CANADA TODAY

as a state-owned public corporation, with approximately
24,000 miles of track, or 57 per cent, of the total
Canadian mileage. The Canadian Pacific Railway, though
privately owned, is governed as to rates, the construction
of branch lines and certain other aspects of administration,
by the Dominion Board of Railway Commissioners. Many
other transportation facilities come under, public control.
All harbours and canals belong to the Dominion; harbours
are managed by a centralized National Harbours Board and
the canals by the Department of Transport. A system of
telegraphs, a number of hotels and an express delivery ser¬
vice belong to the Dominion as part of the Canadian National
Railways. The Post Office is a Dominion government depart¬
ment, and radio broadcasting is licensed and controlled
by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, modelled after
the British Broadcasting Corporation, and reaching many
Canadians with its own stations. From the period of the
war until 1936 the Dominion government operated a mer¬
chant marine, but in the latter year the ships were sold and
the service discontinued; the only shipping service now
carried on by the state is that connecting with the West
Indian ports in conformity with the Canadian-West Indian
Trade Agreement Act of 1926, and consisting of a fleet of
11 vessels. Dominion control over air transport has been
secured by the enforcement within Canada of the Conven¬
tion Relating to Aerial Navigation of 1919; the subject of
aerial navigation was held by the Privy Council in 1932 to
be within Dominion jurisdiction. In 1937 a corporation
known as Trans-Canada Air Lines, the shares of which are
owned by the Canadian National Railway Company, was
created to develop the transcontinental air service.

Besides these national services, the Dominion govern¬
ment controls economic policy through a number of agencies.
The maintenance of a tariff is the best example of a type
of state interference with business, which has always received
the hearty support of Canadian manufacturers. The use
of the tariff to achieve a political rather than an economic
objective is seen in the system of imperial preferences, in
force since 1898. Adjustments in the tariff can be effected

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 49

through the instrumentality of the Tariff Board to which
may be referred proposals for alterations of schedules.

Since 1935 Canada has had a central bank partly state-
controlled from the first, and now state-owned, which al¬
lows of increased control over the internal credit situation
and foreign exchange movements. 1 A Dominion Trade and
Industry Commission was created by Mr. Bennett in 1935
with authority to control unfair trade practices and enforce
commodity standards; this legislation was upheld by the
Privy Council but the Commission has been little employed
since the King government took office. A National Em¬
ployment Commission existed from 1936 to 1938 for the pur¬
pose of collecting information regarding unemployment and
advising as to the best measures to improve and co-ordinate
relief administration throughout the country; unemployment
relief generally, however, is managed by the provinces and •
municipalities with Dominion financial assistance.

Government control of marketing has been experimented
with to some degree. Mr. Bennett established a Wheat
Board with power to fix prices to producers and to market
the entire wheat crop, and he enacted the first Natural
Products Marketing Act to control, in co-operation with the
provinces, the marketing of many primary products. Mr.
King repealed the former legislation and the Privy Council
invalidated the latter, but the Wheat Board was replaced
by one with less extensive powers, and the provincial market¬
ing acts are still in operation to a limited extent.

Turning to the provincial services, the best known is the
Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission, which produces
and distributes electric power in Ontario. The distribution,
and in some cases the production also, of electric power is
provided in part by provincial commissions in Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Road build¬
ing is a major provincial service; in 1935 the funded pro¬
vincial debt for highways stood at close to 500 million dollars.
The telephone system is publicly owned in the three pro¬
vinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta; by this
means remote areas and sparsely populated districts are

!See special article on the Bank of Canada in the Canada Year Book, 1937, pp. 879-86.

CANADA TODAY

provided with telephone communication which private enter¬
prise would never have brought them. The retail sale of
alcoholic beverages is a state enterprise in all provinces but
Prince Edward Island, which enjoys prohibition.* In addi¬
tion to these provincial services, many municipalities have
their own systems for electric light and power, gas, water
and street railways.

The state in Canada has also intervened in the economic
sphere on behalf of industrial workers and certain other un¬
protected classes, by adopting various forms of social legis¬
lation. It would be impossible in brief compass to analyse
in detail this large body of law. It is mostly provincial in
character because of the constitutional allotment of powers,
in consequence it varies greatly in different parts of the
country. Dominion legislation is small in quantity. There
is no national labour code. The Dominion assists in the
payment of old age pensions, which are. now in force in
every province on a non-contributory basis; it also pays a
share of the money distributed by the provinces in unem¬
ployment relief. There is a Dominion Department of
Health, but it has exercised little direct administrative
authority save over certain health services of minor im¬
portance. A Dominion Industrial Disputes Investigation
Act makes possible the creation of voluntary arbitration and
conciliation boards in certain types of industrial dispute. A
pensions service for the blind was begun in 1937. A Farmers
Creditors Arrangement Act provides machinery for debt
adjustment between creditors and debtors. 2 The Dominion
co-operates with the provinces in the establishment and
operation of Employment Service Offices.

Provincial legislation provides workmen s compensation
in all but one of the provinces, payable in most instances out
of an insurance fund created by compulsory contributions
from employers only. Mothers’ allowances exist in seven
provinces. Minimum wages for women are set by boards

1 Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 626.

2See Easterbrook W T., "Agricultural Debt Adjustment”, Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, 1936, p. 390. Several provinces have also adopted measures
designed to protect farmers and householders against dispossession by creditors.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 51

for certain industries in seven provinces. New Brunswick
has a Fair Wage Act, enabling a board to fix in any trade,
industry or business wages and hours where these are found,
on inquiry, to be unfair. Legislation providing for enforce¬
ment and extension of collective labour agreements exists
in Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario and Alberta, and minimum
wages of male employees are thus fixed by piecemeal ar¬
rangement in a considerable number of industries. The state
does not set minimum male wages generally save in British
Columbia and Alberta. Health insurance has been enacted
in British Columbia, but has not yet been put into operation;
it exists nowhere else in Canada, though some provinces
provide payment for medical services to the unemployed.
Municipal doctors are fairly common in the prairies especi¬
ally in Saskatchewan, and experiments in voluntary co¬
operative health service organization on a city or county
basis, are being encouraged in Ontario. Every province
regulates hours of labour to some degree, but the 48-hour
week is by no means general. The Eight-Hour-Day Con¬
vention of 1919 was ratified by Canada in 1935; but the
legislation enacted by the Dominion Parliament in 1935 to
give effect to it was declared ultra vires by the Privy Council
in 1937. Compulsory education exists in every province
except Quebec.

No unemployment insurance exists in Canada, Mr. Ben¬
nett’s legislation of 1935 having been set aside by the Privy
Council. The King government in 1937 proposed an amend¬
ment to the B. N. A. Act to give jurisdiction over this head
to the Dominion; only five out of the nine provinces have
agreed to the proposal, and so far there has been no further
action taken to secure the change. There is no national
system regulating hours or wages, and no health insurance
or holidays with pay. State aid to assist housing develop¬
ment is extremely meagre. There is little uniformity in the
provincial regulations on the various matters covered by
social legislation. 1 Since the impetus to reform given by the

iln 1933 the total expenditure of all provinces on general factory and minimum wage
inspection was only 8.5 cents per non-agricultural worker, which was less than that spent
m the state of New Hampshire, which ranked thirty-fourth amongst the American states.
Keport of Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 1935, p. 129.

52 CANADA TODAY

depression there has been some improvement in the adminis¬
tration of the provincial social services, but no forward
movement can be expected until the financial relations and
distribution of constitutional powers between the Dominion
and the provinces are placed on a sounder basis.

STANDARDS OF LIVING

The standard of living of the Canadian people is generally
rated high. The enquiry conducted by the League of Nations
in 1929 into comparative living standards ranked Canada
second after the United States. 1 This investigation was
based on rather limited data, however. Moreover in a coun¬
try divided like Canada into economically distinct areas no
single description will do for the whole territory. The
Prairie Provinces of Canada, exposed as they have been to
the double scourge of low prices for wheat and prolonged
drought, have had their standard of living lowered further
during the depression and raised less during the recovery
than have the industrialized sections of the country. The
standard in Quebec is lower than that in Ontario, a fact
vividly revealed by contrasting the vital and health statistics
for the two provinces. 2 There are, too, factors of taste and
value which are impossible to include in any quantitative
analysis. The French Canadian, because of the character of
his religious education, tends to believe that a high standard
of living is a proof of “materialism” and a dangerous influ¬
ence on society. All that will be attempted here is to give
some statistics out of which a general picture of Canadian
conditions may emerge.

The average earnings disclosed by all wage-earners during
the twelve months prior to the last three censuses were as
follows : s

lSee International Labour Review, 1929, pp. 580, 876. The order of the first seven coun¬
tries was (Great Britain—100), U.S. 191, Canada 171, Australia 143, Denmark 104, Sweden
101, Irish Free State 98. Indices of real wages and cost of living have not varied sufficiently
since 1929 to alter this ranking to any great extent.

2See also table in Submission by the Government of Saskatchewan to the Royal Commission
on Dominion-Provincial Relations (1937), p. 297, showing that Ontario in 1931 with a popu¬
lation of 3.4 millions had about three times as many automobiles, radios and telephones
as Quebec, whose population was 2.9 millions.

iCanada Year Book ,1937 ,p. 789.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

Average Earnings of All Wage-Earners Ten Years
of Age or Over

Male Female

1911. $ 593 $313

1921. 1057 573

1931. 927 559

The same statistics show that in 1930 there were 60 per cent,
of the male workers and 82 per cent, of the female workers
receiving less than $1,000 a year. This was, however, a year
of declining revenues, and these figures include individuals
of all ages, as well as employments which provide some re¬
muneration in kind. Some attempt has been made by the
Dominion Bureau of Statistics to calculate earnings per
family for average families in selected cities; in 17 cities
studied the modal group (1930) was in the $1,200-$1,399 or
the $1,400-$1,599 income class.

These figures may be compared, with some caution, with
calculations of minimum budgets. A budget of minimum
requirements for a family of five produced by the Montreal
Council of Social Agencies in 1926 placed the amount of
necessary income at $1,102. Corrected for variations in the
cost of living index, this works out at $1,059 for 1930. This
would seem to indicate that average wages of individuals
would not enable them to support a family of five on a
minimum budget, but that in families where there are
several wage-earners the average is likely to be above the
minimum. 1

The 1931 census showed that for Canada as a whole 54.5
per cent, of urban householders lived in rented dwellings.
Land owning amongst farmers is high, four-fifths of the
number of farms being owned by those who work them.
Figures for acreage, however, show that more than one-third
of the acreage is worked by tenants and another third is
mortgaged to an average of 40 per cent, of its value. Be¬
tween 1921 and 1931 tenant acreage increased 34 per cent.,
part tenant acreage 111 per cent., while the fully owned

^Further statistics, particularly with regard to unemployed, will be found in Marsh,
I*. C., Health and Unemployment (Toronto, 1938), Chap. 20.

54 CANADA TODAY

acreage actually decreased. This tendency to concentration
of ownership in land has continued since 1931, at least on
the prairies, as appears from the figures presented by the
Saskatchewan government to the Rowell Commission. 1

The income tax in Canada begins for single persons at
$1,000, and for married persons with two children at $2,800.
In 1936 there were 199,102 Canadians who paid income tax.
Less than 12 per cent, of these were getting more than $5,000
per year. An estimate made of the distribution of total
national income amongst all wage and salary earners, based
on census and income tax returns for 1931, shows the follow¬
ing picture: 2

Number of

Per cent.

Income

Per cent.

Size of Income

Persons

(Millions

of Total

Male and Female

Total

of dollars)

Income

Under $1,000.

1,526,000

56.2

790.0

25.4

$1,000—$1,500.

643,000

23.7

805.0

25.9

$1,500—$3,000.

448,000

16.5

896.0

28.8

$3,000—$10,000. ...

85,000

3.2

401.0

12.9

$10,000—and over..

11,000

0.4

219.0

7.0

Totals.

2,713,000

100.0

3,111.0

100.0

This table shows that the 11,000 income receivers at the top
had as large a total income as 400,000 at the bottom of the
social scale. Almost half the total earnings went to 20 per

lSee Submission (op. cit.), p. 145. The figures are:

Year

1901

1921

1931

1936

LAND TENURE in SASKATCHEWAN, 1901-1936

Land

Farms

Owned

Rented

Owners

Tenants

O wner-T enants

Per cent.

96.1

80.5

70.5

65.2

Per cent.
3.9

19.5

29.5

34.8

Per cent.
96.1

77.6

66.5

60.7

Per cent.
1.6

10.8

15.4

20.4

Per cent.

2.3

11.6

18.1

18.9

See also Brief Submitted by the Government of Ontario to the Royal Commission on Domin¬
ion-Provincial Relations , Vol. I, p. 20, where it is shown that 14,948 or 5 per cent, of the
farm owners own 26,098,771 acres or 23.07 per cent, of the occupied farm acreage or
the Prairie Provinces.

2Woodsworth, J. S., Distribution of Personal Income In Canada, cited League for Social
Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada (Toronto, 1935), p. 16.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 55

cent, of the earners. Statistics for bank deposits for 1935
indicate a similar maldistribution of wealth: 92.5 per cent,
of the four million depositors have accounts averaging only
a little over $100; the top 1 per cent, of depositors own 35
per cent, of total deposits. 1 An insurance company has cal¬
culated (1937) that of every 100 Canadian men starting life
at 25, by age 65 “36 have died, 1 is wealthy, 4 are well-to-do,
5 live on earnings, 54 are no longer self-supporting”. 2

In 1934 the Royal Commission on Price Spreads made an
extensive examination of economic conditions in the coun¬
try, and many Canadians, accustomed to believe that all
workers in the Dominion enjoyed a high standard of living,
were shocked at the disclosures of extremely low wages and
poor working conditions in a number of Canadian industries.
In some instances the offenders were industries enjoying
monopoly power and high protection. “The evidence before
the Commission proves that, in certain industries, the sweat
shop still survives in Canada and that, more generally,
unemployment and low wages have reduced many workers
to a state of abject poverty.” 3 A great many men and
women were found to be working for rates of ten cents per
hour or less. At the same time there were (November, 1934)
I»149,063 Canadians dependent on direct relief. 4 A family
of five on relief in Montreal was receiving $39.48 per month;
this had reached $42.23 by 1936. Other “black patches”
undoubtedly exist in the country: even in 1937 the Chevrier
Commission on Transportation found truck drivers receiving
$15 to $18 per week of 65 hours in Ontario. A proposed mini¬
mum wage ordinance for unskilled labour in Quebec in
February, 1938, suggested hourly rates ranging from 15 to 25
cents, which were an advance on current rates of from 5 to
20 per cent.

From the depression figures there has, of course, been some
recovery. Relief expenditures have dropped considerably,
though in part this is due to drastic cutting of relief rolls and

• ^Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 902. The 1 per cent, includes corporation as well as
individual accounts.

p l 2 f itCd> ^ eague * or Social Reconstruction, Democracy Needs Socialism (Toronto, 1938),

3 Report of Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 1935, p. 107.

4 Report of Dominion Commissioner of Unemployment Relief, March 30, 1935, p. 22.

56 CANADA TODAY

a maintenance of grants at bare subsistence levels. Pro¬
vincial regulation of wages and hours has improved, and
doubtless has eliminated some of the worst conditions dis¬
closed by the Price Spreads Inquiry. Mr. Bennett s attempt
to deal nationally with Canadian economic and social
problems failed, however, and there is no possibility that
the unco-ordinated provincial action can deal adequately
with the situation. Minimum wages for experienced women
workers under existing regulation in Ontario and Quebec are
$12.50 per week of 48 to 54 hours. There are still 951,000
persons dependent on direct relief. 1 Another depression
could easily reproduce, in intensified form, the suffering of
the last crisis. A growing militancy amongst Canadian
trades unions in 1936-37, moving even the usually tranquil
Catholic Syndicates in Quebec to carry on strikes, is an indi¬
cation of a feeling amongst the industrial workers in Canada
that legislatures have failed to assist them and that self-help
is necessary to improve their living standards.

An interesting contrast between the living conditions in
two different areas in the country, the prairies and Ontario,
is provided by the following analysis made of the 1931 census
material:

When the census was taken in the summer of 1931 a period of rela¬
tive prosperity enjoyed by western agriculture had just drawn to a
close. The census gives a total of 288,000 farms for the three Prairie
provinces and 192,000 for Ontario, and contains a brief record of farm
facilities in all the provinces. Of the 288,000 farms of the Prairie pro¬
vinces, 5,036 have water piped in the kitchen; or one out of every
57.20 farms in western Canada in contrast with one out of every 9.54
in Ontario. In the West one out of every 72.8 has water piped in the
bathroom (it would be interesting to know how many have a bathroom
of any kind) as compared with one out of 15.76 in Ontario. One out of
every 34.44 Western farmhouses is lighted by gas or electricity as com¬
pared with one out of 5.95 in Ontario. In proportion to farms Ontario
has more than twice as many rural telephones and over 40 per cent,
more rural automobiles than western Canada. Of these automobiles
four out of five in Ontario, four out of seventy-six in Western Canada,
may travel on paved or gravelled highways, or, 20 per cent, of Ontario

lDecember, 1937. This includes 551,000 non-agricultural and 400,000 agricultural
persons receiving aid. Labour Gazette, February, 1938, p. 124.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 57

farms and 94.7 per cent, of all western farms are located on dirt
roads.” 1

Canada shows many of the characteristics of an older
industrial community as regards standards of living and the
distribution of income. It reveals a great concentration of
wealth, the social counterpart of the trend to monopoly,
while not only amongst the unemployed but also amongst
a considerable section of industrial and agricultural labourers
the standard of living is low. In the intermediate brackets
there is an average standard lower than that of equivalent
groups in the United States but considerably higher than
that in Europe. Even the better paid Canadian employees,
however, are without the social security provisions which
most European workers enjoy.

LABOUR AND FARMER ORGANIZATIONS IN CANADA

( A ) Labour Organization.

By comparison with most democratic countries the Cana¬
dian labour movement is in the earlier stages of development.
The total membership in Canadian unions in 1931 was only
310,544 out of a total wage-earning group of 2,570,000. Even
excluding from this latter figure the professional and higher-
paid salaried workers, there would remain at least 2,000,000
whom a trades-union movement might hope to organize.
This means that more than 85 per cent, of the workers were
unorganized. 2 In 1936 union membership had only risen to
322,473, 3 which is less than it was in 1919-20 despite the
increase in population.

Not only are most Canadian workers unprotected by
trades unions, but such unions as exist are divided against
each other. The Roman Catholic Church in Quebec, fearful
of losing its hold over the industrialized French-Canadian
workers, organized the Federation of Catholic Workers of
Canada in 1921. These Catholic Syndicates, as they are

Hnnis and Plumptre (eds.), op. cit., p. 110.

foetal Planning for Canada , p. 114. Canada was ranked twenty-third amongst the
nur^ nS b ? X r th 1 e , te . rn f t 3 onal federation of Trades Unions in 1925; Brady, A., Canada
(Modern World Series) (London, 1932), p. 257.

iAnnual Report on Labour Organization, 1936.

58 CANADA TODAY

called, have a priest as chaplain to every local, and seldom
move without clerical advice. 1 They have hitherto been more
concerned with carrying on struggles against communism
and the international unions than against employers for
better wages, though in 1937 they conducted several incon¬
clusive strikes. Their membership in 1936 was 45,000.

The principal non-sectarian unions are divided between
the “international” unions and the “national” unions. The
international unions are affiliates of the American Federa¬
tion of Labor or the Committee on Industrial Organization,
to which they pay dues. Part of these dues, however, is
remitted to Canada to finance the Trades and Labour
Congress of Canada, the co-ordinating authority for the
Dominion. In 1936 the Congress, representing 66 organiza¬
tions, had a membership of 149,398, the total membership of
international unions being 174,769. The split between the
A. F. of L. and the C. I.O. has not been permitted to invade
Canada, and most C. I. O. unions are still members of the
Trades and Labour Congress. Indeed it seems that the
principal support of the Trades and Labour Congress comes
from unions which have split from, or have never been in, the
A. F. of L. in the United States. 2

The national unions in Canada are organized in the All-
Canadian Congress of Labour which has a membership
(1936) of 31,883. It favours the industrial rather than the
craft union. Its members constantly exploit the patriotic
appeal in their fight against the international unions. In
addition to this organization there exist some smaller or¬
ganizations, like the Canadian Federation of Labour, which
split from the All-Canadian Congress (membership, 1936,
25,081), and the once powerful One Big Union (membership,
24,000, in 1935) which operates in the western provinces.
Total membership in Canadian unions, excluding the Catho¬
lic unions, was about 100,000.

Many reasons may be given for the backward condition

iThe constitution of the Federation contains this clause: “The F.C.W.C. is a frankly
and openly Catholic organization. It affiliates with itself Catholic organizations alone, it
adheres to the whole doctrine of the Church and it promises always and in everything to
follow the directions of the Pope and of the Canadian bishops." Quoted Latham, A. B.,
The Catholic and National Labour Unions of Canada (Toronto, 1930), p. 99.

2Ware Norman J. and Logan, H. A., Labor in Canadian-American Relations (Toronto,
1937), p. 68.

THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

of Canadian labour organization. Race, religion and geo¬
graphy make union difficult. Workers in mines and forests
may be hundreds of miles from the nearest urban centres.
Often they are in “company towns”. The individualist
philosophy pervades North America, and a belief in steady
financial progress as the inevitable reward for honest toil
continues to dominate the outlook of the people, making
even those inside the unions poor proselytizers and those
outside blind to the need for co-operation. The constant
addition of new immigrants to the Canadian labour market
up to 1930 provided employers with cheap labour willing to
work hard to establish itself in its new home, and liable to
deportation at the hands of administrative tribunals if it ran
foul of the law. Between 1930 and 1934, when there was
considerable labour unrest due to the depression, more
immigrants were deported than in the previous 27 years,
many for acts arising out of their connection with radical
movements. Moreover, the lack of a common background in
the workers has been an additional factor in enabling large-
scale industrial enterprises to oppose trade unionism very
effectively. When the premier of the largest industrial
province in Canada can enter an election with a policy of
preventing Canadian workers from choosing their own
unions freely, it would seem to indicate, even though his
threats were not implemented by legislation, that the public
have not moved very far in the political direction travelled
by New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain. 1

Labour’s lack of organization is reflected also in the ab¬
sence of a consumer’s co-operative movement in Canada.
Some beginnings have been made, but the total membership
in retail co-operative societies affiliated with the Co-opera¬
tive Union of Canada was only 11,000 in 1935, and the total
number of societies was 34. 2 These figures, however, do not
include the credit unions in Quebec known as the “Caisses
Populaires”, which have a considerable membership. An
interesting experiment in co-operation is being carried on in

iMr. Hepburn bitterly fought the C.I.O. when it first became active in Ontario. See
Ware and Logan, op. cit., pp. 63 ff. He interpreted his victory in the election of 1937
as an endorsation of his anti-C.I.O. pblicy. (See Montreal Gazette , October 7, 1937.)

2 Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 767.

60 CANADA TODAY

Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island under the direction
of St. Francis Xavier University.

( B) Farmer Organization.

By contrast with Canadian labour, the Canadian farmers,
particularly in the western provinces, have shown great initi¬
ative. Both on the side of economic and of political organiza¬
tion they have been active. Whereas total sales in the retail
co-operatives amounted to less than $4,000,000, total busi¬
ness in the agricultural co-operatives amounted to over
$158,000,000 in 1935, while their membership was 367,000.
The biggest and best-known of these societies are the wheat
pools of western Canada. Despite their losses during the
depression the pools have survived as co-operative elevator
companies and in 1936 handled approximately 50 per cent,
of the total wheat crop of the Dominion.

From the farmers also have come the most successful inde¬
pendent political movements in Canada. The Ontario
farmers captured the provincial legislature in 1919, and the
United Farmers of Alberta were successful in the provincial
elections of 1921. In 1922 Manitoba returned a farmer
government. Sixty-six “Progressives”, as these farmer
groups were generally called, were elected to the Dominion
Parliament in 1921, twenty-four from Ontario and forty-one
from the western provinces. 1 All these groups lost ground
as the boom period of the 1920’s gathered momentum.
They had no political philosophy to differentiate them from
traditional liberalism, and to that fold they mostly returned.
The United Farmers of Alberta survived the longest until,
due to the depression and internal difficulties, they were
overwhelmingly defeated by William Aberhart and his Social
Credit followers in 1935.

lBrady, Canada, p. 110.

POLITICAL PARTIES

T HE party system in Canada is a convention of the con¬
stitution, as it is in England. The law does not require
it, but the present working of the governmental machin¬
ery depends upon it. There are two major parties in the
Dominion field, Liberals and Conservatives, which have
alternated in office since Confederation with the single excep¬
tion of the Union government of 1917-21. Parties of the
same names, though not always with the same policies,
contest provincial elections and have generally controlled
provincial politics. There are also a number of minor
parties, which rise and fall with the varying stimuli to poli¬
tical action and which have hitherto been more successful
in the provincial than in the federal arena.

LIBERAL

The Liberal Party, led by Mr. Mackenzie King, now forms
the Dominion government, with the largest majority in the
House of Commons since Confederation, though a minority
in the Senate. 1 The party is also in power in every province
except Quebec and Alberta. It last wrote a programme at a
convention held in 1919, but programmes count for little in
Canada except amongst the minor parties before they attain
power. In general it has stood for nationalism in its political
relations with the Commonwealth and other countries, and
internationalism in trade. It has been responsible for most
of the initiative in the development of Canadian autonomy
within the Commonwealth since 1921, for it held office from
that year until 1930, except for a brief interval in 1926. Its

lThe Canadian Senate being nominative and not elective, a victory at the polls does
not change the composition of the upper house until vacancies caused by death can be
filled by new nominations.

I §§1

srei

i£P£Si

62 CANADA TODAY

tariff policy has always been more moderate than that of the
Conservatives, though it does not favour free trade. It has
advocated social legislation in principle, but since it has also
supported “provincial rights” it has been either unable or
unwilling to implement these principles in the Dominion field
save in a comparatively small degree. It is opposed to all
attempts to control production or marketing, and inclines
to view the state as the traditional policeman standing on
the edge of the open market to see that competition is fair.
The progressive disappearance of the open market has not
altered its attitude. It draws its support from all parts of
the country and all classes of people; the name ‘Liberal’
unites ultra-conservative protectionist French Catholics
from Quebec (most of whom have voted Liberal for years)
and progressive free-trade British Protestants from the west¬
ern provinces. Imperial preference was the invention of the
Liberal party; the Ottawa agreements, though loyally ob¬
served by it, run counter to its aim of freeing the channels of
world trade generally.

CONSERVATIVE

The Conservative party has traditionally been a party of
imperial co-operation abroad and economic nationalism at
home—an inconsistency the exact reverse of that found in
Canadian Liberalism. Its pro-imperialist leaning, however,
has not excluded a growing acceptance of the idea of Domin¬
ion autonomy. Sir Robert Borden, in fact, took the lead
among Dominion prime ministers in pressing for a definition
of Dominion status. The party has never professed a belief
in state interference with business, but under Mr. Bennett,
who was appointed leader in 1927 and who held office from
1930 to 1935, the party programme took such a sudden shift
to the “left” that it made the Liberals appear far more
conservative than the Conservatives. A glance at the
Dominion statutes of 1933-35 will reveal how active was the
Conservative leader in the promotion of social reform and
state control of the economy. Mr. Bennett nationalized the
radio, created a central bank, established a national system
of marketing boards for primary products, pegged the price

POLITICAL PARTIES

of wheat and placed the whole wheat export trade under a
Wheat Board, negotiated a St. Lawrence Waterways Treaty
with the United States, entered into the Ottawa agreements,
initiated the new reciprocity agreement with Washington,
extended the criminal law to prohibit unfair trade practices,
created a Trade and Industry Commission to enforce the new
prohibitions, and adopted Dominion legislation to deal with
unemployment insurance, minimum wages, maximum hours,
and the weekly day of rest. In the face of this political tour
de force it is difficult to know how to describe the political
philosophy of the Conservative party in Canada today.
It is certainly not Tory, not laissez-faire liberal, and not the
same as appears from its previous programme of 1927. The
party is in partial eclipse; it holds but 37 seats at Ottawa
and controls no provincial legislature; Mr. Bennett has
announced his retirement; a new leader is to be chosen and
a new programme written. Whoever the leader may be, it
is likely that the party will continue at least moderately pro¬
gressive in its programme and will seek to attract the
younger men who are dissatisfied with the lack of action and
leadership in the present Liberal party. It is likely also that
there will be a further move toward nationalism in foreign
affairs; already the party name has been changed from
Liberal-Conservative (the double title derives from a distant
past) to National-Conservative. The change is a reflection
of the shift in Canadian opinion generally, and also a bid for
French-Canadian support.

It must always be remembered, however, that the two
major parties in Canada, like any parties, need campaign
funds, and neither of them depends upon membership fees
for its principal support. They consequently rely for the
most part upon the contributions of well-to-do individuals
and corporations. Such help sets immediate limits to the
kind of political action which may be expected from them. 1
So long as this relationship between private and corporate

lSolnetimes this help is given in return for specific concessions. Any student^who
wishes a realistic view of Canadian politics should read “After Beauharnois—What?”, by
R. A. MacKay, in Maclean’s Magazine , Oct. 15, 1931, reprinted in Dawson, R. MacG.,
Constitutional Issues in Canada , 1900-1931 (London, 1933), p. 208. Other articles on Cana¬
dian political parties will be found in the latter volume. For a good historical analysis,
see “The Development of National Political Parties in Canada”, by F. H. Underhill,
Canadian Historical Review, 1935, p. 367.

CANADA TODAY

wealth and the two major parties exists, so long will it be
true that neither of them will sponsor anything approaching
a labour or social-democratic programme; nor will either
interfere greatly with the tariff structure behind which
Canadian industry has grown up.

An acute observer of Canadian affairs, M. Andre Sieg¬
fried, has left a description of the Liberal and Conservative
parties as he saw them in 1906. 1 It still is relevant despite
the passage of a generation. The parties are constituted,
he points out, on the British model with British names, but
their methods of controlling constituencies and the tone of
their polemics are derived from the United States. They are
quite detached from the principles which gave them birth,
and tend to become mere associations for the securing of
power. Whichever side succeeds, it is well known that the
country will be governed in much the same way. Canadian
statesmen stand in fear of great movements of opinion, and
seek to lull them rather than to encourage them and bring
them to fruition. They fear that the unity of the Dominion
will be endangered if vital questions are raised, and exert
themselves to prevent the formation of homogeneous parties
divided according to creed or race or class. The result is
that Liberals and Conservatives differ very little in their
opinions upon crucial questions, since they are both made up
of the same varied elements; employers and labourers,
townsmen and farmers, French and English, Catholics and
Protestants. 2 Despite this similarity of programme and be¬
haviour, the parties are sacred institutions to be forsaken
only at the risk of one’s reputation and career. It is rarely
indeed that a Canadian politician shifts his party allegiance.

While this situation is open to attack by the political
scientist, it is understandable in view of the varied elements
and interests within Canada. The major parties provide a
political facade which covers up the ill-joined sections under¬
neath, and by so doing create a certain spirit of unity, some¬
times more apparent than real, even where there is little

iSiegfried, A., The Race Question in Canada (London, 1907), pp. 141 ff.

2The Liberal programme of 1919 and the Conservative programme of 1927 are to be
found in Dawson, op. cit. Their similarity is striking.

POLITICAL PARTIES 65

basis for it. At times the cracks are evident even through
the facade.

SOCIAL CREDIT

In 1935 Social Credit suddenly became a force in Canadian
politics. With no previous record of steady growth and little
warning of its coming power, it placed Mr. Aberhart in office
in Alberta in the provincial elections of 1935, and sent seven¬
teen members to the Dominion House of Commons to be¬
come the third largest group at Ottawa. It has attempted
to spread its doctrine into other western provinces, with
some slight success; two Saskatchewan constituencies were
won in the federal elections of 1935 and 5 Manitoban seats
in the provincial elections of 1936. The party, however,
failed to elect a member in the British Columbia elections
of 1937, and, despite an organized “invasion” from Alberta,
won only two seats in the recent Saskatchewan elections. 1

The economic proposals of Social Credit have been found
impossible of application in Alberta. Its opponents ascribe
this to their inherent falsity; Mr. Aberhart ascribes it to
the opposition of the eastern bankers and their “tools” at
Ottawa. The disallowance of three Albertan statutes by the
Dominion government in 1937, and the setting aside of three
others in 1938 by the Canadian Supreme Court, 2 indicate
that both Liberal party policy and the B. N. A. Act stand
in the way of any thorough attempt at this particular eco¬
nomic experiment in a single Canadian province.

It would be unwise, however, to assume that either Mr.
Aberhart or Social Credit is politically finished by this
rebuff. The movement is at bottom an agrarian revolt in
the west against the financial and commercial policies of the
east (Montreal and Toronto). “It is the fundamental feeling
of dissatisfaction with national fiscal policies which have
placed burdens upon agriculture for the benefit of secondary

iResults of the Saskatchewan election of June 8, 1938, in 50 of the 52 seats, were:

Liberal C.C.F. Social Credit Conservative Other

Number of members. 36 10 2 0 2

Percentage of vote. 46 19 15 12 8

Percentage of vote, 1934... 48 24 0 27 1

20n the ground that the laws infringed the exclusive Dominion power to regulate banks
and banking, currency, and interprovincial trade and commerce. An appeal has been taken
to the Privy Council. See (1938) 2 D.L.R., p. 81.

CANADA TODAY

industry; and it is also the deep agrarian hatred of high
interest rates, mortgages and debt.” 1 These underlying
causes are not removed by disproving the A plus B theorem.
Mr. Aberhart is capable of reviving a lagging support by
adopting a new line of attack, as he did in 1936 with his debt
reduction legislation; he is not likely to be displaced until
some other party appears equally concerned to protect the
farmers' interests.

CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION

In 1932 an attempt was made to unite farmer and labour
movements in Canada under one political banner. Their
common interests vis-a-vis an economic system becoming
increasingly monopolistic were growing clear to many of
their supporters, and a conference in Calgary in that year
succeeded in forming an alliance between delegates repre¬
senting nearly all the local farmer and labour parties of the
four western provinces. 2 The name Co-operative Common¬
wealth Federation was chosen, to symbolize a federation of
parties working together for a Canadian co-operative com¬
monwealth. The leadership was placed in the hands of
J. S. Woodsworth, veteran social reformer and labour repre¬
sentative from Winnipeg. In 1933 a number of “white-
collar” and professional people joined the movement and a
party manifesto was issued with a programme calling for a
regulated economy based on wide public ownership of finan¬
cial institutions and industries. The C.C.F. takes as its
models the labour parties of other parts of the Common¬
wealth and of the Scandinavian countries.

The party has had some electoral success. It polled
400,000 votes in the general election of 1935, 3 despite the
sudden emergence into the political arena of two new protest
parties—Social Credit and the Reconstruction party. It is

iFerguson, G. V., “Economic and Political Outlook of the Canadian West”, in Anderson,
Violet (ed.), World Currents and Canada's Course , p. 115.

2The original groups represented at the Conference which launched the C.C.F. were
the United Farmers of Alberta, the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan section),
the Canadian Labour Party of Alberta, the Independent Labour Party and Co-operative
Labour Party of Saskatchewan, the Independent Labour Party of Manitoba, the Socialist
Party of Canada (British Columbia) and the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees.

3In that election the Liberals polled 47 per cent, of the popular vote, the Conservatives
30 per cent., the C.C.F. 9 per cent., the Reconstruction party 9 per cent., and the Social
Credit party 4 per cent.

the official opposition in Saskatchewan and was for three
years in British Columbia, though in each case the groups
were small. Twenty-seven C.C.F. members were sitting
in Canadian legislatures in 1937, of whom seven were at
Ottawa. The party suffered, however, at first from internal
dissensions and later, when these were overcome, from its
lack of ability to create an organization and to raise funds.
The inability of most international trades unions to take part
in politics bars this form of support, 1 and the Catholic clergy
in Quebec have warned their flock against the C.C.F. on the
ground that no one can be both a Catholic and a socialist,
thus making progress in Quebec almost impossible. At the
present moment the movement is largely western, being
strongest in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba,
with small organized groups in Ontario, Quebec and New
Brunswick.

KnSaHE

life

OTHER GROUPS

The Communist party has been organized in Canada since
1924. It became nationally important after its eight leaders
were imprisoned in 1931, but since their release has made
little headway. Its existence provides Quebec authorities
with an excuse for adopting reactionary laws, although its
programme of activity at the moment is of the popular front
variety. Its influence, particularly amongst the foreign-born
worker group in Canada, however, has been considerable.
Only one Communist has every succeeded in getting elected
to a Canadian legislature, 2 although Tim Buck, the national
secretary, always polls a substantial vote in the civic elec¬
tions in Toronto.

The Reconstruction party was organized by the Honour¬
able H.. H. Stevens just before the 1935 elections, with a
programme of progressive Conservatism much like that of
Mr. Bennett. Mr. Stevens had been Mr. Bennett’s Minister
of Trade and Commerce but resigned in 1935 after a dispute
with his chief. Though polling a substantial vote, the party
returned its founder as its sole representative to Ottawa.
Since then it has not functioned as a political machine, and
the split with the Conservative party is likely to be healed.

iThere are signs that this attitude is changing in Canada as in the United States.
2In Manitoba.

68 CANADA TODAY

Another important political movement in Canada is the
Union Nationale in Quebec. But this is part of the wider
subject of French-Canadian nationalism, and will be dealt
with in the following chapter.

*****

The political situation in Canada is not stable. Its two
outstanding characteristics at the moment are the unco¬
operative attitude of the provincial governments of Quebec,
Ontario and Alberta, and the inactivity of the Dominion
authorities in face of grave national problems. The three
provincial premiers “steal all the headlines”, while Ottawa
is waiting for reports from its numerous Royal Commissions.
So far has sectionalism developed that the Royal Com¬
mission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, faced with the
most important national task of any public body in Canada
since confederation, has not been able to secure even a
promise of co-operation from all the provinces. The absence
of a firm leadership from Ottawa leaves the sense of national
unity voiceless and unorganized against the attacks of pro¬
vincial autonomists. Between the laissez-faire Dominion
government on the right wing and the scattered forces of
the political left, is a wide area of dissatisfied citizens not
knowing where to turn. A sense of direction is wanting, and
none can predict whence it will come.

CHAPTER V

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN FRENCH

CANADA

HE French Canadians in Canada now number about

X 3,300,000. They form the most homogeneous and united
group in the country, for they are not divided by reli¬
gion or racial origin, and their upper governing class is not
in control of great wealth and hence far removed from the
mass of the people. Moreover, their sense of being ringed
round by an alien civilization makes them subordinate their
inner differences to the single racial purpose of self-preserva¬
tion. Their home is the province of Quebec, where 78 per
cent, of those in Canada live (the number in the United
States is variously estimated at 13^ to 3 millions); but the
spread into other provinces is proceeding steadily. In 1871
only 14 per cent, of the French Canadians lived outside
Quebec; in 1931, 22 per cent. did. Their percentage of the
provincial populations in 1931 was: Quebec, 79; New Bruns¬
wick, 33.5; Prince Edward Island, 14.7; Nova Scotia, 11;
Ontario, 8.7; Manitoba, 6.7; Saskatchewan, 5.5; Alberta,
5.2; British Columbia and territories, 2.2. These figures
show the strong eastern concentration of the race.

BASIS OF FRENCH-CANADIAN NATIONALISM

The French Canadian in a real sense is the truest Cana¬
dian. He has lived on the soil for three hundred years, and
the family ties with another world have long been broken.
To Canada alone does he feel attached, for England con¬
quered him and France first deserted him and then travelled
a political and spiritual road his clergy have taught him to
abhor. He sees no help coming from without; he knows he
must build upon his own resources. And when he thinks of
“Canada”, he seldom, like the English Canadian, pictures a
“dominion stretching from sea to sea”; rather he looks to
the province of Quebec and the valley of the St. Lawrence,

70 CANADA TODAY

the part of North America to which the word “Canada” was
first applied. To the English Canadian this is mere provin¬
cialism; to him, it is nationalism and true patriotism. 1 He
builds outward from his securely held position and does not
attempt to embrace the rest of a continent where now there
are only a few outposts of his race.

Because of this basis to his politics, the French Canadian
looks upon both the Commonwealth connection and con¬
federation in much the same way; they are both political
ties with the English which are part of his historic destiny.
He cannot avoid them; he does not, at the moment, wish to
break them, but they do not command his warm allegiance.
Both represent a mariage de convenance. The British con¬
nection is valuable to him in helping to fend off Americaniza¬
tion, and the monarchic tradition is naturally dear to a
priesthood fearful of democracy. Confederation was the
best bargain that he could make at the time with a Pro¬
testant majority; to him the B. N. A. Act is as much a
“treaty between races” as a political constitution. 2 In the
historic evolution of his relationship with English Canada,
which he views as a continuous development, the confedera¬
tion arrangement is neither evocative of particular loyalty
nor suggestive of great permanence. 3 His political status has
already been changed five times—by the cession of 1763,
the Quebec Act of 1774, the Constitutional Act of 1791, the
Act of Union of 1840 and the B. N. A. Act of 1867. When¬
ever the next change comes, he is determined that it will
result in no loss of privileges or autonomy for himself.

Such is the general character of French-Canadian nationa¬
lism, and it will be recognized as the natural aspiration of a
people who believe in themselves and who are determined
to survive with their language, their traditions and their
religion. From time to time, however, and more particularly
of recent years, there has arisen an extremer form of nationa-

1A leader of the more moderate nationalists, Mr. L. M. Gouin, K.C., has said “We
Quebecers ... do not put Ottawa above Quebec. ... If we have to choose between the
Confederation and our own nationality, we refuse to sacrifice the soul of our race either
to the Dominion or to the Empire”.,- Anderson, Violet (ed.), World Currents and Canada's
Course (Toronto, 1937), p. 124.

2See Brossard, R., “The Working of Co» federation”, Canadian Journal of Economics
and Political Science, 1937, p. 335.

3See Siegfried, Canada , pp. 258, 263; Hudon, Tb4ophile, Est-ce la Fin de la Confedera¬
tion? (Montreal, 1936), pp. 18 ff.

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN FRENCH CANADA 71

list fervour, which resembles closely the movements which
have swept over Ireland and other European countries where
there is a racial group struggling for freedom. This spirit
manifests itself in economic as well as political forms; it
seeks immediate steps toward independence for the race,
and it is intolerant of alien groups and alien rights. In
Quebec such a movement is now running strong. 1 It has
been stimulated by the world depression, which caused great
unemployment amongst French Canadians; by the growing
awareness of the extent to which Quebec is dominated by
English-Canadian and American “trusts” and financiers; by
the fear of another imperialist war, and by the decadence
of the old Liberal party machine which had governed the
province without a break from 1896 to 1936. To some
degree also it was fostered by certain of the clerical authori¬
ties, who saw in a revival of nationalism a means of fending
off social unrest which might easily turn radical and begin
to question the utility of the wealth and privileges possessed
by the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec.

UNION NATION ALE

Politically the nationalist movement has taken the form
of the creation of a new provincial party, the Union Na-
tionale, which has been in power since 1936, and which is
pledged to give to the French Canadian the place in Con¬
federation which he feels has been denied him. Its leader is
Maurice Duplessis, formerly leader of the provincial Con¬
servative party, who was politically astute enough to ride
to power on the new wave of feeling which has swept the
province in the past few years. His activities since taking
office have been varied but always colourful. He and his
fellow premiers, Mr. Hepburn of Ontario and Mr. Aberhart
of Alberta, provide the only vigorous—if erratic—leadership
to be found in Canadian politics today.

Out of the Union Nationale has come some needed reform
in the social legislation of the province. Collective labour

iSee “Nationalism in French Canada”, Round Table , December, 1936; Lower, A. R. M.,
“External Policy and Internal Problems”, University of Toronto Quarterly, April, 1937, p. 3;
Bovey, Wilfrid, “French Canada and the Problem of Quebec”, Nineteenth Century, January*
1938, p. 731; Angus, H. F. (ed.), Canada and Her Great Neighbor (Toronto and New Haven’
1938), passim.

72 CANADA TODAY

agreements are favoured, co-operative institutions are being
promoted, and collaboration with Ontario on minimum wage
rates has been sought. The nationalist feeling has found
expression in the attempts that have been made to give pre¬
eminence to the French language in the interpretation of
laws, 1 to frighten workers away from the international
unions, and to obstruct all efforts to amend the British
North America Act. Behind the attack on international
unionism, however, many people see something quite differ¬
ent from nationalism; a deeper motive seems to be the de¬
sire to prevent “communistic” ideas from entering the pro¬
vince and disturbing the religious and political views of the
population. The “Padlock Act” and the growing censorship
of films and literature are other weapons in the same of¬
fensive.

In achieving its economic objectives French-Canadian
nationalism is meeting great difficulties. It is only in recent
years that the economic aspect of their position has engaged
the attention of the nationalist leaders; the older generation,
men like Bourassa and Lavergne, were concerned chiefly
with political and religious affairs. The world depression
shifted the emphasis to the economic. In Quebec the natural
resources in mines, forests and water power, the banks and
financial houses, are largely owned and exploited by English-
Canadian or American capital; the French Canadian pro¬
vides the cheap labour, usually lacking trades union pro¬
tection. The nationalists of today are determined that this
situation shall change, and that in their own province they
shall not be restricted to exercising a political power rendered
helpless by the existence of concentrated economic power in
other hands. With this determination many English Cana¬
dians, only too aware of the situation in Quebec in regard to
living standards and social legislation, would warmly sym¬
pathize. The difficulty is to decide upon a practical policy
for effecting a change, and here the nationalists are at the
moment baffled. A straightforward socialist programme
would give them the control they want, for the state could

iBy a statute adopted in 1937 the French version of statutes and codes was made to
prevail whenever it differed from the English. The law was repealed in 1938 because of
its unsettling effect on the established interpretation of the law and because of its doubtful
constitutionality in view of section 133 of the B.N.A. Act.

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN FRENCH CANADA 73

then expropriate the “foreign” (i.e. non-French) capital and
place French Canadians in charge of their own state-con-
trolled utilities. But socialism at the moment stands
condemned by the clergy of Quebec. Consequently the
nationalist movement is in an impasse; it must risk clerical
censure or else continue to submit to economic inferiority.
So far it has avoided the first alternative, and has had to
content itself with such measures as compelling foreign
corporations developing natural resources to take out pro¬
vincial charters, beginning a tentative programme of hydro¬
electric development under state control, supporting “la
petite Industrie in the small towns in the province, and
stimulating the “achat chez nous ” which is the French-
Canadian equivalent of a “buy British” campaign. It is
impossible to predict how long these slender achievements
will satisfy the demand for action. The drive against “com¬
munism” in Quebec, sponsored by the clergy, is a powerful
deterrent to any proposals that the government should
expropriate existing investments, for the accusation of
“communist” would at once be hurled at any daring advo¬
cate of such an idea. 1

The political and economic situation in Quebec is transi¬
tional. Much will change before a new equilibrium is found.
The increasing urbanization and hence industrialization of
the French-Canadian people, and the exploitation of their
workers by corporations which they do not control, are pro¬
ducing fertile soil for a more radical movement among the
masses than has yet appeared. For that reason the other
parts of Canada are viewing with some alarm the growth of
a fascist movement in the province, and the denial by the
authorities of long-established constitutional rights of free¬
dom of the press, of speech, and of public meeting. The
“Padlock Act”, aimed only at an undefined “communism”,
is being enforced though communism in Quebec is in fact
almost non-existent, while organized fascist parties are drill¬
ing members and distributing extreme anti-semitic propa¬
ganda without interference of any sort. The mass of the

iMr. Duplessis, for example, was charged with following Russian and Mexican tactics
by the Liberal opposition leader in Quebec simply because he ventured to remove some of
the tolls from an important private bridge leading to the island of Montreal.

74 CANADA TODAY

people, there seems little doubt, do not favour the fascist
movement, yet there are enough idle young men in the cities
to give it considerable support, and enough approval by
authorities in church and state of strong action against
suspected “reds” to provide an atmosphere in which fascism
can flourish. 1 Whatever may be the outcome, it will pro¬
foundly affect the whole Dominion, for the French exert an
extremely powerful political influence at Ottawa. No na¬
tional policy can long be followed which does not receive
considerable support from Quebec.

iSee “Embryo Fascism in Quebec”, by “S.”, Foreign Affairs, April, 1938.

W HEN the Dominion of Canada was created in 1867
the federal form of government was preferred to the
unitary state. The choice was due to the insistence
of the French Canadians upon the preservation of their own
laws, customs and traditions, and also to the strong local
patriotism of the Maritime Provinces, which were sceptical
of the wisdom of confederation. Racial divisions and sec¬
tional feelings thus became embedded in the governmental
structure. The constitution as adopted, however, was more
centralized than its American model, for civil war was
raging to the south when the British North America Act was
being framed, and the cause of the conflict seemed to the
Canadian statesmen to lie in the doctrine of “states’ rights”.
The United States had reserved to the states or to the people
the residue of legislative power, leaving the central govern¬
ment with specified powers only. For Canada the reverse
principle was consequently adopted; the federal parliament
was given the residuary power over all matters of common
interest to the whole country, leaving merely local matters
to the provinces. It was expected that the Dominion would
develop a greater unity on matters of national concern as
time passed, and a greater uniformity even in the provincial
laws relating to property and civil rights, in all the provinces
except Quebec. 1

JUDICIAL REVOLUTION

This original concept, which is found clearly expressed in
the writings and speeches of the framers of the constitution,
was entrusted, after 1867, to the keeping of the courts. They
had no easy task to perform. The vision of the statesmen

iThis was the purpose of Sec. 94 of the B.N.A. Act, which has never been made use of
since it was drafted. The opinions of various Canadian leaders of 1867 about the nature
of Canadian federalism will be found collected in the brief presented by the League for
Social Reconstruction to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Janu¬
ary, 1938.

76 CANADA TODAY

had to be perceived in the dry language of the lawyers, and
a just balance maintained between the growing needs of the
central authorities and the legitimate autonomy of the pro¬
vinces. The problem was comparatively simple with sub¬
jects which fell within the more clearly defined sections of
the B. N. A. Act, under such headings as “solemnization of
matrimony”, “banking”, “telegraphs” or the “constitution
of the courts”. It became very difficult with the new sub¬
jects of legislation which emerged as the state embarked
more and more upon schemes of social security and economic
control. How are statutes dealing with minimum wages,
unemployment insurance, marketing, old age pensions, to
be classified? They were not enumerated in the original
document, drafted in the heyday of laissez-faire . They had
to be placed within some of the more general phrases in the
Act. Of these, three were the most likely receptacles—the
Dominion residuary power over matters affecting the “peace,
order and good government of Canada”, the Dominion power
to regulate “trade and commerce”, and the provincial juris¬
diction over “property and civil rights in the province”.
None of these powers is precise; the legal interpretation
might just as well have favoured any one as any other. Yet
ever since the end of the last century the courts, led by the
Privy Council, have favoured the solitary provincial power,
with few exceptions. Thus laws relating to insurance, con¬
trolling the distribution of liquor, regulating provincial
marketing and price fixing, providing arbitration in indus¬
trial disputes, fixing minimum wages, maximum hours and
conditions of employment, establishing unemployment in¬
surance, controlling the production of natural gas, and even
giving effect to international conventions relating to pro¬
vincial matters, have all been held to fall within the “pro¬
perty and civil rights” clause. The Dominion trade and
commerce clause has never yet, by itself, supported a single
piece of Dominion legislation. The Dominion residuary
clause has been narrowed down almost to the vanishing
point by the development of the judicial doctrine that it
could be invoked only amidst war, pestilence or famine. It
can now be said that the residuary power in Canada is vested

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

in the provinces, except in a national emergency more grave
than anything experienced during all the calamities of the
world crisis which began in 1929.

So great an alteration of the original statute would scarcely
have taken place had the final authority for interpreting the
constitution been a Canadian court. Canadian judges were
living in the environment out of which the B. N. A. Act
grew; they knew its purpose, and understood the meaning
of its terms. When the Supreme Court of Canada was
created in 1875 it was hoped that few if any appeals would
be taken thereafter to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, but events were to prove the contrary. The appeal
of right from the new Supreme Court was barred, but
appeals by special leave, or prerogative appeals, were con¬
tinued. The Minister of Justice and most members of the
Dominion parliament who took part in the debate on the
Supreme Court Bill were in favour of abolishing all appeals,
but it was recognized that this would require imperial legis¬
lation. 1 A British court thus became the arbiter of Canadian
constitutional growth. The early decisions of the Canadian
judges and of the Supreme Court on the Canadian constitu¬
tion were imbued with a spirit of national unity quite at
variance with the concept of the Dominion as a loose federa¬
tion of sovereign states which later prevailed in the Privy
Council, and which has perforce come to be the accepted,
because it was the final, statement of the law. By an histori¬
cal accident, the reverse of that which gave a John Marshall
to the American Supreme Court, the Judicial Committee
was dominated for two periods totalling thirty years by two
men who consistently favoured provincial sovereignty—
Lords Watson and Haldane. Of Lord Watson, Lord Haldane
himself has written: “He completely altered the tendency of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. ... In a series of
masterly judgments he expounded and established the real
constitution of Canada”. 2 Of Lord Haldane it can be said

lThe clause barring the appeal as of right was strongly objected to by the imperial law
officers, but the Canadian government refused to withdraw it and the Bill was not dis¬
allowed. See article by Lucien Cannon, K.C., in 1925 Canadian Bar Review , 455.

2See Juridical Review, 1899, p. 279. Lord Haldane repeated his praises of Lord Watson’s
creative work for Canada in his Education and Empire (1902), pp. 138-9, and in an article
in the Cambridge Law Journal, 1922, cited 1930 Canadian Bar Review , p. 438. See also
speeches of Hon. C. H. Cahan and Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe, Canada, House of Commons
Debates (unrevised), April 8, 1938, pp. 2336-53.

“fl

78 CANADA TODAY

that he followed faithfully in the Watsonian tradition.
The actual number of overrulings of the Canadian Supreme
Court are not many, but they occur in matters of crucial
importance; many important cases also have gone direct to
London from provincial courts of appeal. It was the Judicial
Committee which (1) made the Dominion residuary clause
an emergency power only, (2) reduced the trade and com¬
merce clause to a secondary position, (3) gave provincial
corporations capacity to do business throughout the country,
(4) set aside the Dominion Industrial Disputes Investigation
Act, (5) gave treaty legislation in part to the provinces.
Moreover, the Supreme Court, once the Privy Council has
decided, must follow the decision as best it can in future
cases. The constitutional difficulties in which Canada finds
herself today are due less to defects in the original constitu¬
tion than to a persistent pro-provincial bias which has
permeated, with few exceptions, the English interpretations
of the Canadian constitution. 1

DIVERGENCE BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

The disturbance in the legal equilibrium established in
1867 has produced a parallel disturbance in the Dominion-
provincial financial relations which were built upon that
equilibrium. Under the original constitution it seemed that
the provinces would need only moderate incomes since all
matters of national import were allotted to the Dominion;
the taxing powers of the provincial authorities were conse¬
quently limited to “direct” taxation, and they were given
annual subsidies to be paid from Dominion revenues and
intended to be fixed for all time. The increase in provincial
powers, however, coming at a time when the people were
demanding more and more services from governments,
meant that the provinces had to assume the new duties and
hence involved large increases in provincial expenditures.
Today the Canadian provinces, having won the constitu¬
tional battles, find themselves overburdened with charges
which many of them can no longer meet out of revenues. In

lThe principal exceptions are aeronautics and radio.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

their keeping now are the sick, the unemployed, the aged
poor, the needy mothers, the orphans and the industrially
exploited, as well as control of trade and commerce in the
province.

Each province decides for itself how far it will meet these
burdens. The Dominion cannot control provincial spending.
On the other hand it can scarcely allow any of the provinces
to go bankrupt. The situation is thus most unsatisfactory.
Several Dominion-provincial conferences met to deal with
the problem but disbanded without reaching a settlement.
The Liberal government in 1936 introduced a bill to amend
the B. N. A. Act by creating a “loan council” after the
Australian model, but withdrew it later in face of provincial
opposition. Meanwhile, temporary escape from the necessity
of a solution was found in the extension of Dominion “loans”
to needy provinces; these had reached a total of $132,000,000
by March 31, 1937. 1 Finally, a Royal Commission under
the chairmanship of the Hon. N. W. Rowell was appointed
in the summer of 1937 to study and report generally on the
relations between the Dominion and the provinces. When its
report is ready Canada will have to decide in which constitu¬
tional direction she wishes to travel—toward greater central¬
ism or toward a looser federalism. She has not yet faced her
constitutional difficulties as boldly as have her two sister
federations, the United States and Australia.

From the point of view of Canada’s international position
the most serious consequence of the legal interpretations of
the B. N. A. Act has been the splitting asunder of the
Dominion’s treaty-making power. The decision of the Privy
Council in 1937 on this point virtually destroyed the achieve¬
ments of the previous twenty years of nation building. Can¬
ada has now the right to act as an independent nation in the
world society, but the power to fulfil that role has been
denied her. She can make treaties, but may not be able to
enforce them, unless they can be classed as “empire” trea¬
ties under Section 132 of the B. N. A. Act, and this appears
to be a highly restricted category. Other treaties must now
be allotted to the Dominion or provincial parliaments, like

1 Canada Year Book, 1937, p. 36.

80 CANADA TODAY

ordinary statutes, in accordance with the judicial ideas as
to the nature of the subjects covered by them. No other
autonomous country is so handicapped. Canadian plenipo¬
tentiaries appointed by Ottawa, or by London on Ottawa’s
advice, may still meet foreign diplomats to plan international
action but cannot give binding assurances that the treaty
arrived at will be enforced, since the enforcement in some
cases rests with the provinces. No doubt some classes of
treaty will seem clearly to fall within the Dominion field,
but there will always be an element of doubt which only the
courts can clarify. It would be necessary for plenipotenti¬
aries from each of the nine provincial governments to be
present at negotiations in order to be certain that the
Dominion would not be left in default, as she is at the
moment in regard to the three labour conventions ratified
by Mr. Bennett but the implementing of which has been
declared by the Privy Council to rest with the provinces. 1

The hopes of the statesmen of 1867 for a strong united
Canada have been only partially fulfilled. In the realm of
material things their faith was justified. Large commercial,
industrial and financial undertakings now operate on a
national scale within the free trade area of the Dominion.
Railways, banks, insurance companies and the principal
agencies of manufacture and distribution, have their head
offices in Montreal or Toronto and an administrative organi¬
zation that reaches from coast to coast. They cover the
geographical and racial diversities with an economic uni¬
formity. The inhabitants of Halifax, Montreal and Van¬
couver draw cheques on the same banks, buy the same
insurance policies, mortgage their houses to the same trust
companies, ride in the same cars, drink the same whisky,
eat the same canned goods and smoke the same cigarettes.
But while Canadian economic concentration has been de¬
veloping, her constitutional unity has been steadily deterio¬
rating as a result of legal interpretation. The business

effect ® of Privy Council decision (A. G. for Canada v. A. G. for Ontario, [1937]
A. C. 326) see articles in Canadian Bar Review , June, 1937; the Canadian Journal of Eco¬
nomics and Political Science, May, 1937; the Round Table, September, 1937; also Daggett,
A- P ’ ,eaty Legislation in Canada”, Canadian Bar Review, March, 1938; Jennings,
W. Ivor, Constitutional Interpretation—The Experience of Canada”, Harvard Law Re¬
view, November, 1937; brief submitted to the Rowell Commission by League of Nations
Society, January, 1938.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

leaders and modern science have been subduing geography
while the judges have been expanding provincial sovereignty.

Hence there is a conflict between the economic and the
legal realities in Canada. The large corporations cannot be
effectively controlled in the public interest by nine provincial
legislatures, while their efficiency is hampered by the multi¬
tude of varying and vexatious laws and taxes to which they
are subject. The Dominion, on the other hand, is incom¬
petent to meet concentrated economic power with an equal
political authority, or to provide remedies for economic
problems which are essentially national in scope. This fail¬
ure of the Dominion to act produces, by a curiously inverse
process, a greater degree of provincialism and sectional
feeling, for the economic policies formulated by the financiers
and industrialists in the east have borne heavily upon the
extremities of the Dominion and upon the agricultural ex¬
porters, who complain they are sacrificed to the money power
and who blame Ottawa for tolerating the exploitation. Thus
is the vicious circle complete: less power at Ottawa means
more power to big business in the east; this results in less
attention to the needs of the Maritimes and the west, which
creates sectional demands for compensation and encourages
attempts at local solutions. In the long run the “depressed
areas” may come to realize that their only hope lies not in
local but in national action, which will subordinate the in¬
terests of eastern industry to the needs of the national
economy; but a suspicion that Ottawa will always be
dominated by the east undermines confidence in so-called
“national” policies and hence in national powers.

Thus to the separatist and divisive influences of geography,
race and religion must now be added the disintegrating force
of provincial sovereignty. Canada has made slow progress
in the task of nation-building, and in recent years has lost
constitutional ground. To the Quebec nationalists, the
Privy Council has been a fairy godmother; they can now
ask for an increase in French minority rights in return for a
surrender of their new provincial autonomy. Only recently,
because of the greater need for governmental action, has the
seriousness of the constitutional situation been appreciated,

82 CANADA TODAY

but already the sectional feeling is so strong that the political
problem of securing amendments to the B. N. A. Act appears
almost insurmountable. Bold leadership and a statesmanlike
appeal for co-operation will be needed if sectionalism is to
be overcome, and of these there is at the moment little
indication.

CHAPTER VII

THE GROWTH OF CANADIAN NATIONAL FEELING

P REVIOUS chapters in this volume have disclosed the
divisions within Canada. These have been emphasized
because they provide a key to the understanding of most
Canadian problems. Nevertheless Canada, the single
country, is still a fact. Over the longer period a sense of
national unity has been steadily growing within the Domin¬
ion, despite the many obstacles which it has had to overcome.
It is shown in innumerable ways, some visible to the out¬
sider, others felt and understood only by those who have
lived and travelled in the country. The historical back¬
ground to Canadian life is both rich and deep, and its record
of endeavour and achievement makes for a community of
feeling between different sections and groups. A native art
movement, springing from the “Group of Seven” who
started painting just before the world war, has made the
beauty of the Canadian landscape part of the national con¬
sciousness. The radio, the aeroplane, the railways, the
motor-car and the telephone have reduced the vast size of
the country to manageable proportions. There are numbers
of organized movements and associations, from political
parties to learned societies, from chambers of commerce to
athletic clubs, which operate on a national basis within the
Dominion. All these are symptoms of nationhood. Canada’s
participation in the world war, and subsequently in the work
of the League of Nations and in the achievement of Domin¬
ion status, stimulated very greatly the sense of nationality.
The economic depression gave it a setback by creating in¬
ternal strains and accentuating sectional and class differ¬
ences; a Social Credit Alberta and a nationalist Quebec
appear less integrally part of Canada than were those sec¬
tions before these political changes occurred. Few people
believe, however, that such sectionalism as now exists,

84 CANADA TODAY

strong though it undoubtedly is, creates any real threat to
the continued existence of confederation.

The attitude of Canadians toward the United States is a
gauge of their own sense of national solidarity. It is when
Canadians feel most insecure that they are most fearful of the
American influence. A very considerable suspicion, even
dislike, of the United States and its constant 41 Americaniza¬
tion'' of Canada exists in certain sections of Canadian opin¬
ion. The more Catholic and the more British parts of
Canada in particular look upon the United States as a
“materialistic” nation whose luxury and extravagant be¬
haviour are in danger of tempting the honest Canadian away
from his simple and sober manner of living. Sometimes
special interests exploit this antipathy to achieve a particular
object, as when high protectionists fought the reciprocity
treaty in 1911 on the ground that they were saving Canada
from annexation, or employers wishing to preserve the open
shop attacked Mr. Lewis and the C. I. O. in 1937 under the
guise of helping Canadian labour to save itself from American
domination. The anti-American feeling has declined in
recent years, however, and the decline is an indication that
Canadians have matured to the point where they no longer
fear the loss of their identity on the American continent.

The feeling of a Canadian nationality is shared in some
degree by most of the French Canadians. For many of them
(as has been pointed out) the concept does not extend be¬
yond their own race, even their own province. Even these,
however, unless they are separatists, accept the idea of a com¬
mon Canadian nationality, with a dual language and a dual
culture, as a proper basis of association with their English-
speaking fellow-citizens. The French Canadians, indeed,
were the first to make this idea a normal part of their political
thinking. English Canadians have been inclined to look upon
Canada as an entirely British country with “one language
and one flag” (in fact it has neither) and to think of French
Canada, whenever they considered it at all, as an unavoid¬
able and geographically restricted exception to the otherwise
happy uniformity. In recent years this attitude has begun
to change. A number of English-speaking Canadians have

GROWTH OF CANADIAN NATIONAL FEELING 85

moved closer to the French-Canadian position. Imperialist
sentiment of the old sort has declined while the concept of
Canada as an autonomous North American nation has
grown. This concept is equally valid for both French and
English. As the French Canadian expands his vision to in¬
clude the whole of Canada and not merely the province of
Quebec, and as the English Canadian ceases to think of
Canada simply as the British part of North America and
accepts it, with all its racial variation, as his prime allegi¬
ance, they both find they tread on common ground. In a
real sense it is true that only in so far as Canada obtains full
control over her own foreign policy can she become a united
country internally. “The only common denominator [be¬
tween French and English] seems to be a common allegiance
to a common country.” 1

These factors explain why the possibility of another world
war, in which Canada might be expected to take part on the
side of Great Britain, contains so great a danger for Cana¬
dian national unity. The French Canadian feels no obliga¬
tion or desire to take part in any European wars. His fear
that because he is part of the Dominion he will inevitably
be dragged into all such wars makes him view his political
connection with English Canadians with the greatest suspi¬
cion, and makes him feel that the English Canadian is not a
true Canadian at all. 2 The Conscription Act of 1917 was
not applied in Quebec without bloodshed, and any future
attempt to force French Canadians overseas to fight will be
resisted much more strongly, particularly if by some chance
Great Britain were to be fighting against Italy or with Soviet
Russia as an ally. Nor will such resistance be confined by
any means to French Canadians. A very large proportion
of the 2,000,000 Canadians who are neither French nor
British do not understand an allegiance divided between
Canada and the Commonwealth. Not even all the British
blood in Canada will wish to fight abroad, unless the issue
at stake is something deeper than a balance of power in

iLower, A. R. M., in Canada , The Empire and the League (Proceedings of Canadian In¬
stitute on Economics and Politics, Lake Couchiching, Ontario, 1936) (Toronto, 1936), p. 111.

2It is significant that the French word for English-Canadian is “Anglais ”; for himself,
it is “Canadien

86 CANADA TODAY

Europe. An increasing number of Canadians of all racial
origins are coming to the belief that Canada must have the
constitutional right to complete neutrality in future British
wars, so that whatever course will best preserve the unity
of the country may be freely taken. The growth of this idea
is another indication of the growth of the Canadian national
consciousness.

CHAPTER VIII

CANADA’S DEFENCE PROBLEM

T HE defence of a country is both a political and a mili¬
tary problem. On the political side it means the main¬
tenance of good relations with other countries so as to
avoid conflicts if possible and to settle those that arise before
they reach the stage of war. This should be the first aim of
defence policy in any state not determined upon a pro¬
gramme of aggressive expansion. Military force enters prin¬
cipally when diplomacy has failed, though between states
which distrust one another military force will exert a potent
influence upon diplomacy and may have a deterrent effect
on hostile aggression. Once the military have taken charge
of operations, defence becomes a matter of defeating any
opposing forces likely to be met on the field of battle.

DIPLOMATIC DEFENCES

Canada has not yet developed her machinery for the con¬
duct of international affairs to the same point as other self-
governing nations. She has diplomatic representatives in
three foreign countries only—the United States, Japan and
France. 1 She has a High Commissioner in London, and an
Advisory Officer at Geneva. Canadian relations with other
states, such as Germany, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union
and China, are conducted through the British Foreign Office
and its diplomatic and consular channels, or through foreign
consuls in Canada. Canada is better able to supervise her
commercial relations, since Canadian trade commissioners
exist in twenty-five countries. 2 In the countries where
Canada has a minister of her own she has the machinery for
settling disputes by negotiation. Where she has no minis¬
ter her relations with a country depend largely on the
attitude of the British government and its representative,

lAt the time of writing, the government is proposing to establish legations at Brussels
and The Hague with a single minister in charge of both.

2See list in Canada Year Book, 1937, pp. 495-7.

88 CANADA TODAY

who has other than Canadian interests to protect. Even
where Canada has her own representatives she cannot by
diplomatic action avoid wars if, as seems to be the case, she
has no right to neutrality in the event of Great Britain de¬
ciding to resort to war. The Canadian minister at Tokyo,
for example, might succeed in preventing any dangerous
issue arising between Japan and Canada, and yet if the
British ambassador to Tokyo were withdrawn and an
Anglo-Japanese war begun the Canadian minister would
have to be recalled and Canada exposed immediately to
attack on the Pacific coast. In countries like Germany,
where there is no Canadian representative, the recall of the
British Ambassador would leave Canadian citizens totally
unprotected regardless of whether Canada was directly con¬
cerned in the dispute or not. Canada can, it is true, bring
some influence to bear upon the British government as to
the conduct of its policy (an influence perhaps commensur¬
ate with the degree of responsibility Canada is prepared to
assume), but the principle of equality of status has not yet
been fully applied to the conduct of foreign affairs. Canadian
diplomatic defences are thus incomplete.

MILITARY DEFENCE OF CANADIAN TERRITORY

The problem of military defence for Canada is being ac¬
tively discussed at the present time. It will be considered
here, first from the point of view of home defence, and
secondly from the point of view of co-operation in wider
defence arrangements with other powers.

The traditional view of the problem of defence, still widely
held in Canada, is that the British navy is Canada’s pro¬
tection against external aggression. More recently it has
become usual to point to the United States navy and the
Monroe Doctrine as safe-guarding Canadian soil, particu¬
larly from attack across the Pacific. Both these views are
obviously true in part, for while these fleets command the
north Atlantic and the north-east Pacific they are bars to
any large-scale invasion of Canada from Europe or from
Asia; nevertheless, they suffer from over-simplification. It
is more nearly correct to say that, by providing herself with

CANADA’S DEFENCE PROBLEM

coastal defences well within her own capacity to maintain,
Canada can defend herself against any scale of attack which
can reasonably be anticipated at the present time without
having to rely upon other people’s aid. What the distant
future may bring is, of course, another matter.

Canada’s security from the danger of armed invasion de¬
pends on two factors—the present international situation
and the natural advantages derived from geography. In
most discussions of defence insufficient attention is paid to
the first factor. Yet defence cannot be discussed in the
abstract; defence means defence against particular powers
or combinations of powers. It so happens that there are no
powers which threaten to invade Canada. No South Ameri¬
can power is planning her conquest. It is no longer a part of
Canadian defence policy to contemplate war with the United
States: hence the famous undefended frontier. No Asiatic
power except Japan is in an expansive and aggressive mood.
Japan has both an “historic mission” and an actual commit¬
ment on the Asiatic mainland (besides the very real threat
from the Soviet Union) sufficient to keep her occupied for
an indefinite period. China is now defending Canada on the
Pacific by keeping Canada’s only potential invader fully
engaged.

Europe is the only remaining continent from which an
attack might be expected. Italy’s ambitions are clearly
Mediterranean; if she ever looks to America, it will more
likely be to South America. Germany is left. What are
Germany’s ambitions? The Drang nach Osten is Canada’s
immediate defence from that quarter. Not even Mein
Kampf suggests Canada as a part of greater Germany. In
any case Germany must establish an hegemony in Europe
before she can safely begin any trans-Atlantic adventures;
this means she must first dispose of the balance of power
against her. Hence Russia and France are part of Canada’s
defence at the present moment, quite as much as is Great
Britain (whose recent policy, indeed, appears to many
Canadians to be one of encouragement for Germany’s ex¬
pansion). Only if Germany and her fascist allies win the
next European war and are not themselves destroyed by

CANADA TODAY

the victory would it be necessary for Canadian defence policy
to contemplate the still remote possibility of an attack in
force from Europe.

Mr. Mackenzie King, in his statement to the House of
Commons on foreign policy on May 24, 1938, expressed him¬
self as follows on this point:

If we are unlikely of our own motion to take part in wars of conquest
or wars of crusade, it is equally unlikely that at the moment, with the
world as it is today, any other country will single out Canada for
attack. The talk which one sometimes hears of aggressor countries
planning to invade Canada and seize these tempting resources of ours
is, to say the least, premature. It ignores our neighbours and our lack
of neighbours; it ignores the strategic and transportation difficulties
of transoceanic invasion; it ignores the vital fact that every aggressor
has not only potential objects of its ambition many thousands of miles
nearer which would be the object of any attack, but potential and
actual rivals near at hand whom it could not disregard by launching
fantastic expeditions across half the world. At present danger of
attack upon Canada is minor in degree and second-hand in origin. It
is against chance shots that we need immediately to defend ourselves.
The truth of this is recognized in every country. What may develop
no one can say. 1

In addition to these political reasons why Canada is com¬
paratively secure at the moment, there are unusual geo¬
graphical obstacles in the path of any invader. Three
thousand miles of Atlantic and four thousand of Pacific
Ocean are the beginnings of his difficulties. Both the
Atlantic and the Pacific coasts lend themselves to home
defences. The St. Lawrence is not navigable in winter, and
with buoys removed and mines laid would be exceedingly
difficult to utilize for transport purposes in summer. Canada
would be bound to have lengthy warning of any attempted
attack in force. 2 The eastern points most in need of protec¬
tion are the harbours of the Maritimes, such as Halifax,
Sydney and St. John; an army in control of these, however,
is still separated from Montreal by 800 miles of barren
country. The physical features of the Pacific coast are even
more discouraging to the landing of any large force, though

^Canada, House of Commons Debates (unrevised), May 24, 1938, p. 3439.

2See Canadian Defence Quarterly, cited in MacKay and Rogers, op. cit., p. 181.

CANADA’S DEFENCE PROBLEM

they would lend themselves, if undefended, to the planting
of bases for raiding. 1

Military experts in Canada are consequently of the
opinion that Canadian defence policy does not need to pre¬
pare for armed invasion. The utmost that need be expected
at the moment are “minor attacks by combined sea, land
and air forces, to destroy something of strategic or commer¬
cial value, or to secure an advanced base of operations, and
this applies to coasts, to focal sea areas and to the preserva¬
tion of Canadian neutrality”, and also “sporadic hit and run
raids by light cruisers or submarines to destroy our main
ports and focal sea areas”. 2

To deal with these minor attacks and sporadic raids,
Canada is already preparing her coastal defences, both east
and west. The technical details need not be considered here:
in general the need is for fixed coastal batteries and anti¬
aircraft defences at such points as Halifax and Sydney on
the Atlantic, Vancouver and Esquimalt on the Pacific; sea
and air forces capable of searching out and destroying hostile
craft and their temporary bases; and supporting infantry
units ready to move quickly to threatened zones. Under the
new and enlarged defence plans now being carried out these
will be provided within the next three or four years. It is
therefore true to say that Canada is preparing to meet and
is fully capable of meeting her local defence requirements at
the present time out of her own financial resources. It is
also true, however, that her armaments industry is not yet
able to manufacture the heavier equipment needed, and she
must therefore purchase supplies from outside sources. At
present most of the orders have been placed with English
firms—with the consequence that the rapidity of defence
development has been impeded by British rearmament
plans.

Thus far, it will be observed, no reliance has been placed
on those two particular guarantees of Canadian defence—
the British navy and the Monroe Doctrine. Obviously their

^ iFor a more extended discussion of these points see MacKay and Rogers, op. cit., Chap.

2 Hon. Ian Mackenzie, Minister of National Defence, House of Commons Debates (unre¬
vised), March 24, 1938, p. 1793; see also, “Canuck”, “The Problems of Canadian Defence”,
Canadian Defence Quarterly, April, 1938, p. 269.

\ J

92 CANADA TODAY

existence is a still further safeguard for Canada. The ana¬
lysis just given makes these two additional factors, however,
of more potential than immediate utility. When Japan has
completed her campaign in China it is conceivable that she
might be insane enough to look across the Pacific; at that
moment the Monroe Doctrine and the American navy would
become vitally important. That moment, however, is not in
sight. The same is true of a threat from Germany. As for
the British navy, it no doubt operates as a powerful check
upon Hitler’s ambitions in Europe. So also does the French
army, the Russian airfleet and whatever other European
forces may be expected to line up against Germany in the
next European war. The Royal navy is one element in a far
wider picture.

There are, it is true, individuals in Canada, many of them
sincere, who are frightened by the current wave of militarism
and who feel that an invasion of Canada is a real danger.
The Toronto Star in February, 1938, published a doctored
photograph of planes bombing the city of Toronto. It was
not felt to be necessary to suggest whose planes they were or
how they might be expected to return, Toronto being 4,000
miles from Europe. Such propaganda makes the increase in
defence estimates politically easier. Mr. King, despite his
recent statement that Canada is under no threat of invasion,
said in a radio address, on his return from the Imperial Con¬
ference of 1937, “Never imagine that to the overpopulated
countries and under-nourished peoples of other continents,
the countless attractions and limitless possibilities of Canada
are unknown; or that, in some world holocaust, our country
would escape the ‘terror by night’ or ‘the arrow that flieth
by day’.” 1 In this atmosphere of vague impending doom,
the general public seldom stops to ask which people are
eyeing Canada, or how they plan to transport themselves to
her shores.

It is sometimes said that Canada is vitally concerned with
keeping open the trade routes of the Atlantic, on account of
her large overseas trade. The statement is obviously true

l Crown and Commonwealth: An Address on the Coronation, the Imperial Conference,
and visit to the Continent of Europe, delivered over the national network of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, Ottawa July 9, 1937 (Ottawa, King’s Printer, 1937), p. 15.

CANADA’S DEFENCE PROBLEM

up to a point. Canada’s foreign trade is essential to the
economic welfare of the country, given the continuation of
Canada’s present economic policy. But this trade is not
essential in the sense that without it Canadians would starve
to death. There is food and shelter for all within the country,
and it might be cheaper to reorganize the economy during
the period of cessation of the trade than to engage in a war
to preserve it. A recent study group of the Canadian In¬
stitute of International Affairs on the subject of defence
unanimously agreed that “few of the great trading countries
have in practice defended their shipping on the high seas,
and it seemed to be clear that Canada’s defence policy could
not be designed with the object of defending her goods, even
those which might be carried far from home in her own
ships”. Moreover, it has been shown 1 that in actual fact
there is very little “Canadian” trade on the Atlantic. A sort
of de facto “cash and carry” principle prevails; Canada sells
her produce to European importers in Canada, and they
collect it in their own ships at Canadian ports. It is their
trade, rather than Canada’s, on the high seas. They are more
vitally concerned to import it than is Canada to export it,
and they are only too anxious to see it continue, not for
Canada’s sake, but for their own. No one in Canada has
ever taken seriously the suggestion that she should “blast
her way into the markets of the world”; present defence
plans contemplate the protection of “focal sea areas” (a
vague term in current use amongst the military experts) ap¬
parently as a part of coastal defence and as a protection of
overseas shipping only as it converges on Canadian
ports.

If Canada were to remain neutral in a war in which the
United States were involved it might be necessary to defend
that neutrality against violation. For example, if Japan and
the United States were at war, Japan might wish to use the
British Columbia coast as a base of operations, or the United
States might want to transport troops and equipment across
Canadian territory into Alaska. In either case Canada
would have to protect her neutrality, for fear of becoming

iSee above, p. 36.

CANADA TODAY

involved as an ally of one of the belligerents. Coastal de¬
fences of the kind already described, when completed, will
take care of submarine bases or temporary landing parties.
If the United States were determined to use Canadian terri¬
tory, there is nothing Canada could do to prevent it.

PREPARATION FOR DEFENCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OR OF THE LEAGUE

The immediate defence of Canada, then, is not beyond the
capacity of Canadians acting alone, provided they are con¬
tent simply to safeguard their own territory. From the
purely national point of view Canada needs no military alli¬
ances in the present world. If Canadian foreign policy in¬
cludes the idea of intervention in Europe or elsewhere on
behalf of the Commonwealth or the League, however, other
considerations at once arise. The character of Canadian
defence forces must be altered, and preparation for joint
action begun. To protect Canada, as has been shown, fixed
coastal batteries, mine sweepers, aircraft and possibly a
few submarines are necessary, with a small supporting in¬
fantry force at each coast. To prepare for an expeditionary
force to Europe, the emphasis must be placed on mobile and
mechanized units, trained and equipped for immediate inte¬
gration with the British army. These units must be supplied
with machine guns, tanks, bombing-planes, and all the
paraphernalia of modern warfare, much of which is super¬
fluous, either in kind or quantity, for the defence of Canada
alone. This type of army, on a modest scale, is contemplated
and is in fact being organized in Canada. 1 The possibility of
co-operation in war abroad has always been a dominant
factor in Canadian defence policy, since until comparatively
recently most Canadians have accepted without question the
military alliance implicit in the former empire relationship,

ICanada has a permanent active militia of 4,000 men, a non-permanent militia with a
peace establishment of 100,000 but an actual strength of about 45,000, and a paper reserve
militia. The naval forces consist of four destroyers, with two on order (four to be placed
on the Pacific and two on the Atlantic coasts) and a number of mine sweepers; total per¬
sonnel (March, 1938) 119 officers and 1,462 ratings, with a volunteer reserve of 77 officers
and 1,344 ratings. The Air Force consists of an authorized permanent personnel of 1,730
and a non-permanent force of 1,064; 102 aircraft are being secured, and landing fields
have been constructed across the country to permit of rapid concentration. See MacKay
and Rogers, op. cit., pp. 192 ff., and speech of the Minister of Defence (Hon. Ian Mac¬
kenzie) on March 24, 1938, cited above, p. 91, n. 2.

CANADA’S DEFENCE PROBLEM

and empire wars have not been fought in North America for
over a century. Even today the ratio of defence expenditures
as between land, sea and air is 2:1:1, whereas a purely
national defence policy would place both naval and air
expenditures ahead of those devoted to the infantry. 1 In
addition, Canada is under contractual agreement with Great
Britain to permit the use of Halifax and Esquimalt harbours
by the British fleet, and has always co-ordinated her training
and equipment with British practices. There is thus a differ¬
ence between local defence requirements and present defence
policy, a difference representing Canada’s recognition of the
possibility of having to take part in an overseas war. 2

Because of the growing isolationist sentiment in the
country the government spokesmen have tended recently
to emphasize the home defence needs and to deny any “com¬
mitments” to or preparations for war abroad. To do this
without unduly offending imperialist and other sentiment
requires no little verbal ingenuity. An example of the kind
of statement that is made is seen in the following extract
from Mr. King’s speech on February 19, 1937, justifying the
increase in the Canadian defence estimates:

... In the course of this debate it has been necessary at different
times from this side of the house to repeat that what we are doing we
are doing for Canada and for Canada alone. That has been necessary
for the reason that an impression had been created that what we were
doing had relation to some expeditionary force which would be sent
overseas. When we say that what we are doing we are doing for
Canada alone, we mean we are doing it for the defence of our country
within the territorial waters of the coasts of our country, and within
Canada itself for the defence of Canada. But I hope it will not be
thought that because we have laid emphasis on the fact that what we
are doing we are doing for Canada, we are not thereby making some
contribution towards the defence of the British Commonwealth of
Nations as a whole, or that we are not making some contribution to¬
wards the defence of all English-speaking communities, that we are
not making some contribution towards the defence of all democracies,

iSee Glazebrook, G. de T., Canada's Defence Policy, Report of Round Tables of Con¬
ference of Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1937, p. 16.

2In the past Canada’s contributions to imperial defence have been military rather
than naval, and the habit of spending more on the military has continued. Many regi¬
ments which came back from the last war continued in existence. They became social
and recreational centres; the winter quarters were club rooms and the summer camps
cheap holiday outings. It was politically wise to maintain them.

CANADA TODAY

that we are not making some contribution towards the defence of all
those countries that may some day necessarily associate themselves
together for the purpose of preserving their liberties and freedom
against an aggressor, come from wherever he may. 1

The latter part of this double-barrelled statement is
addressed to the body of opinion which feels strongly that
Canada must prepare to meet the challenge of any aggres¬
sive powers, in order to preserve the same institutions and
principles for which the empire took part in the last world
war. As already indicated, Canadian defence arrangements
already take this into account, though not to the extent this
opinion would wish. The following note contributed by a
Canadian expresses this point of view: it is given here in
full and without comment to show how its adherents see the
defence problem.

There is only a very slight chance of Canada becoming involved in
war arising out of any local issue. There is every chance of our becom¬
ing involved because of issues in which we are concerned along with
every other free country. It is therefore the world issue that must
dominate our consideration of defence policy. Canada’s first line of
defence, like Britain’s, is on the Rhine.

The nations of the world of our time are divided into three groups,—
the Fascist states, governed by dictators, believing in war, ambitious
and dissatisfied with their shares of empire; the Communist state,
which may at any turn be added to by proletarian revolutions; and
the Liberal and Democratic states, which are satisfied with the status
quo which they secured partly by their greater progress in the nine¬
teenth century and partly by their victory in the late war. The only
possibility of a war affecting Canada or any other part of the Common¬
wealth arises from the determination of the Fascist states to redress
the balance, and the certainty that they will attempt to do so by war,
unless the armed forces of the free nations are so strong and united as
to foredoom the attempt to failure. If war does come Canada will
again have to be defended on the fields of Flanders and in co-operation
with the British Navy. If those fail Canada will have no option but
to submit to whatever terms the Nazis dictate.

The defence of the mainland of Canada from invasion can be so
easily provided for that no nation on either side of us would attempt it.
Nor would they have the slightest need to do so. If the British Navy
were out of the way it would be a very simple matter for Germany to

ICanada, House of Commons Debates, February 19, 1937, p. 1058.

CANADA'S DEFENCE PROBLEM

seize the island of Cape Breton and use it as a base from which to
destroy all our Atlantic trade or for Japan to seize Vancouver Island
and destroy our Pacific trade. Without export trade Canada cannot
do more than exist. Exports take up so large a proportion of our pro¬
duction, both agricultural and industrial that their cessation would
disrupt our whole economic structure and cause unemployment so
great as to be beyond our power to cope with. It is nonsense to talk
of the trade not being Canadian trade because it is carried from our
shores in ships of foreign registry or owned by foreign purchasers.
An enemy nation which secured control of the oceans could get all the
supplies it needed from other countries and our trade would come
to an end.

It is natural and right that our defence policy should be directed
first of all to our own defence and, since such defence will cost all that
we can at present afford to spend, our Government is taking the right
course in making such defence its sole present aim. But as our people
come to realize the world situation more clearly they will insist on our
being prepared to do our part, if it becomes necessary. That can only
be done by co-operation first with Great Britain, then with the other
parts of the Empire and the United States, and ultimately in a League
of the Free Nations for the defence of our common liberties and in¬
terests. 1

iThis is a point of view held by a considerable body of opinion in the United States.
Its best expression is perhaps to be found in Walter Lippmann’s article in Foreign Affairs,
July, 1937, “Rough-hew Them How We Will”. He sees the hand of a divine Providence
in the American neutrality legislation giving effect to the “cash and carry” principle, since
tt will assist the democratic powers.

CHAPTER IX

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS

ANADA’S external associations are primarily with the
British Commonwealth and the United States, for

obvious historic and geographical reasons; but her de¬
velopment as a supplier of international markets and a
member of the League has brought her into wide contact
with the world at large.

ASSOCIATIONS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH

Canada’s associations with the Commonwealth are in all
essential respects the same as those of her sister dominions.
The formal link of the Crown is apparent in all the functions
of government, both Dominion and provincial. High Com¬
missioners are exchanged between Ottawa and London, and
the Union of South Africa now has an accredited representa¬
tive at Ottawa—the first to come from any dominion. All
Canadians enjoy the common status of British subjects,
though British subjects from other parts of the Common¬
wealth require five years residence before they can be classed
as “Canadian citizens” or “Canadian nationals” under cer¬
tain Canadian laws. 1 The Privy Council remains the final
court of appeal for Canada, much criticized but not yet
abandoned. 2 Canadians participate in various organs of
Commonwealth co-operation set up under the Imperial
Conferences, such as the Imperial Economic Committee and
other joint bodies. Canadian officers are sent for training to

VE.g. under the Immigration Act, the Foreign Enlistment Act, etc.

2In the 1938 session of the Canadian Parliament, the Hon. C. H. Cahan, Secretary of
State in the Conservative administration, 1930-35, introduced a bill to abolish appeals
to the Privy Council “in relation to any matter within the competence of the Parliament
of Canada . Mr. Lapointe, the Minister of Justice, in his speech supporting the bill,
expressed the opinion that the Canadian Parliament had the power to do away with all
appeals. Mr. Cahan then stated that he would be very glad to see an amendment in
committee to that effect (Canada, House of Commons Debates, unrevised, April 8, 1938,
p. 2353). The bill was later withdrawn to permit of further study by law associations
and other interested bodies throughout the Dominion. Mr. Cahan has stated that he
hopes Mr. Lapointe will re-introduce a similar bill on behalf of the government at the
next session. If not, he will himself re-introduce the bill. The wide measure of support
given the bill is indicative of the movement of opinion against the use of appeals to the
Privy Council.

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS 99

the Imperial Staff College. But Canada has consistently
opposed the creation of any central Commonwealth organiza¬
tion which would possess executive power or which might
give the impression that a new system of control was being
established in London. There is no likelihood that this
attitude will change.

Canada’s trade relations with Great Britain and other
members of the Commonwealth have already been described.
46.7 per cent, of Canadian exports went to empire countries
in 1937 and 29.5 per cent, of her imports came from them.
This considerable trade, second only to that between Canada
and the United States, is the result both of historic commer¬
cial relationships and of the imperial preferences. There is
no doubt that Canada s trade with the Commonwealth is
based to some extent upon political considerations, and that
should her political objectives change in this regard the im¬
portance of the empire in her economy would gradually
diminish. The political factor, however, does not appear to
be of great importance in the total picture. Great Britain’s
need for foodstuffs and raw materials makes trade with
Canada very natural.

It is not easy to assess the cultural and sentimental ties
that join Canada to the Commonwealth. They have their
roots in language, literature and religion; in respect for the
Crown and in parliamentary democracy; in a common his¬
tory and in family relationships. These ties are strong in
some sections of Canada, weak in others. They are strong¬
est in the Maritimes, Ontario and British Columbia; less
evident in the Prairie Provinces where the non-British im¬
migrants are mostly settled; and weakest in Quebec.
Canadians with a pro-British attitude occupy most of the
important positions in the Protestant churches, in public
affairs, in education, in business and in the press. In an
emergency, they would act with considerable unanimity.
Nevertheless, imperialist sentiment amongst the general
population has declined in recent years. For half the Cana¬
dians the “British tradition” is something which they found
existing in the country of their adoption, or else, as in the
case of the French Canadians, something which was imposed

100

CANADA TODAY

upon them. These people are Canadians first, members of
the Commonwealth after. This does not mean that many,
perhaps most of these Canadians have not a great respect
for the British Commonwealth and its traditions. Their
loyalty to Canada includes unquestionably a certain loyalty
to the British connection. The degree of the latter loyalty,
however, is obviously much less than would be found
amongst Canadians of British origin. And even large num¬
bers of the British Canadians have transplanted the greater
part of their loyalty.

In the matter of imperial defence Canada has always fol¬
lowed an apparently independent course. At the moment of
crisis in the past she has not stinted her expenditure (witness
South Africa and the world war) but in times of peace she
has been suspicious of joint efforts for imperial defence. She
has never contributed to the British navy, 1 and recently has
given a distinctly cold reception to the “peregrinating im¬
perialists” who from time to time suggest that she should.
Most Canadians are convinced that the British navy, even
admitting its deterrent effect on aggressors, is no larger than
it would be if the Dominion were totally independent. 2
Great Britain quite properly builds for her own defence
rather than for Canada’s. She must protect the North
Atlantic trade routes, for she needs foodstuffs and raw
materials both from Canada and the United States. At the
same time it has already been pointed out that Canada has
never ceased to prepare for possible joint action with Great
Britain. The principle of “no commitments” is now ad¬
vanced as the corner-stone of Canada’s defence policy, at the
same time as officers are being exchanged with British units,
equipment is being made uniform with the latest British
models, and a military force is contemplated of a kind differ¬
ent from that required for purely domestic needs. To most
imperialists, Canada’s co-operation in defence matters seems
pitifully inadequate; to those who support a policy of neu¬
trality Canada seems to be preparing already for another
intervention in Europe whenever Britain calls.

^Though in 1912 she would have done so but for the opposition of the Senate.

2“. . . If Canada dropped out of the Empire tomorrow Great Britain could not reduce
her armed strength by one war-ship, aircraft or man.”—“Canuck”, “The Problems of
Canadian Defence”, Canadian Defence Quarterly, April, 1938, p. 268.

101

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS

In considering Canada’s attitude to the Commonwealth
a distinction must be made between the desire for neutrality
and the desire for secession. Even those Canadians who wish
Canada to have the right to neutrality when Great Britain
or any other part of the Commonwealth is at war, do not
wish to secede from the Commonwealth. According to some
imperialists neutrality means secession; others challenge this
assumption. It is important to remember, however, that
people who believe neutrality is possible in an empire joined
merely by a personal union under the Crown are not, in their
hearts, aiming to destroy the Commonwealth. Despite the
increasing tendency to independent action in international
affairs, the vast majority of Canadians hope the Common¬
wealth will continue and that Canada will remain a member
of it. Even many of the French-Canadian nationalists have
said that they do not desire to quit the Commonwealth
altogether; their independent republic would remain a
dominion under the Crown. None of the movements of
opinion within Canada which conflict with the concept of a
strongly united Commonwealth must be taken to indicate
the growth of a secessionist movement.

A further distinction that needs to be made is that be¬
tween a right to neutrality and a policy of neutrality. A right
to remain neutral is an adjunct of autonomy, a necessary
constitutional power if Canada is to have full control over
her own foreign policy. A policy of neutrality is the exercise
of that right in a particular event. Some people who ask
for the right wish to adopt the policy, but many others wish
Canada to have the right so that she may really be free to
adopt a policy of neutrality or not, according to her own
decision when the next war comes. It is the automatic
belligerency at some one else’s choice which is objected to
even though that belligerency be purely technical at the
outset.

There is also in Canada a considerable body of opinion
which would place the importance of the maintenance of
Commonwealth unity ahead of the right to neutrality in
time of war. Such people would put first the preservation of
the Commonwealth association, hoping at the same time that

102

CANADA TODAY

neutrality might still turn out to be possible. Although they
would maintain Canada’s freedom of action as to participa¬
tion in the conduct of overseas wars, and would always im¬
press the Canadian point of view upon the British govern¬
ment as to any matter affecting Canada’s interests, they
would take for granted Canada’s technically belligerent
status in any British or Commonwealth war. They think
that a neutral Canada would be virtually certain, in a con¬
flict involving great powers, to have her neutrality chal¬
lenged in such a way as to present the alternatives of accept¬
ing belligerency or breaking the Commonwealth connection.
By many of this group the relationship with Great Britain
is accepted as including a tacit military alliance. 1

The British connection has left, as need scarcely be said, a
permanent mark on Canadian social and political institu¬
tions. It is seen most noticeably in the parliamentary nature
of the Canadian government, in the structure of the courts,
in the organization of the military forces, and in religious
and educational traditions. But in spite of this tutelage the
greater number of Canadian institutions and activities are
now North American or just plain Canadian. The parlia¬
mentary tradition has been blended with a federalism which
is American in origin. Political behaviour is often American
despite the forms of government. History relates Canada to
Great Britain, but the daily contacts of Canadians are with
the United States. It has been estimated that some 30,000,-
000 crossings of the Canadian-American boundary were
made in the year 1931-32. 2 Canadian sports and amusements
are American. Only small groups in the principal Canadian
cities read English periodicals, though English books are
more widely distributed. Most English-speaking Canadians
read some American magazines, which have a greater total
circulation in Canada than have the Canadian publications.
Every Canadian with a radio may tune in at any time to a
variety of United States programmes, and their constant
influence affects his outlook even though he may occasionally

lAn estimate of the relative strength of the various groups of opinion in Canada is
made below, pp. 135 ff.

aSee address by R. H. Coats on “The Two Good Neighbours” in Proceedings of Confer¬
ence on Canadian-American Affairs , 1937, edited by Trotter, R. G., Corey, A. B., and Mc¬
Laren, W. W. (Boston, 1937), pp. 106 ff.

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS 103

rise at a special hour to hear a coronation service from
London or some other empire broadcast. Cultural diffusion
east and west is difficult within the Dominion; it is relatively
easy north and south across the international boundary.
The natural affiliations of the Maritime Provinces are with
the New England states; many more Quebec French
Canadians have emigrated to the United States than to
other parts of Canada; Ontario’s business and labour con¬
nections are predominantly American; the Prairie Provinces
are highly Americanized; while British Columbia is an in¬
tegral part of the Pacific slope. 1 Thus does the United States
press upon Canada in a way that Great Britain cannot, and
though the British traditions continue, and provide a kind
ol psychological counterweight which is very powerful the
other influence is the more insistent. The Commonwealth
provides the Sunday religion, North America the week-day
habits, of Canadians.

British institutions are now thoroughly incorporated into
Canadian life and blended with American elements adapted
to Canadian needs. Their continuation in Canada may be
expected, regardless of the continuance of the Common¬
wealth relationship. England's contribution to Canada is
kept alive now not so much by the existence of the Common¬
wealth as by the voluntary adherence of Canadians them¬
selves to the traditions with which their national life began.
On the other hand the existence of these traditions largely
guarantees Canada's continued membership in the Com¬
monwealth.

ASSOCIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

In the formal political sense, the United States is a foreign
country to Canadians, one of the three foreign countries to
which a Canadian minister has been accredited. In actual
fact the United States is not regarded as a foreign country at
all. When the Canadians talk about the “foreigners" in the
population, they are not thinking of American settlers. 2 A

1937)^. ^ afe> N ’ J ' and Logan ’ H - A ’ Labor in Canadian-American Relations (Toronto,

welcome the or S anizers “foreign agitators”, but Canadian politicians

e American financiers with open arms if they have money to invest in Canada.

104

CANADA TODAY

very special relationship exists between the two countries,
as unlike ordinary international intercourse as are the deal¬
ings of the British countries one with another. The existence
of this relationship makes Canada unique in the British
Commonwealth, for no other member has similar associa¬
tions with any country outside the Commonwealth.

Throughout the preceding analysis of the basic factors in
Canadian life, the influence of the United States has in¬
evitably appeared, and there is no need to repeat what has
already been said. Trade and commerce, radio, the films,
newspapers and periodicals, sports, tourist visits and family
connections, maintain the constant intercourse. When dis¬
putes arise and adjustments must be made between the
governments, little difficulty is ever experienced: witness the
settlement of the I'm Alone case, and the steady achieve¬
ments of the International Joint Commission regulating
boundary waters. Perhaps it would be wrong to attribute
all the American characteristics of Canadian life to the in¬
fluence of the United States. Men and women, whether
north or south of the American boundary, derive from the
same racial stocks, live on the same continent, and have to
abstract a living from a very similar physical environment;
it is not surprising that in the process of time their social
and economic institutions have come to have great similari¬
ties. When a Canadian talks of Canada as an American
nation, he does not mean that he wants to become a citizen
of the United States, or hopes Canada will enter the Amer¬
ican Union; he means that he recognizes now, and is not
afraid to face the fact, that his destiny and chief interests lie
in North America. 1

Events that occur in the United States have immediate
repercussions in, and seem closely related to, Canada. Dra¬
matic English events, particularly those touching the Crown,
awake great interest in Canada, but the internal social and
political developments in England seem remote. The election
of President Roosevelt, and the stimulus which his per¬
sonality and programme have given to social and political

Ht has been suggested that the proper reply for a Canadian to the question frequently
addressed to him in England, “Are you an American?”, is, “Yes, I am a Canadian”. Due
to the fact that “United States” is a noun from which no adjective can be made, the word
“American” must do a double duty.

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS 105

changes within the United States, have had a great influence
upon Canadian policy in the past five years. Mr. Bennett’s
legislative reforms of 1935 were not improperly called in
Canada, Mr. Bennett’s ‘New Deal’ ”. Recovery in the
United States preceded and promoted Canadian economic
improvement. The sudden rise of Lewis and the C. I. O.
stirred Canadian trades unions into more militancy and
activity than they had shown since the world war. Mr.
Roosevelt’s visit to Buenos Aires in 1936 made the Pan-
American Union a topic of discussion in the Canadian
Institute of International Affairs, if not in the country at
large. It is generally true that every important development
in the United States is followed with a varying time lag by a
similar development in Canada. Only occasionally are Eng¬
lish changes followed in Canada; possibly the introduction
of new divorce legislation into the Canadian parliament fol¬
lowing A. P. Herbert’s divorce bill is a recent example, as is
also the structure of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
which was modelled on the B. B. C.

CANADA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Since 1920 Canada’s membership in the League of Nations
has been an important factor amongst her external associa¬
tions. It has affected to a considerable degree both her re¬
lationship with the United States and with the British
Commonwealth.

The idea of the League of Nations was attractive to
Canadians for two reasons. In the first place the creation of
the League gave an opportunity for Canada to appear before
the world as an independent nation. Canada, it has been
said, was born in an ante-room at Geneva. In the second
place, Canadians along with other British peoples can be
easily aroused to international co-operation by an idealistic
or humanitarian appeal. The ideals and work of the League
of Nations evoked considerable enthusiasm amongst certain
sections of the Canadian people, and made them desire to
shape a Canadian foreign policy in accordance with the re¬
quirements of a world collective system. This was particu¬
larly true in later years, for at first the League was not

106

CANADA TODAY

understood. While this loyalty to the League did not destroy
a sense of loyalty to the Commonwealth, it made the latter
appear less important to many people.

The history of Canada's participation in League activities
shows a decided opposition to the idea of the League as a
body with power to enforce its decisions. Canadian delegates
at Geneva have generally been willing to co-operate on
minor international matters but unwilling to promote or
support schemes for mutual assistance in the event of war.
In this respect Canadian official action has often been less co¬
operative than some sections of public opinion would have
wished. Canada opposed the Italian suggestion of an inquiry
into raw materials in 1920, and supported the British gov¬
ernment in its rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
of 1923 and the Protocol of 1924. Canada moved for the
deletion of Article X of the Covenant, and when this failed
was instrumental in obtaining the interpretative resolution
of 1923 which recognized that the Council, in recommending
military measures in consequence of aggression, should take
into account the geographical situation and the special con¬
ditions of each state. The Canadian representative at the
time of the Manchurian incident went fully as far as Sir John
Simon in suggesting caution and minimizing the aggression
of Japan. Mr. Mackenzie King in his speech in the Canadian
House of Commons on June 18, 1936, and in his speech at
the League Assembly on September 29, 1936, declared that
Canada had no absolute commitments to apply military or
even economic sanctions against an aggressor named by the
League; that it was for the parliament of Canada (not the
League Council or Assembly) to decide in the light of the
circumstances of each case how far Canada would participate
in any form of compulsion. 1 Yet he had applied the sanctions
against Italy without waiting for parliamentary approval, so
strong was the opinion in the country.

While thus making clear to the League that she would not
give definite commitments in advance, Canada nevertheless
took part in the general work of the League in the same

1A ftill analysis of Mr. King's various statements in this connection is given by Escott
Mr. Mackenzie King’s Foreign Policy”, Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, February, 1937.

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS 107

manner as her sister dominions. She adopted the Optional
Clause and the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes. She has attended the sessions of the
I. L. O.; but the lack of an effective labour party, the in¬
fluence of the employer and agricultural classes in Canada,
and constitutional difficulties, have prevented the Dominion
from implementing more than four of the fifty-seven draft
conventions of the International Labour Conference. 1 An
attempt was made by Mr. Bennett in 1935 to implement
three other conventions, but the Privy Council invalidated
the legislation. None of the provinces has shown any in¬
clination to use the exclusive legislative power in this regard
which the courts have recognized as vested in them; their
legislatures are generally dominated by agricultural repre¬
sentatives and include very few labour spokesmen. 2

Canada’s willingness to participate in the application of
sanctions at the outset of the Italo-Abyssinian war, and the
almost complete unanimity with which this policy was ap¬
proved, at least in English-speaking Canada, indicated that
when loyalty to the Commonwealth and to the League were
combined the majority of the Canadian people were willing
to undertake very considerable commitments in world
affairs. At the same time the more cautious attitude, the
North American suspicion of all European politics, is always
present in the country. The French Canadians in particular
are suspicious of the League, which many of them look upon
as the creation of freemasons and atheists. 3 The Dominion
government’s repudiation of special responsibility for the
Canadian representative’s motion, in the Committee of
Eighteen, to apply the oil sanction, gave expression to the
isolationist feeling. In spite of the League’s virtual dis¬
appearance as an instrument of collective security a belief in
this idea has not died in the Dominion. The disillusionment
and disappointment of recent years, however, have made

lAs of January 1, 1937. See Canada Year Book , 1937, p. 740.

2British Columbia is the sole exception: the Eight Hour Day Convention was put
into force by provincial law. In a number of cases, although the provincial legislatures
have not specifically implemented the conventions, nevertheless they have enacted legis¬
lation covering many of the points dealt with by them.

3See Bruchesi, Jean, in Canada: The Empire and the League (Proceedings of the Cana¬
dian Institute on Economics and Politics, Lake Couchiching, Ontario, 1936) (Toronto,
1936), p. 143.

108

CANADA TODAY

most of the League supporters profoundly sceptical of the
possibility of building again an effective world organization
at Geneva until the European nations settle some of their
own differences by their own action. In consequence, most
Canadians today look upon Europe as being in a condition
indistinguishable from that which existed at the beginning of
this century.

Outside Quebec, sentiment in Canada toward the League
has thus moved from early indifference through a short
period of enthusiasm and active support (Abyssinia) to
almost complete disillusionment. This disillusionment has
spread its influence into the field of Commonwealth affairs.
Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain, China, Austria—these mile¬
stones on the road of international disintegration have
alienated the sympathies of considerable sections of English-
Canadian opinion towards the Commonwealth connection.
These events have had the contrary effect on numerous
other English Canadians.

The former group contend that an inkling of what would
occur were the League to disappear was perceived at the first
British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1 and that its
fears have been amply justified. The influence of recent
international events has reacted in three ways to the
detriment of the Commonwealth association. In the first
place, the policy of the British government since 1931 has
steadily estranged those Canadians who believe it prefers
power politics of the pre-League type to the principles
established by the Covenant. The spectacle of a British
Foreign Secretary going to Geneva, by private agreement
with a covenant-breaker, to beg the powers to recognize a
conquest acquired by barefaced aggression against a fellow
member of the League, is one which these Canadians cannot

l"If a breakdown of the attempt to establish a humane and reasonable world-order
ever did bring these diverse regional factors into active play, who could tell how far the
countries now associated in the British Commonwealth might drift apart on their way to
encounter their diverse fates, whatever these fates might respectively prove to be? To a
well attuned ear, the proceedings at the British Commonwealth Relations Conference
which met at Toronto in September 1933 had a tragic as well as an assuring note.” A. J.
Toynbee, in British Commonwealth Relations (Proceedings of the first British Common¬
wealth Relations Conference) (London, 1934), p. 14. Further opinion of a similar sort
was expressed at the first annual Studies Conference of the Canadian Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs, held in May, 1934; see the report published by the Institute and distributed
privately to members.

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS 109

view without a sense of bitterness and shame, however much
Canada herself may be open to criticism for her attitude
toward sanctions. Distrust of British policy very naturally
breeds a dislike of the idea of the Commonwealth being
asked to back the new policy should it result in the expected
war. In the second place, even many imperialists feel dis¬
turbed at the long refusal of Great Britain to take a firm
stand against the threats of the dictators; while approving
her rearmament programme, they feel that the toleration of
fascist expansion is jeopardizing the trade routes of the
Empire and inviting future aggression at a time when the
strategic position of Great Britain will be far weaker. Lastly,
and perhaps most seriously, the revival of an armaments
race on a huge scale, the return of the struggle for the balance
of power in Europe, and the growing belief that a useless
repetition of the world war is almost certain to occur sooner
or later, make numbers of English Canadians turn to a policy
of North American isolation and self-defence, and confirm
the French Canadians in their determination not to allow
themselves to be involved again. If Europe has reverted to
her former state of armed anarchy, there seems to these
Canadians little use in intervention if there is any possibility
of staying out.

The trend of events has had a very different effect on an¬
other group of English Canadians. Such people may or
may not have approved recent British policy, but their
opinion of what Canada’s policy should be now is determined
by the plain fact that Great Britain is in danger. To them
the preservation of the Commonwealth is a fundamental
article of faith. When the security of the Commonwealth
was reasonably assured they took the association as a matter
of course; but now that that security is threatened, they
urge Canada to rally to the support of the “mother country”.
Today they are more determined in their support of Great
Britain than at any time since 1919. The divergence of
opinion on the question of Canada’s place in the Common¬
wealth is thus becoming more marked, and is increasing the
strain on national unity.

110

CANADA TODAY

ASSOCIATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

Canada’s international relations, apart from those with the
Commonwealth, the United States and the League of Na¬
tions, are principally of a commercial nature. It might be
thought that relations with France would be particularly
close, owing to the fact that so many Canadians are of
French origin. The French Canadian, however, has little
attachment to his mother country. The sentimental tie has
been effectively broken, partly by the absence of political
association for 175 years, but more particularly by the fact
that France has turned anti-clerical while the French
Canadian has remained a staunch believer and an ultra¬
montane. Only to a slight extent, amongst a few intellectuals,
does modem French thought or policy influence the thinking
or attract the attention of the French Canadian. Neverthe¬
less a certain formality of interest is maintained; Canada has
appointed a minister to France, and on important historic
occasions French representatives visit Quebec and make
appropriate speeches.

While the influence of France in Canada is slight, the
influence of the Papacy is considerable. The final decision in
regard to the appointment of Roman Catholic bishops in
Canada is made in Rome. At one period of Canadian history
(during the religious conflict over the Manitoba School Act
of 1890) it was pressure from the Apostolic delegate, Mgr.
Merry del Val, which eased the agitation in French Canada.
The Catholic Church, as M. Siegfried has pointed out, has
interests in North America far wider than the aspirations of
French-Canadian nationalism. 1 The publication of the Ne
Temere decree in 1908 precipitated a Canadian conflict over
the marriage question. 2 The teaching of “corporatism” in
Quebec today is a consequence of the social doctrine contained
in recent Papal encyclicals. Because of the Vatican influence
in Canada, the influence of Italy is also, at the moment,
considerable. French Canada approves the Italian policy
in Spain though this is inimical to the interests of France.

ISiegfried, Andr6, Canada, pp. 69-70.

2A Marriage Bill was introduced into the Dominion Parliament to overcome the effects
ofthe decree, but it was declared ultra vires by the courts. See In Re Marriage Legislation
[1912J A.C. 880.

Ill

CANADA’S EXTERNAL ASSOCIATIONS

The presence of a Canadian minister in Tokyo is evidence
of Canada’s commercial and political concern with the Far
East. Canadian trade with far eastern countries is only a
small part of her total foreign trade, but is by no means a
negligible quantity. In particular, as has been pointed out,
Canada’s trade with Japan has increased considerably in
recent years. Canada has also been interested in the political
arrangements for maintaining peace in the Pacific. She was
largely instrumental in persuading Great Britain to abandon
the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921 out of concern for Amer¬
ican feeling. She became a party to the Nine Power Treaty
and the Four Power Treaty adopted at the Washington
Conference as a basis for future relations between the coun¬
tries bordering on the Pacific. Canadians were amongst the
founders of the unofficial Institute of Pacific Relations.
Canada has never attempted, however, to bring any pressure
to bear upon other signatories to the Washington treaties to
compel them to stand by their engagements. She has left the
initiative here, as in Europe and in the League, to powers
which are more closely involved in the disputes which have
arisen. It is noteworthy that the Canadian government re¬
fused to apply against the belligerents in the Sino-Japanese
conflict the provisions of the neutrality legislation adopted
in 1937. 1 Canadian exporters are being permitted to make
their increased profits out of the demand stimulated by war
in the east, though they were prohibited from similar com¬
mercial transactions with the rebels and the government
forces in Spain. Canada’s general policy of moving when
Britain and the great powers move and not moving when
they do not fitted in here very well with the Catholic opinion
which did not wish any help to reach the Spanish govern¬
ment and the commercial opinion which wanted to seize the
opportunity of greater trade with Japan.

Canadian connections with Latin-American countries are
very slight. There is no diplomatic representative accredited
to any Central or South American state. Trade commis¬
sioners, however, have been appointed for the Argentine
Republic, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Panama and Peru. The

iSee below, pp. 125-6, for its description.

112 CANADA TODAY

total Canadian exports to South and Central America
amounted to only $17,000,000 in 1936, less than Canada’s
exports to Australia. In part this diminutive trade may be
due to the absence of a determined attempt on the part of
Canada to develop markets, but the prevailing opinion in
Canada holds that no very great commercial development is
likely until the standard of living in those countries is ma¬
terially raised. 1 If, however, one thinks of the two Americas
together, then their importance from the Canadian point of
view, even with the undeveloped South American trade, is
at once appreciated. In 1937 they absorbed 45 per cent, of
Canadian exports and supplied 65 per cent, of her imports. 2

lSee the discussion of this and other aspects of Canada’s relations with Latin America
in Canada and the Americas, a report of the Round Table Conference of the Canadian
Institute of International Affairs held at Hamilton, May, 1937, by F. H. Soward; also,
MacKay and Rogers, op. cit., Chap. VIII.

2See table on p. 42, above.

CHAPTER X

SOME ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMONWEALTH

I T WOULD be impossible to find agreement in Canada
about the advantages and disadvantages of membership
in the Commonwealth, since different groups would dis¬
agree as to what constituted an “advantage”. The Orange¬
man in Ontario and the Catholic in Quebec look at the
British connection from fundamentally different points of
view. Instead of attempting, therefore, to form two lists of
the consequences of membership, one labelled “advantages”
and the other “disadvantages”, the more objective method
will be followed of considering what seem to be the principal
results, leaving the reader to form his own estimate as to
their utility for Canada.

Membership in the Commonwealth means that Canada
has always been a partner in a world-wide political organiza¬
tion. This has made the inhabitants of the Dominion more
conscious of their place in international affairs, more con¬
cerned with world movements, than they would have been
as citizens merely of a North American state. It has lessened
to some extent the provincialism and sectionalism to which
the country is only too addicted. This effect of the Common¬
wealth association, however, has of late years lost some of its
force. Canadian foreign trade is so extensive, her relation¬
ships with other countries so wide, that complete isolation
from the rest of the world is no longer possible. The lumber¬
man in British Columbia, the farmer on the prairies, the
miner in central Canada, know what a world market is.
Modem methods of communication keep all parts of Canada
in constant touch with important world events.

If the imperial ties were broken, Canada would at once
have to increase her diplomatic services to enable her to con¬
duct her affairs with foreign states. The right of Canadians
to use the British diplomatic and consular services has thus

113

114

CANADA TODAY

saved Canada the necessity of creating and paying for these
services herself. 1 Every Canadian, by his possession of the
status of British subject, can make use of a ready-made
system of protection throughout the world. He travels and
trades with status. On the other hand the absence of official
Canadian representatives in most countries has meant that
Ottawa has had to rely upon non-Canadian sources of in¬
formation for much of its knowledge of world affairs. 2 Copies
of despatches sent to London from British diplomats may
be forwarded to Ottawa, but these will not contain the
same kinds of information, or even the same interpretation
of events, as would be selected by a Canadian who was view¬
ing foreign developments from the Canadian point of view.

In the international world, Canada as a British dominion
can speak with an authority she would hardly possess were
she an independent country of eleven million people. Canada
has shared to some extent in the prestige and the power of
the whole Commonwealth. It is not easy, however, to meas¬
ure “prestige”. It would be of more use to Canada today
were she a country trying to force her will upon weaker
nations; in so far as she deals with foreign countries on terms
of mutual benefit and goodwill the potential power behind
her is of no special value. Other relatively unarmed coun¬
tries, many with valuable raw materials as in South America,
do not appear to suffer any particular handicap in their
foreign relations. Canada’s most important affairs are with
the United States and the British Commonwealth, and here
“prestige” is of no value today, however useful it may have
been in dealings with the United States during the nineteenth
century, and however useful it may again become in a
changing world. 3

The fact that Canada began its life as a colony quite na¬
turally has produced in many Canadians an attitude of mind
which can best be described as “colonialism”. This outlook
continues to dominate a certain number of people, despite

iThe British consular services, however, on the whole are self-supporting.

2Canadian representatives in London, Washington, Paris, Tokyo and Geneva are able
to supply the government with a great deal of very useful information; but these sources
are incomplete.

3See Trotter, R. G., “Which Way Canada? An Inquiry Concerning Canadian-American
Relations and Canada’s Commonwealth Policy”, Queen's Quarterly , XLV, 3, Autumn, 1938.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMONWEALTH 115

the growth of Dominion autonomy. It produces a distrust
of things Canadian, a sense of inferiority, and a tendency to
follow borrowed traditions blindly rather than to think out
and act upon a native policy. Sometimes, to compensate for
the inner weakness, an ostentatious patriotism appears based
more on narrow loyalty than reasoned faith. Canada will not
be a nation in the full sense until Dominion status has be¬
come a psychological fact as well as a political reality.

One of the commonest ideas held about Canada’s mem¬
bership in the Commonwealth is that through it she has been
provided with defence. Prior to the establishment of the
Dominion and its extension to the Pacific the burden of
Canada’s border defence was borne in large measure by the
British government. In 1870, however, British forces were
withdrawn from Canada, except for the garrisons at Halifax
and Esquimalt, which were maintained until 1905. Up till
confederation expansionist agitation in the United States
would have repeatedly threatened Canadian independence
had not the United States realized that northward aggression
would face the military power of Britain. On the other hand
it must be remembered that some of the agitation for
annexation of Canadian territory was an appeal to anti-
British rather than to anti-Canadian prejudices. 1

So far as an invasion from Europe or Asia is concerned, at
no time in the past 100 years is it reasonable to suppose that
any power would have contemplated such an attack,
whether the British navy or the Monroe Doctrine existed or
not. Japan did not become a modern state until the end of
the nineteenth century, and her expansion has since then
been quite naturally toward the Asiatic mainland. Russia,
after the sale of Alaska in 1867, paid no more attention to
America. Germany and Italy did not become united until
1870 and have been engrossed since in European and African
affairs. The Germany of 1914, had it been victorious in the
world war, would no doubt have contemplated further
colonial expansion, conceivably at the expense of Canada;
if this is so, the Dominion was defended by France, Russia

iSee Trotter, R. G., “The Canadian Back Fence in Anglo-American Relations”, Queen’s
Quarterly , XL, 3, August, 1933.

116 CANADA TODAY

and the other allied powers fighting Germany just as much
as by England and the United States. Canada would be
better defended today by a strong League of Nations, or
even by a strong alliance between England, France and
Russia, than she ever can be by the British Commonwealth
alone.

As regards the problem of defence in the future, it would
appear that neither Commonwealth aid nor the Monroe
Doctrine is immediately essential, though both are im¬
portant. It has been shown how Canada will be able to
defend her own coasts from any expected scale of attack,
when her present defence plans are completed. Geography
and international political alignments give her, at the mo¬
ment, all the defence she needs in addition to her own
strength. In the contemporary world the only place where
Canadians are likely to die violent deaths on the field of
battle is in Europe. Were it not for the Commonwealth con¬
nection Canada would certainly be as isolationist as all the
other American states. It is true that a number of Canadians
consider Great Britain the principal supporter of peace in
Europe; they believe that if she should be defeated in a war
it would be only a matter of time before Canada was subject
to a serious threat of invasion which could only be avoided
by alliance with, followed by political subjection to, the
United States; that the preservation of Canadian independ¬
ence therefore requires participation in the major struggles
of Britain wherever they may be. In short, they think that
defending England is defending Canada in a very real sense,
quite apart from questions of sentiment or of moral obliga¬
tion. 1 The same long-range argument, of course, would lead
Mexico and the South American republics to defend them¬
selves by fighting in Europe, since they are equally liable to
invasion; it would mean also that Canada should help France
and China, both of which can be relied on to oppose Ger¬
many and Japan, Canada’s principal potential enemies.

It has been pointed out that the Canadian defence forces
are equipped and trained according to English standards.

lAn argument tending to support this view is presented in Trotter, R. G., “Which Way
Canada? An Inquiry Concerning Canadian-American Relations and Canada’s Common¬
wealth Policy”, loc. cit.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMONWEALTH 117

This is clearly an effect of the Commonwealth association.
It results in Canada having to rely to a great extent on Great
Britain for supplies. If the Atlantic sea route were blocked
during a war, Canadians might find it impossible to maintain
the coastal batteries at Halifax and Esquimalt, equipped
with English guns. A defence policy based on purely Can¬
adian needs would more naturally follow United States
practices, since supplies are more likely to be available from
that country. The danger of Canada being cut off through
the application of the United States neutrality laws is less
than the danger that air and submarine attacks may make
impossible any transport across the Atlantic. It is in the
interest of the United States that Canada should be able to
defend her neutrality against, and to repel invasion by, a
non-American aggressor.

Another consequence of Commonwealth membership, al¬
ready pointed out, is that Canadian defence policy has em¬
phasized military at the expense of naval and air power. A
concern solely with local defence needs would have resulted
in expenditure devoted much more to coastal defences and
much less to the militia.

Canada’s relations with the United States have grown
steadily closer with the industrial development of the
Dominion, despite Canada’s membership in the Common¬
wealth. Yet most Canadians would feel that the process of
Americanization in Canada would have proceeded further
and more rapidly had Canada been an independent state.
Certainly the links with Great Britain and the other domin¬
ions, the position of the Crown, and innumerable other
British influences have tended to make Canadians feel they
were different from Americans even when the other influences
of geography and commercial intercourse were making the
two countries more and more alike. Had it not been for
membership in the Commonwealth, Canada would probably
have joined the Pan-American Union. It would be a com¬
paratively simple matter, from the military point of view,
to create a league of American nations whose pooled defence
forces would be impregnable against outside attack. Yet
even today the sense of being a “British” country is still

118

CANADA TODAY

strong enough to make most Canadians unwilling to take
this step, and the idea of such a league shows no sign of
entering the realm of practical politics.

Turning to matters of trade, it would seem that the ex¬
istence of the Commonwealth has not affected the develop¬
ment of the Canadian economy to any preponderant extent
since the repeal of the Com Laws in 1846. After that date
Canada went her own economic way. The British preference,
it is true, and the Ottawa agreements, have diverted more
Canadian trade into imperial channels than would have gone
in that direction for purely economic reasons. Canada might
have had fewer American branch factories had they not
sought the benefit of imperial preferences. But Canada
possesses raw materials which many countries, particularly
Great Britain, need and must purchase on the world market.
Canadian nickel must be bought because scarcely any other
nickel exists; the best Canadian wheat will find a market
because no better wheat is produced. Canadian foreign trade
would no doubt be more widely spread were it not for the
spirit of economic nationalism which operates within the
Commonwealth, but it is doubtful how far the Common¬
wealth increases the total volume of that trade. Moreover,
in so far as special economic arrangements between Common¬
wealth countries have the appearance, to outside nations, of
creating a British economic bloc and a market closed to
foreigners, they increase the world struggle for raw materials
and thus add to the general political unsettlement and to
Canada’s insecurity. 1

It would be impossible to trace all the effects of member¬
ship in the Commonwealth on the internal development of
the Canadian people. Their attitudes toward government,
politics, law, religion, and indeed most other fields of human
activity, have been profoundly coloured by the British con¬
nection. The sectional variations in the strength of this in¬
fluence, its counter-action by other influences of racial mix¬
ture and geography, its decline in the face of the growing
national consciousness of Canadians, have already been noted.

ir i r Ra y mond Leslie Buell has remarked that the result of the Ottawa agreements
has been not only to demoralize still further world trade as a whole, but to make the
Empire the object of envy of the overcrowded dictatorships”. See Canada, The Empire
and the League (op. cit.), p. 54.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMONWEALTH 119

Two other effects of membership in the Commonwealth
already touched upon deserve emphasis. In the first place,
Canadians of British origin, no matter how much they might
be separated by the sectional divisions of the country, have
been in the past united in their sense of loyalty to the Com¬
monwealth. Up to a point this common bond overcame
sectional divisions. At the same time the force that tended
to unite the English Canadians tended also to keep them
apart from the French. French Canadians have felt that
English Canadians were merely Englishmen in Canada and
not properly Canadians, believing (without full warrant)
that the latter placed loyalty to the Commonwealth ahead of
loyalty to the interests of Canada. 1 Were Canada not a part
of the Commonwealth Canadians would be more inclined to
place the interests of their own country first, and a similar
loyalty would tend to unite the two races in a way that has
not occurred in the past.

The second of these consequences is found in the pro¬
gressive deterioration of the Canadian constitution as a
result of the Privy Council decisions. Mention has been
made of the way in which judicial interpretation has altered
the nature of the original federal structure, giving Canada in
effect a constitution under which the central government has
a limited number of powers and the residue remains with
provincial authorities. 2 It was sentiment and colonial status
which prevented the Canadian Supreme Court from being
made the final court of appeal; from this point of view mem¬
bership in the Commonwealth has greatly retarded the
development of Canadian unity. It is fair to add, however,
that most Canadians have accepted these decisions without
much criticism until recently, when the seriousness of the
Dominion’s position has come to be recognized. If anything
is to be done now, the responsibility rests upon Canada.

iThe history of English-speaking Canada for more than a century has displayed a
persistent Canadianism which has been willing to use the imperial connection for class or
sectional aims and which has frequently sacrificed imperial interests. The annexation
manifesto of 1849 was supported for reasons of commercial interest by a class which had
just been claiming a monopoly of genuine loyalty. The imperialist sentiment of Canadian
manufacturers at the Ottawa Economic Conference of 1932 was not very noticeable.

2 See above, pp. 75 ff.

CHAPTER XI

THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY

I N the preceding discussion of Canada’s position in the
Commonwealth, the question of neutrality has frequently
arisen. As the international situation deteriorates and an¬
other world war seems to draw closer, the rights and duties
of Canada in time of war are increasingly being discussed by
Canadians.

EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM

Historically, Canada has always felt free to keep out of
minor wars in which Great Britain might be engaged, but
not free to keep out of major wars. Sir John Macdonald re¬
fused to lend Great Britain aid during the Khartoum incident
in 1884, and in an interesting letter to Sir Charles Tupper he
put forward the sensible proposal that “the reciprocal aid to
be given by the colonies to England should be a matter of
treaty deliberately entered into and settled on a permanent
basis”. 1 Sir Wilfrid Laurier distinguished between the “life
and death struggle” and the “secondary wars” of England,
holding that Canada was obliged to engage in the former
only. 2 Mr. King took an isolationist stand, implying a right
to non-participation, in the Chanaq affair in 1922. Events
since then have shown that England may have obligations of
a major kind in Europe which Canada does not share. Im¬
pliedly Canadian non-participation in a major war in which
Great Britain might be involved was admitted in the
Locarno Treaty. The Imperial Conference declaration in
1926, that the members of the British Commonwealth were
“autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal
in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect
of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common
allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the
British Commonwealth of Nations" , logically contained within

iCited MacKay and Rogers, Canada Looks Abroad, p. 73.

2See below, p. 136, n. 1.

120

121

l )

THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY

it the concept of neutrality in any war. The Statute of West¬
minster in 1931 legalized Dominion legislative independence
and set the seal on the new constitution of the Common¬
wealth. But as it dealt with legislative and not executive
power, and as it gave Canada no capacity to amend the
B. N. A. Act, it did not clarify the specific issue.

In 1933, at the first British Commonwealth Relations
Conference, the question of neutrality was side-stepped by
the ingenious device of suggesting that it was “academic”
and ‘unprofitable” to consider “legal conceptions as to war
and neutrality appropriate to the pre-League world”. 1 Al¬
ready in that year, however, a formal political declaration of
a policy of neutrality for Canada was enunciated by the
newly-organized farmer-labour party, the Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation, in its party manifesto. Many
people in Canada were making up their minds to neutrality
while the more bashful Commonwealth representatives were
refusing to consider the problem. It was obvious by that
date that the “pre-League” world had become the post-
League world. Since then the repeated assertions by the
Canadian government that Parliament is “free to decide”
the question of participation in empire wars when the mo¬
ment arises, is at once a recognition of the strength of this
opinion in Canada and also an implied assumption that the
freedom is unfettered by commitments. No serious discus¬
sion of the future of the British Commonwealth can now
avoid facing squarely the problem of neutrality for its
members.

The question that now presents itself is not peculiar to
Canada. It requires, indeed, an answer from every member
of the Commonwealth, though it is not essential that these
answers should be all the same, since Australia and New
Zealand might well feel that their geographical position and
interests compel them to a different solution from that which

iToynbee, A. J. (ed.), British Commonwealth Relations , p. 181. Three classes of people in
Canada describe talk of neutrality as “academic”: those who do not want the subject dis¬
cussed at all; those who, like Prof. F. H. Underhill, (see Anderson, Violet (ed.), World
Currents and Canada’s Course , p. 130) feel that the Canadian people will be denied any choice
when war starts by reason of existing commitments to intervene; and others who believe
that, however legally Canada might assert her neutrality, the chance of maintaining it
against potential foes would be negligible. It seems clear, however, that if a country ever
wishes to remain neutral, the existence or otherwise of the right is a matter of some practical
importance.

122 CANADA TODAY

might be suitable for South Africa or Canada. The answer
involves a choice between differing concepts of Common¬
wealth. Is the Commonwealth necessarily and for every
member an offensive-defensive alliance? 1 Must every do¬
minion support ultimately by armed force the foreign policy
of the British government regardless of whether there is any
possibility of controlling that policy? To put it more simply
for 1938, has the Conservative party of Great Britain the
power to declare war for every dominion? Or is the Com¬
monwealth to be thought of as fulfilling the terms of the
definition of 1926, namely, a free association of states com¬
pletely independent in every matter of domestic and foreign
policy? If the Balfour formula means what it says, it means
that the right to neutrality is necessarily a part of the con¬
cept of the modern Commonwealth. Certainly the dominions
cannot be equal to Great Britain if the government of that
country can put them into a war, while their own govern¬
ments have no such power.

It is not proposed to argue here whether or not the right
to neutrality exists for Canada as a matter of law. The point
is contentious, but the overwhelming weight of authority
takes the view that legally the state of technical belligerency
is created in the Dominion by a British declaration of war. 8
The argument for Canada’s immediate commitment is
stronger than that made out for dominions like Eire and
the Union of South Africa, which have adopted legisla¬
tion enabling them to control fully their own foreign affairs;
the former country has even got rid of the special privileges
for British naval vessels in its harbours. In any case,
domestic changes within the Commonwealth as to how the
royal prerogative may be exercised can have no effect on the
international community, and unless the right is recognized

lEven the term “alliance” is improper to describe the existing situation. An alliance
presupposes sovereign states, voluntarily entering into a compact. The present obligation
of the dominions to take part in British wars is not a matter of agreement between equals
but a relic of colonial status. A colony is necessarily at war when its governing authority
declares it to be so.

2See MacKay and Rogers, Canada Looks Abroad, chap. XV. See also Kennedy, W.P. M.,
The Constitution of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1938), pp. 540 ff.; Corbett, P. E., “Isolation
for Canada”, University of Toronto Quarterly, 1936, p. 120; Keith, A. B., The Governments
of the British Empire (London, 1935), p. 99, Constitutional Law of the British Dominions
(London, 1933), p. 70; Hancock, W. K., Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol. I,
(London, 1937), p. 305; Scott,E.R.,“Canada and the Outbreak of War”, Canadian Forum,
June, 1937. Contra, Ewart, J. S., 1932 Canadian Bar Review, 495; Burchell, C. T.,in MacKay
and Rogers, op. cit., pp. 241 ff.

123

THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY

abroad it is of little value. Nothing has been done officially
by the Commonwealth to bring the existence of dominion
autonomy in peace and war to the attention of foreign
governments.

CONFUSION OF OPINION IN CANADA

Most people in Canada, at the present moment are divided
on, and confused about, the question of neutrality. They
have not been taught to distinguish between the right to neu¬
trality and a policy of neutrality, while the subtle differences
between passive and active belligerency escape them alto¬
gether. A great many either do not see that the achievement
of the right is an essential prerequisite for the exercise of a
free choice—a choice that may just as easily be in favour of
supporting Great Britain as of neutrality—or else they be¬
lieve they already have the right and think that further dis¬
cussion is an attempt to tie Canada to a permanent policy of
neutrality. The political leaders have generally refrained
from clarifying the issue, and have used language that is
capable of contradictory interpretations. Mr. King has been
most explicit, yet every statement he has made implies the
existence of the right to neutrality, without discussing how
it has been achieved or how it may be exercised. His attitude
is succinctly expressed in this sentence: “It will be for this
parliament to say in any given situation whether or not
Canada shall remain neutral." 1 A state which “remains”
neutral until parliament decides obviously is not made a
belligerent by action of the British government. Again, on
his return from the Imperial Conference of 1937, Mr. King
said that the “full and untrammelled responsibility of the
Canadian parliament for decision on the vital issues of
foreign policies and defence was completely maintained
throughout. It was made clear in the conference discussions
that Canada was not committed to joining in any Imperial
or any league military undertakings, and equally, that there
was no commitment against such participation.” 2 Despite
the ambiguity of the term “participation” the whole tenor

ICanada, House of Commons Debates, January 25, 1937, pp. 249-50. Italics added.

*July 19; cited, Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 1, 1938 (unrevised), p. 2092.

124 CANADA TODAY

of the statement implies that Canada has control over the
declaration of war.

Against these statements of the Prime Minister are, as has
been said, the opinions of nearly all the constitutional au¬
thorities. Moreover, Mr. Lapointe, the Minister of Justice,
has acknowledged that Canada is automatically committed
to a state of passive belligerency. 1 He has not, however, ex¬
plained how “active” passive belligerency must be. For, as¬
suming that no right to neutrality exists, Canada’s legal
relations with the enemy state are drastically changed with¬
out Canada’s consent by a British declaration of war. The
decision to send troops may be discretionary, but other vital
matters are not. Automatic and complete economic sanctions
against England’s enemy legally go into force, for example,
even before the Canadian parliament meets to decide its
course of action. It would be illegal for any Canadian to
trade with the enemy after the outbreak of war, since trading
with the enemy is a crime. This is surely “active participa¬
tion”, yet it has never been so much as mentioned in any
governmental statement of policy. Canada has also under¬
taken to allow the British government the use of the har¬
bours of Halifax and Esquimalt for naval purposes, and this
agreement is inconsistent with a neutral position. 2 Passive
belligerency would thus, in the opinion of most people, be
certain to become active participation. For this reason the
present Canadian policy of laissez-faire as regards the right
to neutrality would work out as a continuation of the tradi¬
tional policy of participation.

Some Canadians who admit that this analysis is probably
correct would reply that it is mostly irrelevant, since even if
the right to neutrality were conceded and Canada tried to
remain neutral, she would inevitably be dragged in, like the
United States in 1917, if the war continued for long. There
is no doubt much force in this contention. It is not safe to
assume, however, that attempts at neutrality armed with

iHe has said: “There is all the difference in the world between neutrality, and participa¬
tion or non-participation, which we shall be always free to declare, in the event of any war.
. . . But neutrality is quite different. . . . This question as to the right of the dominions
to be neutral is one of the questions yet to be solved. . . .** Canada, House of Commons
Debates, February 4, 1937, p. 547.

2The text of the Canadian government’s undertaking is given in House of Commons,
Sessional Papers , 1937, No. 285; also in MacKay and Rogers, op. cit., p. 299.

125

THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY

more detailed legislative support than has existed hitherto
will be useless in the future. And the real importance of the
right to neutrality, from the Commonwealth point of view, is
psychological. If Canada is involved in a war at its outset
just because of the legal ties and their consequences, a great
number of Canadians will vent their indignation upon the
Commonwealth connection, whereas if they are dragged into
the war otherwise they will have only themselves and the
world situation to blame. A concession of the right would
thus appear to be a safeguard for Commonwealth as well as
for Canadian unity. 1

Various factors, amongst which the creation of the
Spanish Non-Intervention Committee in 1936 was perhaps
the chief, led the Canadian government in 1937 to arm itself
with wide powers for keeping Canadians from participating
in foreign (i.e. non-British) wars or civil wars which might
involve the peace of the country. Two statutes were passed
by the Dominion parliament in that year, containing per¬
manent provisions capable of application in any future
situation. The first was the Foreign Enlistment Act. 2 This
substantially re-enacted for Canada the provisions of the
imperial Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, and gave the
Dominion government power to prohibit the enlistment of
Canadians in foreign armies either during a war or a civil
war. The second amended the Customs Act 3 so as to give
the government discretionary power in peace or war to “Pro¬
hibit, restrict or control the exportation, generally or to any
destination, directly or indirectly, or the carrying coastwise
or by inland navigation, of arms, ammunition, implements
or munitions of war, military, naval or air stores, or any
article deemed capable of being converted thereinto or made
useful in the production thereof, or provisions or any sort

iSome Canadians believe that foreign countries would refuse to recognize Canadian
neutrality. Obviously the decision of enemies of Great Britain would be based on their
conception of their own interest. Normally it would be to their interest to be at peace
with Canada, though they would probably wish to interfere with trade coming from Canada
and such interference might well lead to war unless Canada were content to submit quietly,
like the Scandinavian countries from 1914 to 1918. Here again it is well to remember that
50 per cent, of Canadian trade is carried in British vessels, 37^ per cent, in foreign and
12 Yi per cent, in Canadian vessels.

2 Statutes of Canada, 1937, cap. 32. It is interesting that the Canadian government
introduced a Foreign Enlistment Act in 1875, but later withdrew it.

3 Statutes of Canada , 1937, cap. 24, sec. 10.

126 CANADA TODAY

of victual which may be used as food by man or beast . . .
The Dominion government exercised its new powers under
this legislation in the summer of 1937 when the acts were
made applicable to Spain.

The present policy of Canada is a threefold one of em¬
phasizing Parliament’s freedom of choice without explaining
what it means, providing legislation to assist neutrality in
non-British wars, and proceeding with military preparations
which lend themselves to some form of participation in the
next war in which the Commonwealth is engaged. This policy
appears acceptable to most Canadians, since the imperialists
believe it gives them what they want and most of the others
fail to perceive the degree to which it leaves them com¬
mitted. If one looks for indications of opinion in the country,
however, it is evident that a great body of opinion would
favour the possession by Canada of the right to neutrality,
so that the Canadian parliament could decide on each oc¬
casion what foreign policy it should pursue in the event of
any war. Certainly French Canadians take this view, and
they constitute 30 per cent, of the population. Of the re¬
maining 70 per cent, another 20 per cent, is of non-British
origin, and can scarcely feel a sentimental obligation to take
part in every British war. In numerous bodies and associa¬
tions representing different groups of English-Canadian
opinion (farmer and labour groups, trades union meetings,
university student conferences, etc. 1 ) during the past few
years, resolutions have been adopted either calling explicitly
for the right or else advocating a foreign policy which im¬
plied that the right existed.

It appears reasonable to assume that a considerable ma¬
jority of the people of Canada believe either that the
Dominion has or that it should have the right to remain
neutral whenever it so desires. There would not be so strong
a support as this for a definite policy of neutrality, which
would tie the hands of the government in advance, although,

iSee, for instance, C. C. F. statement, cited MacKay and Rogers, op. cit., p. 387; resolu¬
tion of United Farmers of Ontario, 1936, and petition of 13,000 university students in 1937
asking for clarification of the legal situation. The Trades and Labour Congress of Canada
voted in 1937 in favour of holding a referendum before Canada takes part in any future wars.

127

THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY

as pointed out below, isolationist sentiment has grown
greatly in strength during the past seven years. 1

ADVANTAGES OF CLARIFICATION

The right to neutrality is inherent in the principle of
equal status. It may well be argued that the time seems to
have arrived when this principle should be given its full
effect in the international sphere, for it is now abundantly
clear that no collective system of international security exists
to render neutrality obsolete. Already constitutional writers
are beginning to picture the state of affairs which would pre¬
vail were the dominions to acquire this further attribute of
sovereignty. A single Crown common to all the members, but
acting for each on the advice of the particular government
concerned whether in peace or in war, would be the basis of
the Commonwealth constitution. The citizens of each mem¬
ber country, while possessing the common status of British
subjects for certain purposes of intra-Commonwealth co¬
operation, would also possess a separate nationality for pur¬
poses of international intercourse. Such ideas are not new to
the Commonwealth; to extend them to situations of peace
and war is merely to develop existing practices to a further
point.

From the point of view of Canada, the change would re¬
quire an abandonment of the present agreement regarding
the use of the harbours of Halifax and Esquimalt by British
naval vessels, an extension (though not necessarily to every
country) of the Canadian diplomatic service, and the transfer
of the remaining imperial prerogatives over foreign affairs
from London to Ottawa. For the Commonwealth as a whole
the change would best be effected after an agreement arrived
at in an Imperial Conference, followed by formal notification
to every foreign government of the new situation. The right
having been established, individual dominions could then
make separate agreements with Great Britain or with one

ISeepage 135, below. Mr. J. S. Woodsworth’s motion in the House of Commons in 1937
calling for a policy of neutrality would have left the government no option but one of
isolation in the event of war; its defeat therefore did not involve a parliamentary decision
as to the advisability of acquiring the right of neutrality. See Canada, House of Commons
Debates, January 25 and 28, and February 4, 1937.

128

CANADA TODAY

another on matters of defence if they so desired. The regional
grouping and interests of dominions would find effect within
the Commonwealth according to the natural geographic and
economic inclinations of the different members. Even those
dominions which gained the right of neutrality but entered
into no new commitments for defence, would still be as free
as they are now to participate in Commonwealth wars. The
Commonwealth would not be disrupted; it would, on the
contrary, have achieved a peaceful change according to the
best democratic tradition, and clarified a constitutional
situation which is now clouded with doubt and uncertainty.
It would have made a decision calmly and without ill-feeling
which may otherwise have to be made in the stress of a
sudden emergency. Thenceforth the Commonwealth as a
whole could not be imperilled, as it can be at present, through
the pursuit by a particular British government of a foreign
policy which might involve England in war and yet meet
with the strong disapproval of some or all of the dominion
governments.

Those who argue that to discuss and plan for neutrality
is to invite disruption of the Commonwealth, are repeating
today an argument that has been steadily used to oppose or
postpone every application of the democratic principle to the
government of the former British colonies. 1 It is, on the con¬
trary, highly dangerous to leave so delicate a question to be
decided under threat of hostilities. A claim to the right of
neutrality advanced at the beginning of a war, without gen¬
eral consent and when emotions were strongly aroused,
might well be interpreted as secession. Even under the
serious though less critical international situation which
exists today, were Canada to make a unilateral declaration
it would be interpreted in some quarters, no doubt, as im¬
plying a more complete withdrawal from the Commonwealth
orbit than is intended by many of those who advocate
acquisition of the right of neutrality. Such interpretations
have been made of other steps toward dominion autonomy.

iThe argument that greater freedom for the dominions strengthens rather than weakens
the Commonwealth is well expressed in The British Empire (Royal Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs Study Group Report) (London, 1937), pp. 230-1. As was said by B. K.
Long in Willert, (Sir) A., Hodson, H. V., and Long, B. K., The Empire in the World (London,
1937), p. 125, “Discussion and recognition of the most far-reaching dominion rights can
only do good”.

THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY 129

An agreement about neutrality reached by Commonwealth
discussion in time of peace, however, need not involve any
such threat of secession. Nor need constitutional changes in
Canada, by which Ottawa secured the same degree of control
as have South Africa and Eire over all kinds of treaties and
documents affecting them to which the King’s name must
be appended, produce any more disturbance in the Common¬
wealth than occurred when those dominions added these
functions to their powers of self-government, which many
claim to have made neutrality legally possible.

CHAPTER XII

PRESENT OBJECTIVES OF CANADA’S EXTERNAL

POLICIES

POLITICAL

T HE student of Canadian affairs who understands the
mixed nature of the Canadian population, the world¬
wide distribution of Canadian foreign trade, and the
conflicting pulls of British sentiment and North American
geography, will not be surprised to find that Canadian
foreign policy lacks a clear and positive direction. Any gov¬
ernment at Ottawa which must make decisions on inter¬
national affairs is speaking for a political party which repre¬
sents every section of the country and of the people, and
therefore every principal difference of opinion. In no field
of political life is Andre Siegfried’s comment on Canadian
statesmen more true, that they “fear great movements of
opinion, and seek to lull them rather than to encourage them
and bring them to fruition”. Politicians must find a policy
which will be supported, in its main lines, not only by a
majority of the people of Canada, but by a majority of the
members of each of the two major racial groups in Canada.
Too definite a stand, it seems evident, will simply transfer
every international quarrel to Canadian shores and produce
two antagonistic camps within the country, as happened
with the attempt to enforce conscription in 1917. In short,
the internal political situation is such that instead of ham¬
mering out a policy at party caucuses or conventions and
then putting it before the public for their acceptance or re¬
jection, Canadian politicians have preferred to let the event,
at the last moment, determine the policy.

A consequence of this fear in the political leaders is that
the Canadian public is largely ignorant of, and confused
about, questions of foreign policy. This is less true of the
French Canadians; they are not better informed, but they

130

1 1

CANADA’S EXTERNAL POLICIES 131

have at least a clear, simple policy of isolation from all
foreign wars and entanglements. The majority of English-
speaking Canadians have not, except in some quarters and
quite recently, given conscious thought to the question of
what foreign policy Canada should follow. Even the mem¬
bers of parliament devote little time to the problem. The
Prime Minister, with all his other duties, is still carrying the
responsibilities of the Secretary of State for External Affairs,
and there is no effective parliamentary committee for de¬
tailed discussion of policy. IVfost of the debates that have
occurred in the past three years have been due to pressure
from the small C. C. F. group or other independents in the
House of Commons. 1 Undoubtedly such bodies as the
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the League of
Nations Society, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corpora¬
tion through its discussions and nation-wide broadcasting of
lectures, coupled with the seriousness of the threat of war,
are helping in the building of an informed opinion, but the
subject can still be kept well in the background of political
issues.

At the same time a certain kind of foreign policy, though
not consciously planned and selected, is given to Canada
ready-made by facts of history, race, geography and eco¬
nomics. Proximity to the United States, constitutional and
sentimental ties with Great Britain, geographic isolation
from centres of world conflict, the necessity for extensive
foreign markets, and more recently membership in the
League of Nations, are basic influences determining the di¬
rection in which she is likely to move. 2 The absence of a
nationally chosen foreign policy, therefore, does not mean the
absence of a foreign policy, but rather it means a policy of
drift in whatever direction these forces may impel the coun¬
try at a given moment. Prior to 1914 the colonial status of
Canada made the empire tie the predominant factor in
every critical situation; the unity of the empire meant that
in practice Canadian policy was inevitably what the British
Foreign Office determined it should be on every major issue.

lOn this whole question see Chapters XII and XIII in MacKay and Rogers, op. cit.

T R-Z'The Permanent Bases of Canadian Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs,

132

CANADA TODAY

The insistence upon separate membership in the League of
Nations, and the insistence on the progressive evolution of
dominion status, were the first occasions on which Canada
asserted a policy which might be called original. Yet once in
the League Canada tended to follow rather than to lead, her
only distinctive contribution being the early attempts to
water down the obligations of the covenant as to sanctions.
Now that Geneva has ceased to be a centre of major world
affairs Canada is thrust back more upon her own initiative;
the covenant gives little guidance upon policy, and theo¬
retically the British Foreign Office makes no binding com¬
mitments for Canada. Thus, for the first time in her history,
Canada is now faced with the full responsibilities of an
autonomous state in a world of international anarchy.

In face of this new situation, the full implications of which
are only beginning to be realized, certain fairly well defined
groups of opinion can be discerned in Canada, centering
around the three possible policies of non-intervention in
foreign wars, imperialism or a British front policy, and col¬
lective security. These groups, it should be noticed, by no
means differ on all points of foreign policy. They are all
agreed that Canada must continue to trade in world mar¬
kets—this means that there are no economic isolationists or
“autarchists” in Canada. Again, nearly all their supporters
are agreed that friendly relations with the United States,
membership in the Commonwealth, and membership in the
League should continue, though the non-interventionists
insist that neither membership should involve commitments.
The differences between these groups narrow down to ques¬
tions of emphasis in policy and particularly to the problem
of economic and military action in wars abroad. 1

The non-interventionists (who generally call themselves
isolationists though they do not envisage breaking all ties
with foreign countries) are opposed to Canada’s participating
in overseas wars, whether for the League or for the Com¬
monwealth. Canada’s contribution to world peace, they feel,

lCanadian writers vary in their estimate of the number of these groups. Mr. J. W.
Dafoe listed three in 1936 (Foreign Affairs, January, 1936) but five in 1937 (World Currents
and Canada’s Course, p. 144). Hon. Ian Mackenzie, Minister of National Defence, names
five (House of Commons Debates, March 24, 1938). Prof. Underhill boils them down to
two—those who want to take part in the next European war and those who don’t.

CANADA’S EXTERNAL POLICIES 133

is best made by her staying quietly at home and minding her
own business. Her work for humanity is to develop her
resources and to make them available to all in the markets of
the world. She has no enemies, save those which the British
connection or League obligations may make for her. People
who want her raw materials can buy them freely enough.
She can provide for her own defence, and can go peacefully
on her own way, they feel, with every bit as much safety as
any other American nation. Some non-interventionists
would be isolationist as against Europe and the Far East
only; they would welcome a development of Pan-American¬
ism for the better co-operation of all people in the two Amer¬
icas, believing that here a regional security system is both
feasible and desirable.

The imperialist or “British front” school believe that the
Commonwealth is still a unit as far as primary issues of policy
are concerned. Whether the relationship between the mem¬
bers be called an alliance, an entente or a partnership, it
requires, they feel, that the dominions and Great Britain
should stand or fall together in any emergency, and pur¬
sue parallel policies on major world issues. This opinion
tends to view the United States with suspicion (though some
would hope to see an “Anglo-Saxon front” emerge) and to
dismiss the League of Nations as an impossible dream in a
world of hard realities. There are shades of opinion within
this imperialist camp, however, and many who formerly
supported a League policy for Canada have reverted to the
imperialist position, either because they believe a strong
Commonwealth is the best alternative to a League, or be¬
cause they think that the Commonwealth may be the
foundation on which the collective system can be rebuilt in
the future. Sometimes, making the best of both worlds, the
spokesmen for a British front policy speak of “collective
security within the Empire”. 1

The third policy for Canada, which still has many ad¬
herents despite its vanishing chances of realization, is a
policy based on the idea of a revived League of Nations,
leading eventually to the re-establishment of the collective

lE.g. Senator Griesbach, in Queen’s Quarterly, Spring, 1937.

134

CANADA TODAY

system of security. The supporters of this policy would hold
that peace is indivisible and cannot be maintained by armed
alliances, British or other. They believe that nothing has
failed at Geneva except the statesmanship of the great
powers, amongst which they would include Great Britain as
a chief offender. British foreign policy ever since the Na¬
tional government took office in 1931 seems to them to have
displayed the worst features of the old, secret diplomacy and
imperialist “power politics’ ’ which they thought the English
people had renounced when they subscribed to the covenant.
The toleration of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931,
the indifference to Hitler’s rearmament programme in 1933
and to his remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the
making of a private naval treaty with Germany in 1935, the
cold-blooded nature of the Hoare-Laval Treaty regarding
Abyssinia and the backing-down over sanctions, the farce
of non-intervention in Spain and Mr. Chamberlain’s new
policy of collaboration with the League’s arch-enemies, have
produced in them a profound distrust of British influence in
the present international situation. Canadian policy in the
past they recognize also as having been short-sighted and
selfish at Geneva but her greater remoteness from the issues
and the small weight that her voice can carry, while not
excusing her from blame, free her in their eyes from any
major responsibility for the League debacle. Many people,
formerly of this collectivist opinion, their faith in a revived
League being dead, have turned to a temporary isolationism
rather than to imperialism as the present best policy for
Canada. Having once raised their loyalty to the height of a
world system they cannot accept as a substitute an empire
alliance based merely on race and history and constantly in¬
triguing to keep itself on the stronger side of a European
balance of power. Other League supporters are hoping
against hope that a positive alliance between existing League
members, committed first to a stopping of further aggression
and then to the progressive strengthening of the various
organs of League co-operation, may yet arise out of the pres¬
ent chaos. To this they would wish Canada to lend her full
support.

CANADA’S EXTERNAL POLICIES 135

These three groups and their subdivisions include all those
parts of the population which have thought about foreign
affaire. There is in addition a large number of individuals
who have not accepted any of these positions, and who drift
along without positive direction, capable of being driven into
one or another of the camps by the trend of the news and
the pressure of popular feeling. This unattached opinion is
content that Canada should continue playing the minor part
she now plays, and believes she is reserving her own freedom
to act as seems best when the moment for action comes. It
is the way this opinion swings which will largely determine
Canada s course of action should a war occur; those who can
control the swing will probably control the bulk of opinion.

Estimates of public opinion are risky undertakings, but
the association of particular policies with particular racial
groups in Canada enables one to arrive at some sort of ap¬
proximation of the numbers supporting an isolationist posi¬
tion at the present time. The French Canadians are almost
wholly isolationist. Probably half of the 2,000,000 other
persons of non-British origin are still too alien to British
ideas or too opposed to British policy to favour European
commitments. This makes approximately 4,000,000, or
nearly 40 per cent, of the total population. To these must
now be added an unnumbered but substantial group of
people of British origin who, partly through the disillusion¬
ment following the last war and the breakdown of the
League, partly through longer associations with North
America, and for other reasons, 1 have moved into the
isolationist position. In terms of mere numbers, it is not un¬
reasonable to place in this group today fully half the popu¬
lation of Canada. 2 Many in the other half will turn isola¬
tionist if British policy continues during the next few years
to be what it has been since 1931. Whereas up to 1914 the
official attitude of Canada, should Great Britain be involved

l^eft-wing political groups, apart from Communists, are inclined to isolationism. Then
there are nearly 400,000 Irish Catholics in Canada, a fair portion of whom have no fondness
ior the British connection.

iQQ 7 Senat ° r Mo ! loy .estimated 90 per cent, of the Canadian people to be isolationist in
i?etI^ Se june 0t f937 n p 1 ^9 Ward ’ F * H -’“ Canada and Forei S n Affairs”, Canadian Historical

136 CANADA TODAY

in a major war in Europe, was “Ready, aye, ready”, 1 today
it is one of “No commitments”, either for or against inter¬
vention. This is the political recognition given to isolationist
sentiment.

Yet once again it must be remembered that the strength of
the imperialist position is not in its surface showings but in
its underlying controls. Its real power is found partly in its
instinctive appeal to the ancient loyalties of the British half
of Canada, partly in its occupation of those offices in govern¬
ment, industry, finance, the army, the church and the press
which will enable it to crystallize opinion and formulate
policy when a decision must be made, and partly also in that
complex of relationships—constitutional ties, absence of the
right to neutrality, co-operation in defence arrangements,
adaptation of Canadian industry to British armament re¬
quirements, etc.—which contains within it by implication
the whole of the imperialist policy, and which Canada can
scarcely be expected suddenly to scrap when the moment of
crisis has arisen. Against these pulls the arguments of the
isolationists are likely to be of little avail. There will be no
referendum at that moment to discover the opinion of the
human beings who inhabit Canada; critical decisions will be
made in a number of places outside of parliament where
imperialist sentiment prevails; and inside parliament, where
the major decision must be taken, the total French-Canadian
and foreign group which is most isolationist holds only about
25 per cent, of the seats.

This analysis of Canadian sentiment toward foreign affairs
has been given as a background against which can be set the
present official policy of the Canadian government. Since
1937 it has been comparatively easy to outline the basic
points of Mr. King’s foreign policy, for in that year Mr.
Escott Reid, national secretary of the Canadian Institute of

l“If there were an emergency, if England were in danger—no, I will not use that ex¬
pression; I will not say if England were in danger, but simply if England were on trial with
one or two or more of the great powers of Europe, my right hon. friend might come and ask,
not $35,000,000, but twice, three times, four times $35,000,000. We would put at the dis¬
posal of England all the resources of Canada; there would not be a single dissentient voice."
Sir Wilfrid Eaurier, Canada, House of Commons Debates, Dec. 12, 1912, cited Dawson, R.
MacG., The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936 (London, 1937), p. 167. Compare
Sir W. Laurier’s statement in the House of Commons, Feb. 5, 1900, cited Dawson, op. cit.,
p. 135: . . If England at any time were engaged in struggle for life and death, the

moment the bugle was sounded or the fire was lit on the hills, the colonies would rush to the
aid of the mother country.”

137

CANADA’S EXTERNAL POLICIES

International Affairs, made a summary of the policy as he
ound it m Mr. King’s speeches and decisions on international
affairs, and Mr. King remarked in parliament that the sum¬
mary was ‘‘a very good statement of some of the features of
Canada s foreign policy”. The principles enumerated were:

1. The guiding principle in the formulation of Canada’s foreign
policy should be the maintenance of the unity of Canada as a nation.

2. Canada s foreign policy is, in the main, not a matter of Canada’s
relations to the League, but of Canada’s relations to the United
Kingdom and the United States.

3. Canada should, as a general rule, occupy a back seat at Geneva
or elsewhere when European or Asiatic problems are being discussed.

4. Canada is under no obligation to participate in the military
sanctions of the League or in the defence of any other part of the
Commonwealth.

5. Canada is under no obligation to participate in the economic
sanctions of the League.

. ®’. _® e I° re the Canadian government agrees in future to participate
in military or economic sanctions or in war, the approval of the parlia¬
ment or people of Canada will be secured.

, Canada is willing to participate in international inquiries into
international economic grievances.

Mr. King’s only criticism of this statement was that “pos¬
sibly it stresses too much what has to do with possible wars
and participation in war, and does not emphasize enough . . .
what has been done in the way of trade policies and removal
of causes of friction between this and other countries”. It
would therefore seem proper to add to the last principle Mr.
Reid’s own amendment 2 to the effect that “Canada should
pursue, within the measure of its power, ‘the attempt to
bring international trade gradually back to a sane basis, to
lessen the throttling controls and barriers’ ”. This endeavour
is one that Mr. King has pursued with some success. Finally,
to complete the summary of present policy, there should per¬
haps be added an eighth principle deducible from Mr. King’s
attitude during 1937, that whenever Great Britain and other
powers chiefly interested agree to plans for localizing a war

1 ‘Canada and the Threat of War”, University of Toronto Quarterly , January, 1937, p.
243, quoted in Soward, “Canada and Foreign Affairs” (op. cit.), p. 195. Mr. Reid discussed
the policy further in “Mr. Mackenzie King’s Foreign Policy, 1935-36”, Canadian Journal
of Economics and Political Science, February, 1937, p. 86.

2In the last quoted article, at p. 97.

138

CANADA TODAY

between states or a civil war, the Canadian government is
willing to accede to such proposals provided they fall short
of military commitments. 1

It will be observed how this policy takes account of the
permanent factors in Canada's background and environ¬
ment, and how it gives expression to the important groups
of opinion in Canada without offending those of opposite
views. The * ‘maintenance of the unity of the nation" means
that Ottawa cannot embark upon a foreign policy which will
so divide French and English, or Catholic and Protestant, as
to threaten the existence of the federal union; foreign policy
must always be tested by its effect on domestic unity, just
as much as by its effect on Commonwealth unity or League
unity. The second principle states a fact resulting from
history and geography; Canada's relations with the United
Kingdom and the United States (both considered, be it
noted, as 4 ‘foreign" policy) are of prime importance, and her
policy at Geneva must not strain these relationships too far.
The proposition that Canada should occupy a “back seat" at
Geneva with regard to Europe and Asia is in line with the
growing feeling that Canada is essentially a North American
nation which should follow rather than lead in the solution
of problems in remote continents. The fourth, fifth and sixth
principles are a declaration of complete freedom from com¬
mitments to sanctions of any sort in any war; they conform
to the rising tide of sentiment in Canada which is convinced
that whatever decision is made on such vital matters should
be one freely entered into to secure the best interests of
Canada when all the factors, domestic as well as foreign, are
considered. The seventh principle, the willingness to seek
economic co-operation, is a prime necessity for any country
as heavily committed as Canada to external trade. Finally,
the participation in schemes to localize war means that in
general such plans, when initiated by other powers, are
likely to receive Canadian support.

While thus showing clearly the motives from which it
springs, this present Canadian foreign policy, like that of
most democratic nations today, shows a lack of positive

1A description of the new neutrality legislation is given above, p. 125.

CANADA'S EXTERNAL POLICIES 139

direction and of long-range vision. It is principally one of
preserving traditional relationships while subtracting their
commitments, 1 and of a “wait and see” attitude for the
future.. It is a policy which enables politicians to postpone
the evil day of decision, which may seem a good thing for
the politicians but is a poor one for the people, since it is the
negation of the democratic method and means that when the
decision must be made a foreign policy dictated by blind
forces instead of conscious purposes will prevail. It has
already been pointed out how slight Canada’s freedom of
choice may turn out to be in so far as British wars are con¬
cerned, unless she takes steps in advance to make alternative
courses possible.

ECONOMIC

The present objectives of Canadian economic policy spring
from the nature of the Canadian economy. That economy,
as has been pointed out, requires a large export market for a
comparatively few staple products, and at the same time has
developed a number of secondary industries which demand
continued tariff protection. The interests of the primary
producers, particularly the wheat grower, call for a policy of
freer trade, but the manufacturing interests are politically
stronger and have never been seriously challenged in their
tariff stronghold. Present Canadian commercial policy, seek¬
ing as it must for ever-widening export markets, is thus un¬
able to make concessions to foreign countries which would
dislocate existing industries to any considerable extent. Two
foreign markets are especially important to Canada—the
United Kingdom and the United States; in both Canada
holds a preferred position under the Ottawa agreements of
1932 and the trade treaty of 1935, and the maintenance of
this position is the bed-rock on which her policy rests.

Because of the individualistic nature of the Canadian
economy, economic policy is only in part, perhaps only in

lit is to be noted that the “policy of no commitments” differs from the old imperial
relationship and also (probably) has altered Canada’s obligations toward the League. As
Mr. J. W. Dafoe has said, “The Canadian government’s only admitted ‘vital interest’ is
the defence of Canada—beyond that it will consider what it is prudent and necessary to
do when decisions can no longer be deferred. This is rejection, not only of League engage¬
ments, but of any obligation, legal, moral, implied or advisable towards the Commonwealth
of British Nations or any nation member of the Commonwealth”. See Anderson, Violet
(ed.), World Currents and Canada’s Course, pp. 147-8.

140

CANADA TODAY

small part, the creation of the government which the people
elect. Canada exercises no control over her foreign trade in
the sense that New Zealand does, where the government
itself markets a considerable proportion of the exports
through state boards. Every Canadian corporation is free to
sell abroad where it will and at any prices it is able to get.
Canadian financiers may invest Canadian funds in areas of
their own choosing. For example, Canadian trade policy in
the Far East has recently been to increase very rapidly the
sale of such essentials to Japan as scrap iron, copper, nickel,
lead and zinc, but this decision was not a government de¬
cision though it makes Canada an important factor in the
Sino-Japanese dispute. So, too, there has been no parlia¬
mentary decision that Canada is to turn her resources to the
manufacture of British armaments, though this is very
definitely increasing Canada’s commitments in Europe, as
did the manufacture of supplies for the Allies by United
States manufacturers from 1914 to 1917 increase American
commitments. In considering the objectives of Canadian
economic policy, this distinction between what the Canadian
government decides and what independent Canadian ex¬
porters decide must be borne in mind, for frequently Cana¬
dian policy in fact will be determined by the exporters rather
than by the government. Foreign policy proper has been so¬
cialized, is decided upon by the cabinet and is carried out by
government agents. Economic policy in the international
field is a resultant of the combined effects of governmental
action on the one hand and the trade agreements, carteliza¬
tions, marketing agreements and sales policies of Canadian
corporations on the other. Once economic policy (public and
private) has turned in a certain direction, foreign policy
cannot easily take a different course.

There is nothing isolationist in Canadian economic policy,
however her foreign policy may show a trend in this direc¬
tion. The only instance of the “no commitment” doctrine in
the economic sphere is in regard to Spain, to which country,
as has been pointed out, the government applied its neu¬
trality legislation in the summer of 1937. Mr. Bennett went
partially isolationist against the Soviet Union in 1931 when

141

CANADA’S EXTERNAL POLICIES

he placed an embargo on certain Russian imports, but Mr.
King removed that embargo in 1936. Canadian industry is
developing steadily, but not in the direction of economic self-
sufficiency since its dependence on foreign trade increases
rather than declines. The question whether it is possible to
be politically isolationist while the economy is so largely
geared to the war preparation requirements of great powers
in Europe and the Far East is one which has received little
attention in Canada, even from the isolationists themselves.

So far as internal economic policy is concerned, it is diffi¬
cult to define any “national” objective. Giving a free hand
to business but checking its worst abuses, while protecting
workers and farmers against certain economic and social
hazards, contains about all that can safely be put into such
a phrase. Individual initiative and the profit motive are the
dominant impulses to economic action. That these incentives,
operating amidst Canada’s natural resources, will continu¬
ously raise the standard of living of an increasing population
is the belief of a great majority of the people and proposals
for national planning on a socialist scale are confined to left-
wing minority political parties. 1 The idea that the first duty
of the state is to see that the economy provides a basic
standard of decent living for every citizen is not a political
idea which either of Canada’s major parties has yet espoused.
Mr. Bennett adopted part of this philosophy in his election
campaign of 1935, but the economic policy of the succeeding
government has been of a more laissez-faire variety. Canada
has experienced nothing like so great a movement for social
reform during the past decade as has, for instance, swept
over the United States. Such reform parties as have been at
all successful politically have been provincial rather than
national, like Social Credit in Alberta and the Union Na¬
tional in Quebec, which undoubtedly came to power by
capturing the demand for change.

iThe League for Social Reconstruction has outlined its planning proposals in two books:
Social Planning for Canada (Toronto, 1935), and Democracy Needs Socialism (Toronto, 1938).

CHAPTER XIII

CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH

W HEN people form a political association they do so
with some object in view. They may wish to unite
against enemies, to escape from tyranny, to improve
their economic condition, to glorify a race or a religion.
Political unity may also be the obligatory unity of conqueror
and conquered. Association may be less than complete unity,
as in treaties of alliance or trade. Whatever form it may take,
a political relationship expresses some definite purpose or aim.
What the British Commonwealth is feeling for today is a
new definition of its own purpose, which will be valid for its
nationally autonomous members under modern world con¬
ditions.

In the early days of the British Empire its growth and
development were the result of racial expansion. The British
peoples took to the sea and to foreign trade. They explored,
conquered and settled in various parts of the world, some
uninhabited, some inhabited. They sent their sons and
daughters to build new homes in the new lands. The mo¬
tives of the individual settlers were various, but the venture
as a whole was a national venture. In a world of independent
national states, where force was the ultimate arbiter of inter¬
national disputes, this process of expansion and aggrandize¬
ment was purpose enough in itself. It brought prestige and
power and by its mere existence made Britain great.

This centralized empire could not last. It could not last
because centralized government, under early conditions of
transport and communication, was necessarily unrepresenta¬
tive of the distant territories, and the British people have
never long tolerated autocratic government. Dominion
autonomy was the inevitable product of the parliamentary
British tradition. No person trained in that tradition could
submit to having his life and destiny shaped by a govern-

CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 143

ment which he could not control, not even when it was a
British government. The same spirit which made Englishmen
behead one king and expel another in the seventeenth cen¬
tury, turned the colonies into autonomous dominions in the
twentieth century. Independence of action proved that the
dominions were British in spirit, not that they were anti-
British. It was failure to recognize their own characteristics
when displayed by Englishmen outside England which lost
the English their American colonies.

Today the old ideas of empire are dead in so far as the
majority of Canadians are concerned. True, a strong body of
imperialist tradition exists in Canada, which hankers after,
perhaps believes in, the simple, old certainties of size and
strength. But the continued enlargement of the empire, it
need hardly be said, cannot be a part of dominion foreign
policy. The sense of racial superiority which may come from
seeing a map coloured largely in red or in thinking of the
hundreds of millions of British subjects and of the unsetting
British sun, is a feeling that any adult mind will want to elimi¬
nate rather than foster. Nor can the primitive slogan, '‘What
we have we’ll hold”, act as a unifying principle for nations
anxious to establish peace on a permanent foundation. The
possibility that the Commonwealth, as it now exists, con¬
tributes to international insecurity through its failure to deal
with the problems of colonies and raw materials must be
frankly faced by every member. Appeals for joint action in
matters of defence are equally inadequate as the basis of
future co-operation; defence is only an instrument of policy,
and not a policy in itself. Moreover, for Canada, the special
assistance of the Commonwealth in defence matters is not
at the moment essential. The principles on which the Com¬
monwealth can continue to co-operate in the future will have
to be principles different in kind and quality from those
which sufficed in the past. What, then, are such principles?

In approaching this critical question care must be taken to
avoid vague generalities. Since empire became Common¬
wealth, the preservation of peace has always been advanced
as an aim of the Commonwealth association. So, too, has the
maintenance of democracy. It is not questioning the sincerity

144

CANADA TODAY

of these pronouncements to point out that they do not
necessarily produce co-operation. Whose peace is to be pre¬
served? Peace in Canada may best be secured in the opinion
of many by avoiding all European wars. Democracy is
further advanced in the Scandinavian countries which re¬
mained neutral in 1914 than in any of the countries which
fought to make the world safe for democracy. The objectives
of peace and freedom are undoubtedly objectives for the
Commonwealth; the difficulty is that dominions may legiti¬
mately differ as to the best way of achieving these objectives.

It will be simplest in exploring the possibilities of Com¬
monwealth co-operation from the Canadian point of view
to start with the easier problems. It is beyond question a
useful thing, both for the members of the Commonwealth
and for the world, that between these members war is ex¬
tremely improbable. 1 The practice of settling intra-Com-
monwealth disputes by negotiation and compromise is of
great value to the partners in the association, and no doubt
a good example to their fellow nations. The Commonwealth,
by its mere existence as a large area of peace and peaceful
change, performs a valuable function in a world society
possessing too little of either.

Within the Commonwealth there is at the moment a great
deal of co-operation on a multitude of technical matters,
each of considerable importance in its own field. This 11 quiet
co-operation” 2 covers such things as copyright, statistics,
customs, patents, education, cable and wireless communica¬
tions, workmen’s compensation, oil pollution of navigable
waters, forestry, and merchant shipping. Laws have been
harmonized, standards developed, research planned and in¬
formation exchanged. These forms of co-operation are ex¬
tremely useful, and the fact that they can occur more easily
amongst a number of nations because of the Commonwealth
tradition makes the Commonwealth itself of value.

Underlying these various kinds of joint effort is the general
idea of the progressive improvement of social and scientific

lThe term “unthinkable”, though frequently used, should perhaps be limited to relations
between the Anglo-Saxon communities in the Commonwealth.

., 2 ^ ee a , us T eful . surv ey of it in The British Empire , a report by a study group of members of
^ e r? R ?r' al ^ InStl , tUt ® of I uternational Affairs (London, 1937), chap. XII; also Palmer.
O. L. H., Consultation and Co-operation in the British Commonwealth (London, 1934)

CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 145

conditions in Commonwealth countries. Each dominion
government is endeavouring to solve its local problems, many
of which are affected by conditions in some other part of the
Commonwealth. Wherever this is so, co-operation becomes
valuable. Co-operation with other foreign states may be
equally valuable; the Commonwealth promotes co-operation
because the will to mutual aid is stronger.

In so far as the raising of the internal standard of living is a
common objective for dominion governments, the existence
of the Commonwealth is potentially of the greatest im¬
portance. A freer exchange of goods and services, a more co¬
operative and scientific development of Commonwealth re¬
sources and markets, can be made to benefit every member.
British preference is a recognition of the common purpose of
economic co-operation. There is, however, a danger lurking
in any such scheme, the danger that a short-term benefit for
the members may be secured at the expense of co-operation
with foreign states. Nothing would be of less use to Canada,
and it would seem to the Commonwealth as a whole, than an
attempt to create an economic bloc out of the dominions,
Great Britain and her dependencies. It has been pointed out
that the Ottawa agreements have already evoked criticism
from American and other sources. Economic co-operation
remains a valuable principle of Commonwealth action if it is
for the purpose of raising the general standard of living in
Commonwealth countries (and not merely for the purpose of
raising prices through production control) and if, in addition,
it creates no obstacles to wider forms of world economic co¬
operation. If empire agreements are intended for the pur¬
pose of producing a bargaining power which can break down
other nations’ trade barriers, they might lead eventually to
an increase of world trade, but the difficulty of changing the
direction of the trade they stimulate makes such results
highly doubtful.

In the matter of immigration, it has been shown how diffi¬
cult is Canada’s position. An unexpectedly long period of
prosperity might produce a demand for employment which
Canada could not fill from her own population. If this
occurs, immigration will revive of its own accord. But this

146

CANADA TODAY

condition has not yet occurred, save possibly in certain
skilled trades, and the lack of labour here is due to the
Dominion’s own short-sightedness in not carrying on tech¬
nical training amongst the unemployed. No new attempt to
foster immigration by official action is likely to be expected
from Canada at the present time. There is clearly no gain,
from the Canadian point of view, in permitting individuals
to transfer from the dole in England to the dole in Canada.
State-aided schemes for shifting population from the British
Isles to Canada belong to long-range planning rather than
to immediate policy; indeed, Canada is having to face the
problem of internal shifts away from her drought areas in
the west to more suitable localities.

A majority of the human beings who constitute the popu¬
lation of the empire are not yet full citizens enjoying self-
government. Viewing the empire as a whole, the right to
select the governing authority and hold it responsible to the
will of the people is a right possessed by a minority of British
subjects. So long as this remains true, and accepting
democracy as a Commonwealth ideal, the British nations
have a large task to perform, a task that might perhaps be
described as that of progressively eliminating the remnants
of empire from the Commonwealth. The more politically
advanced parts of the Commonwealth are thus under an
obligation to co-operate for the purpose of raising the poli¬
tical, educational and economic level of the subject peoples.
Perhaps the Commonwealth is nearing the time when it will
accept the principle that the improvement of the condition
of the native population is the first charge to be met out
of the economic development of any area. Canada is not as
directly concerned in this problem as some other parts of the
Commonwealth, yet she has her minorities to whom she has
not accorded full citizenship, and in this respect she faces an
unfulfilled obligation. The British Commonwealth has not
yet evolved what might be termed a ‘‘nationalities policy”,
which aims to achieve a progressive improvement in the
cultural and economic advancement of native races. 1

1A clear realization of the need for such a policy will be found in The Alternative to War,
by C. R. Buxton (1936). See also Hancock, W. K., Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs,
vol. I (London, 1937), p. 506.

CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 147

In most of these various fields useful forms of co-operation
can be developed or expanded, without the danger of offend¬
ing organized groups of opinion. Greater difficulties begin to
arise when the most important field of all is entered—that of
foreign policy and its allied subject, defence. Even here the
area of uncertainty can be narrowed through the existence
of well-understood ideas. Imperial federation is dead for¬
ever, at any rate with Canada as a federating unit. Canadian
foreign policy will remain autonomous, and no delegation of
executive authority to a central imperial cabinet is con¬
ceivable. The existing centralization of the right to declare
peace and war is being questioned because it conflicts with
this principle of self-determination. It follows that there is a
right to differ as to foreign policy. Members of the Common¬
wealth have agreed they will not take any international
action likely to affect the interests of other members without
previously giving an opportunity to each member affected to
make its interests known, and “that neither Great Britain
nor the Dominions [can] be committed to the acceptance of
active obligations except with the definite assent of their own
Governments”. 1 Thus in place of formal machinery for reach¬
ing a united decision there exists merely an understanding,
called by some writers a constitutional convention, that
every government has the right to express its views in rela¬
tion to the foreign policy being pursued by any other Com¬
monwealth government, if in its opinion its interests are
affected by the pursuit of that policy. 2 There is also a vague

^Summary of Proceedings, ImperialConference, 1926, Cmd. 2768, cited Dawson, op. cit., p.342.

2The Imperial Conference of 1930 approved a three-point summary of the main recom¬
mendations made at previous Imperial Conferences “with regard to the communication of
information and the system of consultation in relation to treaty negotiations and the
conduct of foreign affairs generally”.

The first point was, “Any of His Majesty’s Governments conducting negotiations should
inform the other Governments of His Majesty in case they should be interested and give
them the opportunity of expressing their views, if they think that their interests may be
affected.” The report later makes it clear that this point does not apply merely to treaty
negotiations: "The application of this is not, however, confined to treaty negotiations. It
cannot be doubted that the fullest possible interchange of information between His Majesty’s
Governments in relation to all aspects of foreign affairs is of the greatest value to all the
Governments concerned.”

The second point was, “Any of His Majesty’s Governments on receiving such informa¬
tion should, if it desires to express any views, do so with reasonable promptitude. ... It
is clear that a negotiating Government cannot fail to be embarrassed in the conduct of
negotiations if the observations of other Governments who e consider that their interests may
be affected are not received at the earliest possible stage in the negotiations. In the absence
of comment the negotiating Government should, as indicated in the Report of the 1926 Con¬
ference, be entitled to assume that no objection will be raised to its proposed policy.”

The third point was “None of His Majesty’s Governments can take any steps which
might involve the other Governments of His Majesty in any active obligations without
their definite assent.” ( Summary of Proceedings, Imperial Conference, 1930, Cmd. 3717,
cited Dawson, op. cit., pp. 403-4).

WiuimuuHiMnnu

m : m

148 CANADA TODAY

recognition that the purpose of these arrangements is to help
to co-ordinate the foreign policies of the various govern¬
ments. 1 Canada is not likely to promote any change in this
situation, and the Canadian government in practice inter¬
prets the relevant resolutions of the Imperial Conferences
to mean that its failure to express dissent from a United
Kingdom policy of which it has knowledge must not be
interpreted as meaning assent to that policy or a willingness
to support it. 2

What applies to foreign policy applies also to defence. Co¬
operation and consultation exist, but, in so far as Canada is

1“ During the discussions [at the Imperial Conference of 1937] emphasis was laid on the
importance of developing the practice of communication and consultation [on questions of
foreign affairs] between the respective Governments as a help to the co-ordination of
policies. . . . Being convinced that the influence of each of them in the cause of peace was
likely to be greatly enhanced by their common agreement to use that influence in the same
direction, they declared their intention of continuing to consult and co-operate with one
another in this vital interest and all other matters of common concern.” ( Summary of
Proceedings , Imperial Conference , 1937, Cmd. 5482, pp. 13-4).

2The views of the Canadian government on this point were set forth on a number of
occasions during the parliamentary session of 1938.

(a) On March 17, Mr. T. L. Church asked the following question:

“Has any action been taken by the government to assure His Majesty’s government of
Great Britain of Canada’s moral support, interest, co-operation and aid in the present foreign
situation, and will any papers relating thereto be tabled?”

Mr. King replied as follows:

“Mr. Speaker, the answer to the question as drafted is in the negative. As already
indicated in answer to a question by the member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) on
March 1, the government has been receiving from the United Kingdom government certaih
communications relating to the international situation. Such communications are continu¬
ing. As indicated in that answer and in answer to a question by the member for Winnipeg
North Centre (Mr. Woodsworth), on February 25, these communications are in the nature
of information rather than consultation upon policies. As such, they are helpful to the
Canadian government in assisting it to understand the actual facts of the current situation.”

(b) In reply to a question asked by Mr. M. J. Coldwell on March 1, subsequent to the
resignation of Mr. Anthony Eden and the ensuing debates in the British parliament, Mr.
King said:

“The Canadian government has been furnished with full summaries of recent statements
made in the British House of Commons by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and
the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In addition, it has received a brief
report of a conversation with a representative of a foreign government. These communica¬
tions, as is usually the case, are in the nature of information rather than consultation. The
Canadian government has not offered any opinion on the statements in question.”

instructive: . ....

“Mr. COLDWELL: . . • The Prime Minister of Great Britain has stated in the house
that the dominions have been consulted and that to some extent recent pronouncements in
regard to Czechoslovakia are in part due, it is said, to the attitude of the self-governing
dominions.

“Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Consulted, did my hon. friend say?

“Mr. COLDWELL: Yes, consulted.

“Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I do not believe the Prime Minister of Great Britain has
used that word. I may be wrong, but my recollection is that the Prime Minister said that
we had been kept informed of what had taken place. But that we had been consulted, or
that any advice had been given by the government, was not, I think, suggested.

“Mr. COLDWELL: I think in certain press dispatches the word ‘consulted’ was used.
I know that when I was thinking of what I was going to say I took that word ‘consulted’
from one of the dispatches. But if the right hon. gentleman says that that is not the word
that should have been used, I take it that the government has been kept informed, and if
there has been any actual or implied advice with respect to that information I think we
should be given to understand what that advice may have been, if any has been given.

“Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I can assure my hon. friend right away that no advice
has been asked and none has been given by the present government.”

(Canada, House of Commons Debates, unrevised, March 1, 1938, p. 994; March 17,
1938, pp. 1530-1; and April 1, 1938, p. 2104).

CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 149

concerned, stop short of an express understanding equivalent
to a military alliance. The nature of the present defence
policy of Canada has already been analysed, and it has been
pointed out that, far from excluding the possibility of war in
conjunction with Great Britain, Canadian defence plans
take such an emergency into account while the government
clings to the principle of parliamentary decision on each
situation as it arises. In this matter also the policy of
Canada is unlikely to change in the near future, given the
divisions of opinion within the country. At the same time,
on the economic side Canada is co-operating to a consider¬
able extent through the acceptance by various industries of
large orders for the manufacture of war equipment. This co¬
operation, as has been shown, is operating as one of the
powerful underlying forces linking Canadian foreign policy
ever closer to that of Great Britain, despite the surface
retention of the “no commitment” policy.

If the problem of intra-Commonwealth co-operation on
foreign policy could be based on an active League of Nations,
then at once the situation would be clarified. Postulating a
functioning collective system, Commonwealth foreign policy
is replaced by League policy on the vital issues of war, and
neutrality disappears. The first British Commonwealth Re¬
lations Conference was correct in its statement that in such a
world the purely Commonwealth problem becomes academic.
Theoretically, the ideal solution—if not the only solution—is
a world system for the maintenance of law and justice in
which the Commonwealth members have agreed to the
nature of their commitments. The creation of such a system,
in the opinion of many Canadians, thus remains as the ulti¬
mate and the most unifying principle of co-operation for
Commonwealth members. Every form of co-operation in¬
consistent with that ultimate aim is dangerous and injurious
to the welfare of the world and hence the Commonwealth.
For though the great powers may have destroyed the effec¬
tiveness of the League they have not succeeded in destroying
the effectiveness of the education in international behaviour
carried on by the League. Unless every lesson learned since
1914 has proved false, power politics, balance of power

150

CANADA TODAY

diplomacy, armed alliances unrelated to generous and sincere
offers of settlement to opposing forces, are not steps towards
peace, but are simply preparations for another war which in
turn will create more problems than it solves.

The present world, however, has no such League. No
great power is advocating an attempt to re-establish it. Its
achievement has ceased to be (if it ever was) a leading prin¬
ciple of British foreign policy; if Britain and France were to
win another war, can it be said that a new League with any
greater chances of success than the last would be created?
Today the dominating motive actuating Commonwealth
members in international affairs is that of postponing im¬
mediate war and preparing to be on the winning side when
hostilities begin. In such a world, co-operation between the
dominions and the United Kingdom must necessarily be
chiefly concerned with defence matters. Here the attitude of
the dominions will vary in accordance with their national
sense of need and commitment. Canada’s share in defence
co-operation will not be likely to change in the next few
years. In the ultimate event of a European war involving
Great Britain some Canadian contribution, even if only
economic, is certain; its extent, particularly in a military
sense, will depend on unpredictable factors both foreign and
domestic. One thing can be said with safety: the degree of
Canada’s willing participation will be greatly increased if
British policy leans to the principles of collective security.

The fields in which Commonwealth members may pursue
joint policies are important. They are being developed to
some extent now: their further expansion along proper lines
is desirable. But no group of nations scattered about the
world like the British nations, comprising within their
borders a multitude of races, religions and economic areas,
has any difficulties unlike those which are shared by man¬
kind in general. The Commonwealth must seek the solutions
to its problems, not apart from other peoples, but in con¬
junction with them.

For Canada at the present moment grave internal prob¬
lems, economic, racial and constitutional, dominate all other
issues. Commonwealth co-operation can be of some, but

CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 151

probably not of great, assistance to her in solving these
domestic difficulties. Canadians must first make up their
own minds as to what kind of society they want and how
they propose to get it; then only will they see clearly how
to harmonize their foreign and domestic policies. Canada
is searching for a new basis on which to re-establish her
national unity, and until she finds it she has no accepted
internal criterion with which to measure her external obliga¬
tions. When she knows her own mind on her national
objectives she will know better what contribution she can
make toward international and intra-Commonwealth co¬
operation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

For more extended bibliographies on Canadian affairs the reader is
referred to: Canada looks abroad , by R. A. MacKay and E. B. Rogers
(published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs by the Oxford University Press, Toronto, London and
New York, 1938); the Selected bibliography prepared by Miss Mar¬
garet Cleeve, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, for the
British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938; the bibliography
in Select documents in Canadian economic history , 1497-1783 , edited by
H. A. Innis (Toronto, 1929); and the bibliographies published in the
Canadian journal of economics and political science and the Canadian
historical review .

I. Sources

A mass of information is to be found in the briefs submitted by
provincial governments and by various organizations to the Royal
Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (the Rowell Commis¬
sion) in 1937 and 1938. The report of the Commission is expected in
1939. Eight volumes of a series of books on Canadian-American rela¬
tions, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
have already been published, and more are forthcoming; several of
them have been referred to in foot-notes. The nine volumes in the
series entitled Canadian frontiers of settlement are invaluable (particu¬
larly vol. I, Mackintosh, W. A., Prairie settlement , the geographical
setting ; vol. VII, Dawson, C. A., Group settlement: ethnic communities
in western Canada ; vol. IX, Lower, A. R. M. and Innis, H. A., Settle¬
ment and the forest frontier in eastern Canada , by A. R. M. Lower,
Settlement and the mining frontier , by H. A. Innis. Among recent
government reports the following will be found useful: Report of the
Royal Commission to inquire into railways and transportation in Canada
(Ottawa, 1932); Report of the Royal Commission on banking and cur¬
rency (Ottawa, 1933); Report of the Royal Commission on price spreads
and mass buying (Ottawa, 1935); Final report of the National Employ¬
ment Commission (Ottawa, 1938).

Useful documents are to be found in R. MacGregor Dawson’s two
volumes, Constitutional issues in Canada , 1900-1931 (London, 1933)
and The development of dominion status , 1900-1936 (London, 1937).
Canada looks abroad , by MacKay and Rogers, contains about 65 pages
of speeches and other documentary material and, on page 389, a list
of other sources. The Canada year book , published annually by the
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, is invaluable, as is also The encyclopedia
of Canada (6 vols.), edited by W. S. Wallace (Toronto, 1935-37).

II. Books on Canadian Affairs

Anderson, Violet, (ed.), World currents and Canada 1 s course , Lectures
given at the Canadian Institute on Economics and Politics, 1937
(Toronto, 1937).

153

154

CANADA TODAY

Angus, H. F. (ed.), Canada and the doctrine of peaceful change (pub¬
lished by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (Toronto,

1937) (mimeographed).

Armstrong, Elizabeth H., The crisis of Quebec, 1914.-1918 (New
York, 1937).

Barbeau, Victor, La mesure de notre taille (Montreal, 1936).

Brady, A., Canada (Modern World Series) (London, 1932).

Canada , the empire and the league, Lectures given at the Canadian In¬
stitute on Economics and Politics, 1936 (Toronto, 1936).
Canadian constitution, The, Series of broadcasts by C.B.C. (Toronto,

1938) .

Canadian papers, 1938 (published by the Canadian Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs, Toronto, 1933).

(Mackintosh, W. A., “Canadian tariff policy”; MacDonald,
James M., “Statistical outlines of Canada’s transpacific trade”;
and other papers.)

Canadian papers, 1936 (published by the Canadian Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs, Toronto, 1936) (mimeographed).

(Gibson, J. D., and Plumptre, A. F. W., “The economic effects on
Canada of the recent monetary policy of the U.S.A.”; Hurd, W. B.,
and MacLean, M.C., “Projection of Canada’s population on the
basis of current birth and death rates”; Taylor, K. W., “The effect
of the Ottawa agreements on Canadian trade”; and other papers.)
Conference on Canadian-American affairs, Canton, New York, 1935,
Proceedings (Boston, 1936).

Conference on Canadian-American affairs, Kingston, Ontario, 1937,
Proceedings (Boston, 1938).

Dafoe, J. W., Canada: an American nation (New York, 1935).
Democracy needs socialism (published under the auspices of the Re¬
search Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction,
Toronto, 1938).

Glazebrook, G. deT., and Benson, W., Canada's defence policy,
Report of round tables of annual conference, 1937, Canadian In¬
stitute of International Affairs (Toronto, 1937) (pamphlet).
Innis, H. A., and Plumptre, A. F. W. (eds.), The Canadian economy
and its problems (published by the Canadian Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs, Toronto, 1934).

Innis, Mary Quayle, An economic history of Canada (Toronto, 1935).
Jackman, W. T., Economic principles of transportation (Toronto, 1935).
Kelsey Club of Winnipeg, Canadian defence: what we have to defend,
A series of broadcast discussions (Ottawa, 1937).

Kennedy, W. P. M., The constitution of Canada, 1534-1937, 2nd. ed.
(Toronto, 1938).

MacGibbon, D. A., The Canadian grain trade (Toronto, 1932).
MacKay, R. A., and Rogers, E. B., Canada looks abroad (published
under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, Toronto, 1938).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

155

Mackintosh, W. A., Economic problems of the prairie provinces
(Toronto, 1935).

Marshall, H., Southard, F. A., and Taylor, K. W., Canadian-
American industry (Toronto, 1936).

S^billeau, Pierre, Le Canada et la doctrine de Monroe (Paris, 1937).

Siegfried, Andr£, Canada (London, 1937).

Social planning for Canada (published under the auspices of the Re¬
search Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction,
Toronto, 1935).

Soward, F. H., Canada and the Americas , Report of round table of
annual conference, 1937, Canadian Institute of International
Affairs (Toronto, 1937) (pamphlet).

Strange, William, Canada , the Pacific and war (published under the
auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
Toronto, 1937).

Wittke, Carl, A history of Canada , rev. ed. (New York, 1933).

Wrong, George M., The Canadians: the story of a people (Toronto,
1938).

III. Periodicals

Canadian banker (Toronto, quar¬
terly).

Canadian bar review (Ottawa,
monthly).

Canadian defence quarterly (Ot¬
tawa).

Canadian forum (Toronto,
monthly).

Canadian historical review (To¬
ronto, quarterly).

Canadian Institute of Interna¬
tional Affairs: reports of an¬
nual conferences (Toronto).

Canadian journal of economics and
political science (Toronto,
quarterly).

Dalhousie review (Halifax, quar¬
terly).

Financial post (Toronto, weekly).

Foreign affairs (New York, quar¬
terly).

International affairs (London,
every two months).

League of Nations Society in
Canada: reports of annual
conferences (Ottawa).

Maclean's magazine (Toronto, bi¬
monthly).

Pacific affairs (New York, quar¬
terly).

Queen's quarterly (Kingston).

Revue trimestrielle canadienne
(Montreal, quarterly).

Round table (London, quarterly).

Saturday night (Toronto, weekly).

University of Toronto quarterly
(Toronto).

The following are some of the more important articles that have
appeared recently in the foregoing and other periodicals:

Bovey, Wilfrid, “French Canada and the problem of Quebec”, Nineteenth
century , CXXIII, 731 (January, 1938).

Brebner, J. B., “Canada, the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Washington
conference”, Political science quarterly , L, 1 (March, 1935).

Brossard, Roger, “The working of confederation: a French-Canadian view”,
Canadian journal of economics and political science , III, 3 (August, 1937).

156 CANADA TODAY

Bruchesi, J., “Defence—and French Canada”, Maclean’s magazine , June 15,

1937.

-“Canadian unity and the French Canadians”, Revue trimestrielle

canadienne XXIV, 94 (June, 1938).

Cahan, C. H., “Canada and/or commonwealth loyalty”, United empire ,
XXIX, 21 (January, 1938).

■- Speech on appeals to the judicial committee of the privy coun¬

cil, Canada, House of commons debates (unrevised), April 8, 1938, pp.
2336 ff.

“Canada and imperial defence”, Canadian defence quarterly , XII, 2 (January,

Canadian bar review , June, 1937. Special number on constitutional questions.
“Canuck”, “The problems of Canadian defence”, Canadian defence quarterly.
April, 1938.

Dafoe, J. W., “Canada’s interest in the world crisis”, Dalhousie review , XV, 4
(January, 1936).

Economist, The , special supplement, “The dominion of Canada”, January 18,

Feis, H., “A year of the Canadian trade agreement”, Foreign affairs , XV, 4
(July, 1937).

Ferguson, G. Howard, “Canada must arm”, Maclean’s magazine , April 15,

Green, J. F., “Canada in world affairs”, Foreign policy reports , June 15, 1938.
Griesbach, W. A., “A united empire front”, Queen’s quarterly , XLIV, 1
(Spring, 1937).

Keenleyside, H. L., “Department of external affairs”. Queen’s quarterly .

XLIV, 4 (Winter, 1937-38). H *

Lower, A. R. M., “America and the Pacific”, Dalhousie review , XVIII. 1
(April, 1938).

‘Canada can defend herself”, Canadian forum , Tanuary,

1938.

Martin, David, “Canada: our military ward”, Current history (June, 1938).

Marvin, D. M., “The bank of Canada”, Canadian banker (October, 1937).

“Nationalism in French Canada”, Round table , No. 105 (December, 1936).

Noble, S. R., “The monetary experience of Canada during the depression”,
Canadian banker (April, 1938).

Reid, Escott,. “Canada and the threat of war: a discussion of Mr. Mac¬
kenzie King’s foreign policy”, University of Toronto quarterly VI, 2
(January, 1937).

- : - “Mr. Mackenzie King’s foreign policy, 1935-6”, Canadian

journal of economics and political science , III, 1 (February, 1937).

“S”, “Embryo fascism in Quebec”, Foreign affairs , XVI, 3 (April, 1938).

Scott, F. R., “The permanent bases of Canadian foreign policy”, Foreign
affairs , X, 4 (July, 1932).

- “Canada’s future in the British commonwealth”. Foreign af¬

fairs , XV, 3 (April, 1937).

Soward, F. H., Canada and the league of nations”, International conciliation ,
No. 283 (October, 1932).

“T”, “Canada and the Far East”, Foreign affairs , XIII, 3 (April, 1935).

Tarr, E. J., 4 Canada in world affairs”, International affairs , XVI 5 (Sep-
tember-October, 1937). ’ v

- “Defence and national unity”, Maclean’s magazine , July 1, 1937.

Trotter, R. G., The Canadian back fence in Anglo-American relations”.
Queen’s quarterly , XL, 2 (August, 1933).

-——- ‘‘Which way Canada?”, Queen’s quarterly , XLV, 3 (Autumn,

1938).

Underhill, F. H., “Keep Canada out of war”, Maclean’s magazine , May 15,

INDEX

Aberhart, Hon. William, 18, 60,65,
66, 71.

Abyssinia, see War.

Acadia, see Nova Scotia.

Act of Union (1840), 70.

Africa, 42, 115.

Alaska, 1, 9, 93, 115.

Alberta, 4, 7, 23, 24, 35, 46, 46n., 47,
49, 51, 61, 65, 66m., 68, 69, 71, 83,
141.

All-Canadian Congress of Labour, 58.
American Federation of Labor, 58.
Anderson, Mrs. Violet, 15*., 32*.,
121*., 139«.

Angus, Professor H. F., 18*., 45*.,
46*., 71*.

Argentine, 111.

Asia, 42, 88, 89, 115, 137, 138.

air-route to North America, 36.
Association of American Railroads, 34.
Atlantic Ocean and seaboard, 35, 88,
90,91,92,93,94,94*., 97, 100,117.
Australia, 20,44, 52*., 59, 79,112,121.
Austria, 108.

Balfour, Earl of, 122.

Barbeau, Monsieur Victor, 32*.
Belgium, 41.

Bennett, Rt. Hon. R. B., 10*., 49, 51,
56, 62, 63, 67, 80, 104, 107, 140,141.
Bidwell, Professor Percy W., 43.
Board of Railway Commissioners, see
Canada, railways.

Borden, Sir Robert, 62.

Bourassa, Monsieur Henri, 72.
Bovey, Mr. Wilfrid, 71*.

Bowman, Dr. Isaiah, 45*., 46*.
Brady, Professor A., 57*.

Brazil, Canadian investments in and
relations with, 33, 111.

British Columbia, 3*., 4, 5, 9, 13*.,
15, 24*., 30, 40, 51, 65, 67, 69, 81,
91, 93,99, 103, 107*., 113.

British Commonwealth, 1, 18, 35, 43,
44, 47, 61, 70, 85, 85*., 94, 95, 96,
98-103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 108*.,
109, 110, 113-9, 120, 121, 122, 123,
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133,
137, 138, 139*., 142-52: see also
Imperial Conferences.

Ottawa Agreements (1932), 40, 43,
62, 63, 118, 118*., 119*., 139,
145.

Relations Conference (1933), 121.

British Empire, see British Common¬
wealth and Canada.

“British front”, 132, 133.

British Israelite movement, 18.
British North America Act, see Con¬
federation.

Brossard, Monsieur R., 70*.

Bruchesi, Professor Jean, 107*.
Brussels, 87*.

Buck, Mr. Tim, 67.

Buell, Dr. R. L., 118*.

Buenos Aires, 105.

Burchell, Mr. C. J., 122*.

Buxton, Mr. C. R., 146*.

Cahan, Hon. C. H., 98*.

Calgary Conference, C.C.F., 66, 66*.
Cameron, Miss Jean C., and Hurd,
Professor W. B., 21*., 22*.
Canada:

aerial navigation, 2, 7, 35-6, 48,
78*., 83.

agriculture and farmers, 3, 5, 7, 9,
20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 45, 46,
50, 52, 53-4, 56, 56*., 60, 64, 65
66, 81, 97, 107, 113, 118, 141.
farmer organizations, 60, 66,
66*., 107, 126.

Alaska, and, 1, 9, 93.
class conflict, 32, 107.
climate, effects of, on transporta¬
tion and unemployment, 7, 33.
Commissions and Boards:
Arbitration and Conciliation, in¬
dustrial, 50.

Fair Wage, New Brunswick, 51.
Hydro-Electric, Ontario, 49.
Marketing, 49, 63, 140.

National Employment, 49.
Railways, 34, 48.

Royal, 9, 35, 46, 68: see also
Dominion-Provincial relations.
Royal, on Price Spreads, 21*.,
51*., 55, 56.

Tariff, 44, 49.

Trade and Industry, 49, 63.
Transportation (Chevrier), 55.
Wheat, 49, 63.

defence, 87-97, 100, 100*., 115-6,
123, 128, 139*., 143, 147, 148,
149, 150.

diplomatic relations, 87-8, 113-4,

158

INDEX

Canada— continued

Dominion-Provincial relations, 15,
30,35,49, 50,51,52, 65, 65ft., 68,
70, 75-82, 83, 84, 119.

Royal Commission on (1937-38),
46, 52n., 54, 54ft., 68, 75ft., 79,
80.

drought and drought relief, 20,
20ft., 52, 56, 146.

emigration to U.S.A., 5, 15ft., 18-
20, 103.

Empire, and the, 18, 20, 35, 39-42,
43, 44, 61, 62, 70, 70ft., 85, 85ft.,
94, 95, 95ft., 96, 97, 98-103, 104,
105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113-9,
120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128,
131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138,
139ft., 143, 144, 147ft., 149, 151.
English Canadians, 3, 4, 7, 10, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 26,
62, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 84, 85, 99,
100, 102, 108, 109, 119, 126, 131,
135, 136, 138.

Europe, and, 2, 10, 35, 41, 85, 86,
88, 89, 93, 94, 100, 107, 108, 109,
111, 115, 116, 120, 133, 135-6,

137, 138, 140, 141, 144, 150.

Far East, relations with, 2.
federal system, 9, 65, 72, 75-82, 84,

102, 119, 150.

finance and banking, 3, 9, 15, 32,
37-9, 49, 55, 62, 65, 65ft., 66, 71,
72, 73, 76, 80, 81, 91, 103ft.,
119ft., 136, 140.
fisheries, 3, 4, 28, 44.
foreign investments in, 36-8, 47.
foreign investments of, 33, 37, 140.
foreign policy, 17, 85, 88, 90, 94,

• 98-112, 118, 123, 125, 126, 127,

130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137,

138, 139, 140-1, 143, 147, 148,
148ft., 149, 151.

foreign trade, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33,
36, 38-42, 43-4, 47, 76, 78, 87,
92-3, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 109,
111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 125,
125ft., 131, 133, 138, 139, 140-1,
145: see also Imperial Prefer¬
ences.

French Canadians, 2, 3, 10n., 13 n.,
14, IS, 17, 21, 23, 24, 26, S2, 57,
62, 63, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,
84, 85, 85 n., 99-100, 103, 107,
110, 119, 126, 130, 135, 136, 138.
nationalist sentiment and move¬

ment, 15, 30, 32, 62, 68, 69-74,
81, 83, 84, 101, 110.

Canada— continued
geography, 1-5.

effects of, on, 7-12, 25, 30, 33,
59, 80, 81, 84, 89, 90, 99, 106,
116, 117, 118, 130, 131, 138.
Great Britain, and, 2, 10, 13, 18,
20, 36-42, 43-4, 76-8, 87-8, 89, 91,
92, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 111, 114,
115, 116, 117, 120, 123, 124,
125ft., 127, 130, 131, 132, 133,
134, 135, 135ft., 136, 136ft., 137,

138, 139, 146, 148ft., 149.
immigration and immigrants, 10,

13, 14, 15, 18-25, 59, 99, 146.
assimilation, 23-5.
Order-in-Council re, (1931), 20.
industry and industries, 3, 4, 15,

27, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37, 47, 52, 55,
73, 80, 97, 117, 136, 139, 141,
145, 149.

Japanese minority, 13ft., 16, 20.
labour and wages, 50, 51, 52-3, 55,
56, 57, 58, 59, 64, 66, 71-2, 73,
76, 80, 84, 107, 141, 146.
labour organizations, 23, 56, 57-60,
66, 66ft., 67, 72, 103, 105, 107,
126: see also Catholic Syndi¬
cates, C.I.O., etc.

League of Nations, and the, 83, 94,
97, 98, 105-9, 110, 111, 116, 131,
132, 133, 137, 138, 139ft.
manufacturing and manufactures,
3,28, 30,31,37, 40, 44, 91,119ft.,

139, 140, 141.

migration, internal, 19, 21-3, 146.
military, 91, 94, 94ft., 95, 95ft., 98-9,
100, 101, 106, 117, 125, 136, 150.
mineral resources, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 27,

28, 118, 140.

mining, 27, 28, 34, 36, 41, 44, 46,
47, 59, 72, 113.

monopoly, and trend toward, in,
31-3, 55, 57, 66, 71, 80, 81.
national income, 30, 54, 78.

distribution of, 52-7.
national unity and nationhood, 7,
10, 24, 25, 61, 62, 63, 77, 79, 80,
81, 83-6, 98, 100, 101, 109, 113,
115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 125,
128, 132, 137, 138, 141, 146, 147,
150, 151: see also separatist
movement, and French Cana¬
dians, nationalist sentiment,
natural resources, 3, 4, 5, 18, 27, 30,
36, 44-7, 72, 73, 118, 133, 141.
neutrality:

legislation, 125-6, 140.

INDEX

159

Canada— continued
neutrality:

policy of, 100, 101, 121, 123, 126.
preservation of, 91, 93, 101, 102,
117.

problem of, 120-9, 149.
right to, 88, 101, 122, 123, 124,
126, 127, 127w., 128, 136.
Oriental minorities, 4, 9, 13 n., 14,
16, 20, 24.
polar area, and, 1.
political life and thought, 9, 15, 25,
30, 32, 64, 68, 71, 84, 99, 102,
105, 110, 113, 114-5, 117-8, 119,
119n., 132-5, 141.

political parties, 61-8, 69, 141: see
also Conservative Party, Liberal
Party, C.C.F., Social Credit, etc.
attitude to Reciprocity, 10.
population, 3, 3 n., 4, 9-10, 13-26,

45, Sin., 57, 69, 114, 130, 146.
distribution of, 5-7, 13, 14 ff.,

46, Sin., 69.

protectionism: see Canada, tariff.
provincial-Dominion relations, see
Dominion-Provincial relations,
public finance, 33.
pulp and paper, 5, 28, 39.
racial origins and problems, 14^.,
69, 80, 81, 85, 86, 104, 110, 118,
130, 131, 134, 135, 143, 146, 150.
railways, 9, 32, 33-5, 47, 80, 83:
see also Canada, Commissions
and Boards.

religious denominations, 16-8, 24.
Roman Catholics, 3, 16, 17, 18, 24,
52, 57, 64, 67, 71, 73, 84, 110,
111, 113, 135 n., 138.
royal commissions: see Canada,
Commissions and Boards.

Scots, in, 8-9, 14, 17.
secession, 101, 128.

Senate, 9, 61, 61 n., 100 n.
separatist movement, 15, 84.
Socialist movement, see Co-opera¬
tive Commonwealth Federation,
and Socialism and radicalism,
standards of living, 52-7, 141, 145.
staple products, 4, 9, 27, 28, 30,
38-9, 139.

tariff: see also Canada, Commis¬
sions and Boards.

British preferential: see Im¬
perial Preferences,
effects of Confederation on, 7.
general tariff, 43.
policy, 33, 43-4, 48, 61, 62, 139.

Canada— continued
tariff:

protectionist, 9, 33,48,55,62,139.
structure, 43.
timber, 2, 3, 4, 5.
tourist trade, 38, 41, 42, 104.
trade agreements, 43-4, 48, 140:
see also Reciprocity Treaty, West
Indies.

transportation, 2-3, 7, 23, 33-6, 47,
49, 56-7, 83, 90, 113.
costs of, 9, 10, 33, 34.
unemployment, and unemployment
insurance and relief, 9, 19, 20,
20n., 47, 49, 50, 52, Sin., 56, S6n.,
57, 63, 71, 76, 79, 97, 146.
United States, and the, 1, 3, 5, 9,
10, 20, 24n., 34, 36-42, 43, 44, 58,
63, 71, 84-5, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93,
98, 99, 102, 103-5, 114, 115, 116,
117, 118, 131, 132, 133, 137, 138,
139.

war: see War.

water power, 3, 5, 27, 28, 44, 49, 50,
72, 73.

waterways, 2, 3, 34, 35, 36: see also
St. Lawrence and Great Lakes.

Canadian Federation of Labour, 58.

Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, 18n., ISn., 38n., 93, 95«.,
105, 112n., 131, 136-7.

Canadian National Railways, 34, 47,
48. ^

Canadian Northern Railway, 34.

Canadian Pacific Railway, 14, 34, 35,
48. ^

Canadian Pacific Steamships, 36.

Canadian Shield, 2, 4, 5, 27, 34, 36, 46.

“Canadien”, 85w.

“Canuck”, 91 n., 100 n.

Cape Breton, island of, 96.

Catholic Syndicates, 56, 57-8.

C.C.F.: see Co-operative Common¬
wealth Federation.

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Neville, 134.

Chanaq incident (1922), 120.

Chevrier Commission, 55.

Chicago, 35.

China, 87, 89, 92, 108, 116.

Church, Mr. T. L, 148n.

Churchill, port of, 34.

C.I.O.: see Committee for Industrial
Organization.

Coats, Mr. R. H., 102n.

Coldwell, Mr. M. J., 148n.

Collective security and sanctions,
105-9, 127, 132, 133-4, 137, 138,
149, 150.

160

INDEX

Committee for Industrial Organiza¬
tion, 58, 59w., 84, 103n., 105.

Communism, 17, 1 7n., 32, 58, 72, 73,
96.

Communist Party, 67, 135n.

Confederation and the B.N.A. Act, 7,
13, 35, 61, 65, 70, 70»., 71, 72, 75-
82, 84, 115, 121: see also Canada,
federal system and Dominion-Pro¬
vincial relations.

Conscription Act (1917), 85.

Conservative Party, 62-4, 67, 98n.

Constitutional Act (1791), 70.

Co-operative Commonwealth Federa¬
tion, 32, 66-7, 121, 126n., 131.

Co-operative Union of Canada, 59.

Co-operatives, 59-60.

Corbett, Professor P. E., 122n.

Corey, Professor A. B., 102n.

Corporatism, 17, 110.

Czechoslovakia, 148 n.

Dafoe, Mr. J. W., lOn, 132n., 139n.

Daggett, Mr. A. P., 80n.

Dawson, Professor R. MacG., 63 n. 9
64 n., 136n., 147«.

del Val, Mgr. Merry, 110.

Democracy, 95, 96, 97n., 99, 128, 138,
139, 143, 144.

Denmark, S2n.

Doukhobors, 13n., 24.

Duplessis, Hon. Maurice, 73 n.

Easterbrook, Mr. W. T., 50 n.

Eden, Rt. Hon. Anthony, 148n.

Eire, 20, 44, Sin., 122, 129.

Electric power: see Canada, water
power.

Emigration: see Canada.

England, 36, 69, 104, 105: see also
Great Britain.

Eskimos, 13.

Esquimalt, B.C., 91, 95, 115, 117, 124,
127.

Europe, 2, 10, 35, 41, 57, 71, 85, 86,
88,89,92, 93, 94, 100, 107, 108, 109,
111, 115, 116, 120, 133, 136, 137,
138, 140, 141, 144, 150: see also
Canada, Europe and.

Ewart, Mr. J. S., 122n.

Far East:

Canada’s relations with, 2, 133,
140, 141.

Fascism, 17, 73-4, 96, 109.

Feis, Mr. H., 43 n.

Ferguson, Mr. G. V., 66n.

Foreign policy: see Canada.

France, 44, 69, 87, 89, 110, 115, 116,
150.

Franco, General, attitude of Cana¬
dians towards, 17.

French Canadians: see Canada.

Geneva, 105, 106, 108, 114n., 132,
134, 137, 138.

Germany, 44, 87, 88, 89, 92, 96, 115,
116, 134.

Gibson, Mr. J. D., 38«., 40n.
Glazebrook, Professor G. deT., 95w.
Gouin, Monsieur L. M., 70n.

Grand Trunk Pacific, 34.

Grand Trunk Railway, 34.

Great Britain, 52«., 59, 85, 101, 108,
109, 111, 122, 123, 124, 125n., 128,
134, 139, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148,
150.

Canada, and, 2, 10, 13, 16, 36-42,
43-4, 76-8, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95,
96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106, 114, 115, 116, 117,
120, 122, 123, 125n., 127, 131,
132, 133, 137, 139, 146, 149.
foreign policy, 88.

Great Lakes, 2, 3, 34, 35.

Hague, The, 8 7n.

Haldane, Lord, 77.

Halifax, port and harbour of, 2, 80,
90, 91, 115, 117, 124, 127: see also
Nova Scotia.

Hancock, Professor W. K., 122 n.,
14 6n.

Hepburn, Hon. Mitchell F., 59 n. } 71,
103«.

Hitler, Herr Adolf, 92, 134.
Hoare-Laval Proposals, 134.

Hodson, Mr. H. V., 128 n.

Holland, 87n.

Hudon, Monsieur T., 70n.

Hudson Bay, 2, 13«., 34.

Hurd, Professor W. B., 14 n., lln.,
22«., 2 Sn. '

Hydro-electric: see Canada, water
power.

Immigration: see Canada.

Imperial Airways, 36.

Imperial Conferences, 98, 127, 147w.,
148.

(1926), 120, 147n.

(1930), U7n.

(1937), 98, 123, U8n.

Imperial Preferences, 43, 62, 99, 118.

Imperial relations:

communications, 2, 36.

Indians, Red, 13, 13m.

Innis, Professor H. A., 30 m., 3In.,
33m., 34m., 35 m., 57m.

International Federation of Trades
Unions, 57m.

International Labour Conference: see
League of Nations, I.L.O.

International Labour Organization:
see League of Nations, I.L.O.

Ireland, 71.
northern, 20.

Irish Free State: see Eire.

Isolation policy, 17, 109, 116, 127,
132, 133, 134, 135, 135n., 136, 140,
141.

Italy, 87, 89, 106, 110, 115.

attitude of Canadians towards, 17.

Japan, 41, 44, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 97,
106, 111, 115, 116, 134, 140: see
also Canada, Japanese minority.
Jennings, Dr. W. I., 80m.

Keith, Professor A. B., 122m.
Kennedy, Professor W. P. M., 122m.
Khartoum incident, 120.

King, Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, 49,
51, 61, 90, 92, 92 m., 95, 106, 106m.,
120, 123-4, 131, 136-8, 141, 148m.

Labrador, 1, 5.

Lapointe, Rt. Hon. Ernest, 98m., 124,
124m.

Latham, Mr. A. B., 58m.

Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 120, 136m.
Lavergne, Monsieur A., 72.

League of Nations, 52, 121, 134, 149,

attitude of Canadians towards, 17,
18.

Canada, and, 83, 85m., 94, 98, 105-9,
110, 111, 116, 131, 132, 133, 137,
138, 139m.

I.L.O., 107.

League of Nations Society in Canada,

80m., 131.

League for Social Reconstruction,

32m., 54m., 75m., 141m.

Le Devoir , 10m.

Lewis, Mr. J. L., 84, 105.

Liberal Party, 61-2, 63, 64, 71, 73m.,
98m.

Lippmann, Mr. Walter, 97m.
Liverpool, 2.

Lloyd’s list, 36m.

161

Locarno Treaty, 120.

Logan, Professor H. A., 58m., 103m.
London, 80, 87, 98, 99, 103, 114,
114m., 127.

Long, Mr. B. K., 128m.

Lower, Professor A. R. M., 45m., 71m.,
85m.

Macdonald, Sir John A., 120.
MacGregor, Professor D. C., 33m.
MacKay, Professor R. A., 63m.
MacKay and Rogers, Canada Looks
Abroad , 16m., 25m., 35m., 91m., 94m.,
120m., 122m., 124m., 126m., 131m.
Mackenzie, Hon. Ian, 91m., 94m.,
132m.

Mackintosh, Professor W. A., 45m.
McLaren, Professor W. W., 102m.
MacLean, Mr. M. C., and Hurd, Pro¬
fessor W. B., 25m.,

Maine, U.S.A., 34.

Manchuria, 106, 108, 134.

Manitoba, 4, 49, 60, 65, 67, 69, 110.
Maritime Provinces, 3, 7, 9, 34, 40,
75, 81, 90, 99, 103.
population of, 3, 3m., 7, 15, 19, 30.
Marquis: see Wheat.

Marsh, Professor L. C., 53m.
Marshall, Southard, and Taylor,
Canadian-A meric an Industry, 37 m.
Mediterranean, 89.

Mexico, 73m., 116.

Canadian investments in, 33.
Minnesota, U.S.A., 47.

Molloy, Hon. John Patrick, 135m.
Monroe Doctrine, 88, 91, 92, 115, 116.
Montreal, 3, 10m., 17, 53, 55, 65, 73m.,
80, 90.

Moscow, 17.

Neutrality: see Canada.

New Brunswick, 3, 13, 13m. 2, 15, 49,
51, 67, 69, 90.

New England states:

Canada’s relation to, 7, 13, 103.
French Canadians in, 15m., 103.
Newfoundland:

Canada, and, 2, 20, 47.
dominion status, and, 2.

Labrador, and, 1.

New Hampshire, U.S.A., re minimum
wages, 51m.

New York, 38.

New Zealand, 20, 44, 59, 121, 140.
North America, 1, 10, 23, 36, 42, 59,
70, 85, 95, 102, 103, 104, 107, 109,
110, 113, 130, 135, 138.

Northwest Territories, 3, 69.

162

INDEX

Norway, In., 66, 12 5n., 144.

Nova Scotia, 1, 3, 13, 13*., 45, 47, 49,
60, 90, 91.

Oceania, 42.

One Big Union, 58.

Ontario, 3-4, 9, 13, 13*.2, 15, 21, 22,
24, 30, 35, 40,49, 51, 52, 52n., 54*.,
55, 56, 59*., 60, 62, 68, 69, 71, 72,
99, 103, 113.

Orientals: see Canada.

Ottawa, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70*., 74, 80,
81, 98, 114, 127, 129, 130.

Ottawa Agreements: see British Com¬
monwealth.

Pacific Coast and Ocean, 1, 2, 4, 9,
16, 34, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 94*.,
97, 103, 111, 115.

Padlock Act: see Quebec.

Palmer, Mr. G. E. H., Consultation
and Co-operation in the British Com¬
monwealth , 144*.

Panama, 111.

Panama Canal, 2, 34, 35.

Pan-American Union, 105, 117, 133.

Paris, 114*.

Peru, 111.

Plumptre, Professor A. F. W., 30*.,
31*., 33*., 34*., 35*., 38*., 40*.,
57*.

Poland, 44, 87.

Prairie Provinces, 3*., 4, 9, 15, 16, 21,
23, 30, 40, 45, 52, 56, 65, 81, 99,
103, 113.

Pre-Cambrian Shield: see Canadian
Shield.

Prince Edward Island, 3, 50, 60.

Privy Council:

aerial navigation, on, 48.
appeals to, 65*., 77, 78, 98, 98*.,

defines limits of Labrador, 1.
interpretations, 76-8, 79, 80, 80*.,
81,119.

invalidates legislation, 49, 51, 107.
upholds legislation on unfair trade
practices, 49.

Pulp and paper: see Canada.

Quebec, 3-4, 9, 13*.2, 15, 15*., 17,
19, 21, 22, 24, 24*., 30, 35, 40, 51,
52, 52*., 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 67,
68, 69-74, 83, 85, 99, 103, 108, 110,
113, 141.

Padlock Act, 17*., 72, 73.

Quebec Act (1774), 70.

Reciprocity Treaty, Canada-
U.S.A., (1911), 10, 84.

(1935), 10, 41, 43, 63.
Reconstruction Party, 32,66,66*.,67.
Reid, Mr. Escott, 106*., 136, 137,
137*.

Reward: see Wheat.

Rhodesia:

Canadian investments in, 33.
Southern, 44.

Rome, 110.

Roosevelt, President Franklin D.,
38*., 104, 105.

Rowell Commission: see Canada, Do¬
minion-Provincial relations, Royal
Commission on.

Russia: see U.S.S.R.

“S” 74*.

Saint John, N.B., 90.

Saint Lawrence:

Gulf of, 2.
river, 2, 3, 35, 90.
valley, 3, 69.

Saint Lawrence Waterways Treaty,
35, 63.

Sanctions: see Collective security.
Saskatchewan, 4, 7, 13*., 24, 49, 51,
52*., 54, 54*., 65, 66*., 67, 69.
Scott, Professor F. R., 122*., 131*.
Siegfried, Monsieur Andre, 25, 38*.,

64, 70*., 110, 130.

Simon, Sir John, 106.

Social Credit, 18, 32, 60, 65-6, 83, 141.
Socialism and radicalism, 32, 56, 64,

65, 66, 66*., 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 105,
135*., 141.

South Africa, Union of, 20, 44, 98,
100, 122, 129.

South America, 42, 89,111-2,114,116.
Soward, Professor F. H., 112, 135*.
Spain: see War, Spanish.

Stevens, Hon. H. H., 32, 67.

Sverdrup Islands, In.

Sweden, 52*., 66, 125*., 144.

Sydney, N.S., 90, 91.

Tariff: see Canada, Tariff.

Taylor, Professor K. W., 32*., 37*.,
44*.

Tokyo, 88, 111, 114*.

Toronto, 3, 28, 65, 67.

Toynbee, Professor A. J., 108*., 121*.
Trade Agreements: see Canada.
Trades and Labour Congress of Can¬
ada, 23*., 58, 126*.

Trades Unions: see Canada, labour
organizations.

INDEX 163

Transportation: see Canada, trans¬
portation, and railways; Saint
Lawrence; and Great Lakes.

Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 13.

Trotter, Professor R. G., 102*., 114*.

Tupper, Sir Charles, 120.

Underhill Professor F. H., 63*.,
121 *., 132*.

Union Rationale , 68, 71-4, 141.

United Empire Loyalists, 13, 16.

United Kingdom: see Great Britain.

United States, 52, 52*., 57, 58, 64, 69,
71, 75, 79, 93, 97, 97*., 100, 124,
140, 141.

boundary with Canada, 1, 3, 5, 9,
102, 103, 104.

Canadian attitude towards, 84-5,
133.

Canadians living in, 16, 19, 103.
relations with Canada, 10, 20, 24*.,
36-42, 43, 44, 58, 63, 87, 88, 89,
91, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103-5,
110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 131,
132, 137, 138, 139.

U.S.S.R., 36, 73*., 85, 87, 89, 92,
115, 116, 140-1.

Vancouver, City of, 2, 28, 80, 91.

Vancouver Island, 97.

War:

Abyssinian, attitude of Canadians
towards, 17, 107, 108, 134.
Canada’s isolation, and, 12, 86, 107,
109, 116, 120, 127*., 132, 133.

W a r —continued

future, 71, 85, 86, 87-94, 95, 96,
101, 106, 109, 120, 121*., 125*.,
132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139,
144, 150.

Sino-Japanese, Canada’s attitude
towards, 111, 140.

Spanish, attitude of Canadians to¬
wards belligerents in, 17, 108,
110, 111, 125, 126, 134, 140.

World, (1914-18), 13*., 83, 100,
105, 115, 140, 144.

Ware, Professor N. J., 58*., 103*.

Washington Conferences and Treat¬
ies, 111, 114*.

Watson, Lord, 77, 78.

West Indies, trade agreement with

Canada (1926), 48.

Westminster, Statute of, (1931), 121.

Wheat, 30, 46, 52, 63, 118.

Hudson Bay route, and, 2, 34.

Marquis, 7.

production in Canada, 4, 27, 30, 46,
118, 139.

Reward, 7.

trade, Canada’s, 2, 27, 30, 33, 35,
44, 46.

Wilgus, Colonel Wm. J., 1*. 1.

Willert, Sir A., 128*.

Winnipeg, 28, 66, 126*.

Woodsworth, Mr. J. S., 54*., 66,

127*., 148.

Yokohama, 2.

Yukon, 3*.

}

International Affairs, Book One

CANADA,
the PACIFIC,
and WAR

by William Strange

In fifty years Japan has leapt from comparative
obscurity to a position whence she can challenge
the peace of the world. The possibilities that he
in the present war in China are of more grave con¬
cern to Canadians than many may realize. This
book has been written in an attempt to clarify the
Canadian view of the Pacific in general, and to
give the thoughtful Canadian a background
against which he can more intelligently compre¬
hend the day-to-day events of the Far East as
reported in his daily newspaper. Published in
November, 1937, under the auspices of the Cana¬
dian Institute of International Affairs.

A clear and well-informed book upon the Far Eastern
problem and Canada’s relation to it.

—London Morning Telegraph .

Canada , the Pacific and War offers in brief compass
an excellently clear and non-technical introduction to
the problems of the Pacific. — Queen’s Quarterly.

Writing with remarkably clear vision, Mr. Strange
sums up the dangers of the present situation. . . . His
well-written book with its balanced judgment and
evidence of careful investigation will arouse many ques¬
tions, and deserves close examination by those who
realize that “the peace, the very civilization of the
West, as well as the East, are at stake.” — Overseas .

Very useful book. . . . Treats one aspect of Cana¬
dian affairs which has heretofore received little atten¬
tion. Outlining the relation of the Dominion to the
struggle for power in the Pacific, Mr. Strange contem¬
plates the danger of war to Canadian safety. In
stimulating journalese, he raises many problems of
coastal defense which should interest citizens of both
Canada and the United States.

— Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York).

$1.75

Price in Great Britain 7/6

THOMAS NELSON & SONS, LIMITED

91 Wellington Street West
TORONTO

CANADA LOOKS ABROAD

R. A. MACKAY and E. B. ROGERS

Price:—$3.00 in Canada; 12/6 in Great Britain; $3.50 in U.S.A.

Peace theories and pacts have collapsed, ‘power’ politics, with the
slogan ‘might is right’ have taken the field, and Canada—with the
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be formulated now, and this book, CANADA LOOKS ABROAD,
answers a very pressing need in giving an unbiased and authoritative
survey of all the facts about Canada which are of importance in de¬
termining this policy, and which should be considered by every
intelligent citizen.

Part I of this book gives a sound geographical and economic back¬
ground; Part II traces the historical development of Canada’s foreign
policy; Part III studies the machinery of this part of government,
with chapters on treaty power and neutrality; Part IV suggests four
policies for the future, with the logical arguments for each. An
appendix gives the text of important documents and speeches, and
the book is carefully documented and annotated throughout.

Comments from reviewers —

One of the most significant and important studies in Canadian
public policy undertaken in recent years. It ought to be read by all
editors, parliamentarians, students, and intelligent citizens.

—Financial Post .

The first comprehensive survey of the Dominion’s external rela¬
tions. Carefully organized and objectively written, with relevant
documents and bibliography, it represents a masterly handling of
complex and difficult problems. Americans who are interested in the
attitude of their northern neighbors toward foreign affairs will find
here an intelligent and provocative approach to such problems as
neutrality, collective security, and empire co-operation.

—Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York).

A thorough treatment of the subject, “a stock-taking” . . . which
takes rank as the indispensable reference work in the field.

—Canadian Historical Review .

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

480 University Avenue
TORONTO

Issued under the auspices of the

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PRINTED IN CANADA

SAT

A Decade of League

URDAY NIGHT January 24, 1942

For Social Reconstruction

BY F. R. SCOTT

Has there ever been as much social change in any decade as in that
between 1932 and 1942?

That period is the lifetime of the League for Social Reconstruction,
which, founded in Toronto in January 1932, has seen quite a lot of
its ideas come true and others come at least nearer to realization.

Professor F. R. Scott of McGill, who was one of the original members,
here sketches the work of the League and suggests that there is still
need for thinking about the future of Canada.

T EN years ago, in January 1932,
about eighteen people met in Tor¬
onto to draft a manifesto for a new
social order in Canada. So large an
undertaking for so small a group
was undoubtedly presumptuous, the
more so as most of them were pro¬
fessors—men, that is, whose ideas
about practical affairs were by def¬
inition academic and hence untrust¬
worthy. Those were days when the
aura of infallibility had not yet worn
off the captains of industry, though
in places it was wearing thin; nor had
“brain trusts” yet become an accept¬
ed institution of government.

However the world was due for
great changes, that was clear, and
these individuals were determined to
create an organization through which
to dissiminate their views about the
future. Thus was born the League
for Social Reconstruction. It defined
itself as “an association of men and
women who are working for the
establishment in Canada of a social
order in which the basic principle
regulating production, distribution
and service will be the common good
rather than private profit.” The sub¬
stitution of democratic planning for
capitalist anarchy was the central
idea of the movement.

Ten years is a short time in
the life of human communities. Great
changes come slowly, perhaps partic¬
ularly slowly in Canada, a country
which has not yet fully awakened
from the long sleep of colonialism.
But future historians will probably
consider the decade of the 1930’s as
being one of the most compressed
periods of revolutionary change that
the world has ever known. To gain
some measure of how far we have
moved, even in Canada, let the read¬
er substitute the words “war effort”
for the words “common good” in the
L.S.R. statement and then ask him¬
self whether the amended declara¬
tion of purpose would not be accepted
by 95% of Canadians today.

If, by subordinating private profit
to “w'ct't' effort” we can produce the
astonishing increase of physical goods
and services now evident in Canada

by comparison with 1932, why could
we not have produced the same in¬
crease before the war by subordinat¬
ing private profit to the “common
good”? The war effort needs ships,
guns, planes, tanks. The common
good needs houses, schools, hospitals,
roads, libraries, museums and more
goods and services of all kinds. One
is as easy to supply as the other.

The only thing wrong with the
L.S.R. idea, it seems, was that we
did not adopt it. Now we have been
forced toward it by the war emer¬
gency. Mr. Hitler has been more
persuasive than all the L.S.R. pub¬
lications. Changing the economic
system, it becomes clear, is primarily
a problem of changing our habits of
mind.

T HE L.S.R. achievements in the
way of publications have not been
spectacular. It took as its model the
Fabian Society, the early tutor of the
British Labor Party. Even Canadian
radicals have their imperialist con¬
nections; or perhaps it would be tru¬
er to say that they must look out¬
side the “Tory Dominion,” as the
New Statesman has called us, for
their inspiration. The American
League for Industrial Democracy was
another model consciously followed.
But it is easier to copy an organiza¬
tion than to reproduce its personnel,
and Canada could have used a
Beatrice and a Sydney Webb. More
particularly did we need a Bernard
Shaw and an H. G. Wells; men, that
is, who could inject new ideas with

the needle of art rather than through
an attempt to feed the patient with
the tough meat of statistics and eco¬
nomic analysis. But alas, all Can¬
adian art has done for us is to teach
us to admire our landscape through
pictures; it has not yet opened our
eyes to our social \lces or portrayed
for us a glorious future. Yet this
seems the only way to reach the mul¬
titude.

Nevertheless the L.S.R. did not per¬
haps do so badly, using such poor
things as Frank Underhill, King Gor¬
don, Eugene Forsey, Leonard Marsh,

J. F. Parkinson, Graham Spry,
George Grube and others. Its major
work was the preparation and, rather •
surprisingly to itself, the publication
of Social Planning for Canada. Into
that cumbersome and rather disjoint¬
ed volume went the arguments, the
complaints, possibly the vision, of
the planners. Though only seven men
signed their names as co-authors of
the book, its actual writing and com¬
pilation was the result of the joint
effort of fully twenty-five individuals
who might with some fairness be
classed as experts in their fields.

No doubt this collective cooking is
evident in the broth. Still the book
sold, thus meeting the final test of
capitalism. It ran through a second
printing, and the royalties financed
the L.S.R. for another two years. Not
a little of the credit for this success
must be given to the anonymous pam¬
phleteer (well known to the members
of the L.S.R.) who wrote a sixty page
attack on the volume and its perni-
• cious ideas, and had his diatribe dis¬
tributed from the head office of his
employers, one of the largest cor¬
porations in Canada, to a number
of business men. That sent the sale
up by the hundreds.

npHE only other book to be pub-
lished by the L.S.R. was Democ¬
racy needs Socialism, intended as a
more popular version of Social Plan¬
ning for Canada. It is doubtful if the
L.S.R. could ever be popular in any
sense of the term, and this second
venture received, as it deserved, less
attention than its predecessor, though
managing to dispose of itself in due
time. Then there were a number of
pamphlets brought out during the
decade; Combines and the Consumer,
Dividends and the Depression, So¬
cial Reconstruction and the B.N.A.
Act, Does Canada Need Immigrants?
The Church and the Economic
Order, Recovery—For Whom?, Pion¬
eers in Poverty, Rich Man—Poor
Man.

These did not achieve the wide
scale that pamphlets must if they are
to result in political change, but no
doubt helped to spread the L.S.R.
ideas. The L.S.R. also presented a
brief to the Sirois Commission (who
did not?), subsequently published
under the title Canada, One or Nine?,
the proposals of which can truthful¬
ly be said to have found a very con¬
siderable degree of acceptance in the
final recommendations of the Com¬
mission. The L.S.R. bought, and
saved from bankruptcy, the Cana¬
dian Forum, which it still owns.
L.S.R. members, too, have done their
fair share of public lecturing, both to
their own and to other groups. At
one time the organization had as
many as twelve branches.

F ROM the very first the relation¬
ship between the L.S.R. and the
C.C.F. caused some concern. Ob¬
viously both were aiming at the same
kind of new social order. But the
L.S.R. carefully refrained from af¬
filiating with the C.C.F., so as to
preserve its independence and its
right to criticize. Hence L.S.R. pub-

SUCCESS
^ SIGNALS

GAIN IN FORCE

EXPENSE

SURPLUS

ASSETS

During 1941, new settled business
both ordinary and group, showed sub¬
stantial increases. The amount of
business in force was increased by
$2,956,056. Total business in force
now stands at the highest point in
Company history.

During 1941, total expenses of opera¬
tion were reduced for the sixth
successive year.

Earnings during the year were well
maintained. These earnings were used
to write down assets and to strengthen
still further the security standing be¬
hind the Company’s policy contracts.

During the year, total ledger assets
were increased to $13,603,606.32.
This is the highest total in Company
history.

National Life

Assurance Company

of Canada

Home Office
Toronto

Established
18 9 7

lications are not official C.C.F. pub¬
lications. The L.S.R., too, was first
in the field, for the C.C.F. was not
formed till July, 1932. It is interest¬
ing to note however that the political
party was formed entirely independ¬
ently of the intellectual movement,
for no L.S.R. members attended the
Calgary meeting at which the C.C.F.
was organized. Mr. Woodsworth, it
is true, was president of both move¬
ments—but then nothing progressive
and democratic could occur in those
days without J. S. Woodsworth be¬
ing somewhere in the picture. It
was not long before most L.S.R. mem¬
bers became individual members of
the C.C.F., and a comparison between
the Regina manifesto of the C.C.F. in
1933 and the L.S.R. manifesto of
1932 will indicate the degree of in¬
fluence which the eastern theoreti¬
cians had upon the western political
movement.

Persecution? Some, but perhaps
not more than was to be expected in
a movement starting where it did
at the time it did. There were some
near escapes from loss of positions,
and one prominent member of the in¬
ner L.S.R. group was deprived of his
post in a Canadian college. His exile

to Siberia meant a new and success¬
ful career in the United States. Such
things occur even in the best democ
racies. The Canadian touch was the
later discovery that a prominent
member of his Board of Trustees was
connected with a corporation that
had failed to fulfil all its obligations
with respect to corporation taxes.

Today, after ten years, the L.S.R.
has virtually ceased to function as
an organization. There has been a
dispersal of leaders, and the actual¬
ities of politics, particularly since
the new advances of the C.C.F., seem
more attractive today than the pur¬
suit of theoretic truth. This is per¬
haps a pity, for if ever Canadians
should be concerned about their
future it is now. Victory must be
won, but it is going to require more
than military victory to steer us
through the coming years: the total
elimination of Canada is more like¬
ly to occur through annexation to
the United States than through occu¬
pation by Hitler. We shall only sur¬
vive as a nation if we have a live
ideal of ourselves as a nation. The
L.S.R. has contributed a great deal
toward the formulation of that ideal.

“ ,. . that owing to a disastrous
power plant explosion our war produc¬
tion has been seriously curtailed and
we are forced to withdraw entirely from
civilian production.”

power-plant safety measures ...
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VV7HEN accidents like the
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of halted production.

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An experience of 65 years—an
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aid quickly . . . These are some
of the advantages which give a
Boiler Inspection policy a price¬
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total oi its 22 competitors.

The Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co.

908 FEDERAL BLDG.
TORONTO

of Canada

806 THE BANK OF NOVA
SCOTIA BLDG., MONTREAL

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